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Foreword
As sharply illustrated in this book, despite the common ancient root in
Latin, the meaning of resilience changes from discipline to discipline,
from domain to domain, from perspective to perspective. In recent years,
the very term resilience has attracted such increasing scholarly attention
that it has acquired centrality in managerial debate, becoming a jargon
or portmanteau term; an issue of ambiguity that this book is very clearly
addressing, by weaving back and forth in reconstructing the very complex
texture of resilience via an exhaustive, cross-sectoral and multi-disciplinary
perspective.
In the very days in which this book sees the light, the world is facing
the Covid-19 pandemic: an unprecedented jolt and shock to our personal,
professional, organizational and communitarian lives. As often happens
in times of crisis, politicians and decision-makers are encouraging us to
be resilient, and promote the nurturing of resilience at all levels (as
citizens, individual workers, teams, organizations and communities). A
question legitimately arises, though: Is resilience itself resilient enough to
be employed in these troubled days?
To get rid of the potential tautology, some further reflection may be
found useful. I like to frame resilience in the light of the Chinese proverb
“When the winds of change blow, some people build walls and others
build windmills” (Gallo, 2015; Giustiniano et al., 2020), as the capacity to
build walls and windmills at the same time, boasting the ability to absorb
shocks and endure, to be “sponge and titanium” (Giustiniano & Cantoni,
v
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2018). To do so, one might accept that resilience, however defined, is a
complex construct made of opposing tensions (e.g. executing vs. learning,
rethinking vs. adapting). As the book unshyly reveals, such tensions are
paradoxically intertwined (Giustiniano et al., 2018); hence, resilience has
a paradoxical side. To this extent, the practice of resilience can be seen
as “paradox work” with managers and policy makers called to resourcing
their organizations under tension. The cases presented in the book show
that the attempt—and sometimes the achievement—of resilience can be
pursued by identifying new scopes of meaning (situational, organiza-
tional or institutional) and by extending the very frameworks in which
organizational life takes place (see also Schneider, Bullinger & Brandl,
2020).
As organizational life relies on resilience, it’s necessary to remember
that resilience is not based on individuals but on collectives: entire
communities can express resilience, even in the absence of resilient
members; on the contrary, a group of resilient individuals does not
guarantee a resilient team (for example, if a collaborative atmosphere is
lacking).
What’s feeding such a resilient life, then? Learning appears to be the
main course on the menu, and in particular keeping the capacity of
“learning to learn” active and energetic. “Learning to learn” is about
nurturing generative doubt (Välikangas & Romme, 2013), by returning
to a sense of mission, requalifying and reinventing a new sense of orga-
nizational purpose, while asking “why are we doing this?” Resilience
emerges as a paradoxical force: Risk factors can destroy, but where they
do not, resilience can be energized. While a group of resilient individuals
does not guarantee a resilient team (for example, if it lacks a collabora-
tive and socially supportive culture), resilience is based not on individuals
alone but collectives; entire communities can express resilience, even in
the absence of resilient members. Similar to other related constructs (e.g.
grit), therefore, the presence of resilience does not grant the spread of
resilience. In fact, for resilience to escalate to higher levels of aggregation
(e.g. from the individual to the teams), it must be expressed by indi-
viduals, conveyed towards the others and perceived by the receivers (see
Rego et al., 2020). Hence, as clearly illustrated in the many cases reported
in the book, for organizations and communities to survive and flourish,
policy makers, managers and professionals should consider resilience as
the achievement and maintenance of “positive adaptation”, as reactive
organizational experimentation out of the ordinary, building on paradox
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work and a paradoxical mindset (Miron-Spektor et al., 2018). Nonethe-
less, as the book gently suggests, “too much of a good thing can be
a bad thing”. As reality reports, an extreme concern for resilience may
induce people to become overly persistent in seeking to achieve unattain-
able goals or overly tolerant of adversity (like tolerating demoralizing jobs,
toxic bosses or dangerous working conditions). Additionally, “unwanted
phenomena” (crime, a cancer) can engender resilience.
In synthesis, I believe the construct of resilience can boost resilience
even in times of unprecedented uncertainty and ambiguity, both as
a construct in the academic debate and as a feature for managerial
practice. For that to happen, though, it must be approached from a
multi-disciplinary perspective and pursued with a strong-willed agency by
organizational leaders, as this book sharply suggests.
November 2020 Luca Giustiniano
Full Professor of Organization
Studies and Director of the
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resilience has become central in various social science domains (Fisher
et al., 2019; Linnenluecke, 2017; Williams et al., 2017) and consti-
tutes a suitable concept for tackling contexts or situations that appear
to be increasingly volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA).
Resilience emerged out of a general discontent with linear and reduc-
tionist perspectives in science and provides a more holistic approach
to understanding an increasingly interconnected, dynamic and complex
world. So-called ‘wicked problems’ (cf. Head, 2008) or ‘grand chal-
lenges’ (United Nations1)—such as climate change, poverty and racial
and gender equality—are thought to be impossible to address without
resorting to a more holistic view that brings together different disci-
plinary, theoretical and conceptual perspectives and explores both the
social entities in question and the nested systems and interrelation-
ships in which they are embedded. Extant research on resilience from
different research perspectives has ascertained that the phenomenon is
multifaceted (e.g. Giustiniano et al., 2018; Ruth & Goessling-Reisemann,
2019; Walker & Salt, 2006), making multidisciplinarity both essential to
addressing resilience as a phenomenon and a theory.
Resilience has been the target of numerous studies in recent years, and
it has gathered momentum (Manyena, 2006). A quick google scholar
search (27.05.2020) of the term ‘resilience’ in the period 2000–2020
yielded 1.27 million results, 97% of which occurred in the last decade
alone, attesting to the popularity of the concept/phenomena among
scientists. Scholars within the fields of environmental studies/science and
psychiatry were rather prominent (Table 1.1).
In a recent literature review, Giustiniano et al. (2018, pp. 18–19) iden-
tify 20 influential scientific papers on resilience between 1973 and 2017.
Twelve belonged to the management/business/administrative sciences
literature, while the rest pertained to the fields of psychology, ecology
and cybernetics. Bhamra’s (2016, p. 17) analysis of the state of the art of
resilience studies (108 papers; 1973–2015) identified the following five
key perspectives in descending order of importance/number of influential
papers: organizational, socio-ecological/community, individual, ecolog-
ical and supply chain. Behaviour and dynamics were the most prevalent
concepts, featuring in the majority (68%) of the publications, ‘possibly
due to theoretical and conceptual features of the concept of resilience
1 Online at: https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/global-issues-overview/.
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Table 1.1 Resilience papers (title) by disciplinary domain (2010–2020)
Source Web of Science
being developed’ (ibid.). Other topics of significant weight were capa-
bility, strategy and performance. This shows that resilience has become
highly multidisciplinary, and each discipline has brought forward its own
definitions and central bibliographical references. Regarding methodolog-
ical approaches, theory building and case studies ranked highest, and
surveys were the least preferred: ‘as the area of resilience-based research
has developed, the focus has become increasingly empirically focused’
(ibid.), and there is ample room for theoretical elaboration.
The Concept of Resilience
As a scientific term, ‘resilience’ originates from engineering and physics
and denotes elasticity under pressure (Giustiniano et al., 2018, p. 14).
The term derives from the Latin verb salire (climb or jump) and in
particular from its extension, resilire, which means to jump back or
recoil (Giustiniano et al., 2018; see also Zolli, 2012). Ontologically
speaking, resilience thinking pertains to the investigation of complex,
interconnected and emergent patterns of relations among entities and
their respective sub-entities (Grove, 2018, p. 19). As far as the existing
definitions are concerned (Table 1.2), Bhamra (2016) argues that ‘regard-
less of context, the [multifaceted] concept of resilience relates to achieving
stability within the functioning of an element or system’ (p. 18).
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Table 1.2 Definitions of resilience
Author Context Definition
Coutu (2002) Individual Resilient individuals possess
three common characteristics:
an acceptance of reality, a
strong belief that life is
meaningful, and the ability
to improvise
Bruneau et al. (2003) Disaster management The ability of social units to
mitigate hazards, contain the
effects of disasters when they
occur, and carry out recovery
activities that minimise social
disruption and mitigate the
effects of future events
Bodin and Wiman (2004) Physical systems The speed at which a system




McDonald (2006) Organisational Adapting to the requirements
of the environment and
being able to manage the
environment’s variability
Zolli (2012) Socioecology The capacity of a system,
enterprise, or person to
maintain its core purpose and
integrity in the face of
dramatically changed
circumstances
Walker et al. (2014) Ecological systems The capacity of a system to






Sociotechnical systems Protect a system’s integrity
by strengthening links to
other systems and tolerating
or even fostering structural
changes
(continued)





Multi-level governance The ability to face shocks
and persistent structural
changes in such a way that
societal well-being is
preserved without
compromising the heritage of
future generations
Sources Adapted from Bhamra et al. (2011, pp. 5379–5380), Zolli (2012, p. 7), Schaffer and
Schneider (2019, p. 8), European Commission (2019)2
In general, resilience is a property of societal systems, individuals, orga-
nizations and organizational fields that enables them to survive despite
minor or major disruptions (de Bruijne et al., 2010; Ramanujam &
Roberts, 2018; Walker & Salt, 2006; Weick et al., 1999; Westrum, 2006;
Zolli, 2012). There are two basic perspectives on resilience; they concern:
(a) the ability of systems of any kind, including individuals, to bounce
back to a state of normality following disruptive and often unexpected
events or crises (e.g. how a forest grows again after a fire), and (b) the flex-
ibility to adjust to new, emergent situations without crossing a threshold
(e.g. how a forest might adjust to climate change without becoming a
quasi-desert).
To some extent, the phenomenon of resilience can be seen as an
elaboration of existing theories that frame the interactions between
organizations and an increasingly unstable and unpredictable external
environment. According to the classic perspective within organizational
studies of contingency theory (e.g. Donaldson, 2001) observed outcomes
(e.g. striving, survival, etc.) result from a ‘fit’ or match between environ-
mental imperatives and internal designs or structures. The environment is
represented as a list of potential threats that, through the construction of
probabilities and scenarios of risk analysis, can be ranked according to risk
and uncertainty. This approach allows researchers to focus on the devel-
opment of effective responses to those categorized situations. A deeper
awareness of environmental complexity and volatility, probably due to
2 Online at: https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/en/research/crosscutting-activities/resilience.
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the unprecedented interconnectedness of the world, has recently chal-
lenged the possibility of limiting response elaboration to proper actions
related to probable contingencies. Systems thinkers have been signalling
this interconnectedness since the 1970s (e.g. Meadows et al., 1972), but
little attention was paid to indeterminateness until more recent years
when researchers started casting doubt on the determinateness of the
world and the ability of humans and organizations to understand it—e.g.
Weick and Sutcliffe’s (2001) ‘Expecting the unexpected’ and Bazerman
and Watkins’ (2004) ‘Predictable surprises’ (Frigotto, 2018). The envi-
ronment has proved to be hard to classify into precise probable events,
because the world is characterized by Knightian ‘ignorance’, rather than
by ‘risk’ and ‘uncertainty’ (Knight, 1921). In fact, ‘risk’ relates to a situ-
ation in which probabilities are given, and ‘uncertainty’ to cases in which
states are naturally defined but the translation into probabilities is not;
‘ignorance’ refers to situations in which states are neither naturally given
nor easily constructed (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1995, p. 622). The concept
of resilience has gained momentum in the last decade, as it can capture
this change of perspective. This change also implies a shift in the abilities
of individuals, organizations and societies to address the shifts in environ-
ment: from the ability to classify it to the ability to resist it, with little
importance attributed to the definition of the disturbance, and ideally,
independently of the source, form and manifestation of the disturbance.
Although resilience embodies a holistic response that is appropriate
to the VUCA: (volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity) world
of today, the way in which it has been imported from engineering and
physics to the social sciences has brought to the fore some unaddressed
issues that, in our view, diminish the potential of the extant literature to
serve as a foundation for a thorough resilience framework. In the social
sciences, definitions of ‘resilience’ (Table 1.2) include the ability of a
social entity—i.e. an individual, organization, or system—to respond to
and recover from disturbances (Linnenluecke, 2017). The concept has
been transferred from the realms of physics and engineering to the realm
of social action with a metaphorical meaning and, as noted by Carpenter
et al. (2001), this has led to an increasing ambiguity in theoretical under-
standings, operationalizations and measurements (2001, p. 767). The
discourse on resilience has typically focused on one level of analysis at a
time and has developed within specific disciplines. For example, books on
resilience from an organizational perspective tend to have a narrow rather
than a systemic or holistic approach, for instance, focusing on topics such
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as learning and/or the role of leaders (Kayes, 2015; Pirotti, & Venzin,
2016). Other seminal contributions in the field tend to be more concep-
tual in nature (Giustiniano et al., 2018) or pay considerable attention to
certain subsystems such as ecology (Walker & Salt, 2006) and sociotech-
nical systems (Ruth & Goessling-Reiseman, 2019). Within this landscape
of flourishing and diverse literature, this edited volume advances an orig-
inal perspective on resilience in organizations and societies that combines
empirical evidence and theoretical developments at different levels of anal-
ysis, from a multiplicity of disciplinary backgrounds and perspectives, as
well as, sectors of the economy.
Missing Links on Resilience: Five Key Questions
In this section, we provide a brief overview of five key questions that
need to be addressed in order to reach the next step of resilience theory
development and empirical understanding.
In physics, resilience refers to a precise kind of disturbance, namely
the ability of a system (typically a material) to absorb energy before
breaking down when subject to a dynamic perpendicular force (shock)
(Kalpakjian & Schmid, 2016). This shock is standardized into the Charpy
pendulum, which is used to measure the resilience of materials. Resilience
is high when a material has a high level of elasticity. For example, the
strings of a tennis racket deform due to the impact of a ball and accu-
mulate potential energy that is released during the return stroke. The
opposite of resilience is fragility, which is characteristic of materials with
little elasticity and that are close to their breaking point. Unlike resistant
materials, resilient materials do not oppose shocks until they break, but
absorb shocks due to their elastic properties.
Similarly, resilience in the social sciences represents the ability of a
social entity—such as an individual, organization, system, or society—to
retain its function while responding to adversity. However, this metaphor
is responsible for both the appeal and the opaqueness of the concept in
the social sciences (Carpenter et al., 2001), as ‘ability’ and ‘adversity’ have
been variously understood (e.g. Britt et al., 2016), leading many scholars
to ask for further theoretical elaboration (Britt et al. 2016; Duchek,
2020; Fisher et al., 2019; Linnenluecke, 2017; Kossek & Perrigino, 2016;
Vanhove et al., 2016). A decade ago, de Bruijne et al. (2010) outlined
some of the elements that were lost in translation. This yielded a set
of pertinent questions regarding the need for theoretical elaboration,
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which have been echoed by more recent literature reviews (e.g. Duchek,
2020; Fisher et al., 2019; Linnenluecke, 2017; Kossek & Perrigino, 2016;
Ruiz-Martin et al., 2018).
Five questions have remained largely implicit in the understanding of
the parallel between materials in physics and individuals, organizations
and societies in the social sciences. Here we identify and reframe them to
develop three principles that both organize our current understanding of
resilience and suggest future directions of research.
First, in the social sciences, resilience has been used in quite a broad
way. Following a thorough literature review on existing perspectives,
concepts and methodologies, Bhamra (2016, p. 24) contended that ‘it
is essential to understand whether resilience is a measure, a feature, a
philosophy or a capability’, as in the present literature it refers to all of
these. Critics of resilience claim that the concept has been adopted too
broadly in the social sciences and provocatively ask: ‘At this rate, what isn’t
resilience?’ (Roe & Schulman, 2008, p. 163). To progress with conceptual
elaboration, this implies asking: What is the core of resilience? Addressing
this question clarifies how the concept of resilience can be characterized
and better specified to include different conceptual and analytical mani-
festations while still allowing for the cross-fertilization of concepts, ideas
and best practices across the social sciences.
Second, when we say that resilient social entities reach a final state after
facing adversities, how should this final state be understood? Answering
this question means clarifying when we can talk about resilience, and
when we cannot. Rather than redefining resilience, we aim to define
the boundaries and the core of the concept by specifying what ‘stable
final state’ in the social sciences might correspond to the steady states of
engineering materials. The fact that a given material finds an equilibrium
(i.e. the same state before and after a shock), allows scholars to claim
that it is resilient. However, the ways in which individuals, organizations
and/or societies respond, recover and return to ‘normality’ always entails
a change—if only because time has passed and experience (learning) has
occured. Contrary to physical materials, social systems and the agents that
are embedded in them exercise agency, which affects how they adapt to
external events. Moreover, it is crucial to clarify whether we can talk of
resilience when a ‘new normal’ is reached in a social system, or if that
means that the original system was not resilient and that a new system
(with a different state and function) has emerged. So, we ask: what is
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the outcome of resilience? Does the recognition of resilience depend upon this
outcome?
Third, how can disturbances or adversity triggers be qualified in the social
sciences? Recent studies reviewed the following examples of adversity trig-
gers (Britt et al., 2016; Duchek, 2020; Fisher et al., 2019; Kossek &
Perrigino, 2016; Linnenluecke, 2017; Vanhove et al., 2016): for the indi-
vidual, the death of a beloved person or a divorce; for organizations, a
new technology that challenges extant business value propositions; and for
systems, a new political movement that gains ground. In physics, shocks
are precisely defined: they have a certain strength and hit from a certain
angle (Frigotto, 2020). In the social sciences, the ability to anticipate,
resist and respond to adversity is contingent on knowledge of adversity
triggers: when they are well-known and well-defined, they can be antici-
pated or at least a precise response can be prepared that is activated when
they occur; when they are poorly-known and ill-defined, understanding
them is part of the challenge (cf. Logan, 2009). Some authors refer to
this in terms of the expected and the unexpected (e.g. Weick & Sutcliffe,
2001). While this distinction is intuitive, a more precise elaboration could
clarify the impacts of different kinds of adversity and their potential for
triggering resilience and its various empirical manifestations.
Fourth, in the social realm, resilience concerns an entity’s responses
to a shock over time, including before (preparedness), during (recovery)
and after (outcome). While a temporal dimension is noticeable in social
systems that might take time to show resilience, what some call ‘dynamic
capability’ (Giustiniano et al., 2018, p. 38), others consider a process, as
well as, a property and an outcome (Bhamra, 2016) So, the following
question arises: does resilience have a temporal deployment upon which it
should be observed and assessed as a whole?
Fifth, what is the subject of resilience? In general, we have referred to
system resilience as having a generic subject in the social sciences, and
other times and more precisely, we have articulated three main levels of
analysis, i.e. individual (micro), organization (meso) and society (macro).
This plurality of levels at which it can manifest adds a layer of fuzziness to
resilience, as in the same setting, a lower level entity can show resilience,
while at a higher level there might be none and vice versa. Carpenter et al.
(2001, pp. 765–767) claim that it is always necessary to specify resilience
in relation to a social system or a level of analysis by asking: ‘Resilience
of what to what?’ In particular, it is necessary to address if there is a
correspondence between lower and higher levels of resilience, and if lower
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levels of resilience guarantee higher levels of resilience. This has become
crucial for policymakers, institutions and citizens in understanding how
resilience can be cultivated, especially after the COVID-19 pandemic (e.g.
Giovannini et al., 2020).
These five questions, in our opinion, advance the academic debate
by allowing us to frame resilience in light of the dynamic nature and
complexity and ambiguity inherent to social systems at multiple levels of
analysis. This introduction outlines three organizing elements that serve
as a starting point for the theoretical and empirical analyses in the chap-
ters that make up the bulk of this edited volume. We argue that resilience
needs to be grounded in both stability and change, given that ‘becom-
ing’ is a characteristic of social entities. We define resilience in terms
of change that maintains a continuity of essence, whether self-assessed
by those that dealt with the adversity—and that recognize themselves
through change—or exogenously assessed when an observer can detect
or identify some form of persistence of identity, processes, mindsets, etc.
Organizing Principles for Resilience
Building upon the definitional consistencies and inconsistencies, theoret-
ical missing links and empirical puzzles found in the five questions above,
this section introduces three organizing principles for resilience. The first
pertains to the core of resilience, which comprises both change and
stability. The second principle concerns the novelty profiles of adversity
triggers. The third principle regards the temporal deployment of resilience
into foresight, mechanisms and outcomes, which take place either before
adversities trigger resilience, right after they have occurred and stimulated
a response, and/or after they have been addressed. This is followed by a
discussion of the temporal, spatial and social scale of resilience, which
serves both the advancement of our theoretical understanding and the
empirical adoption of resilience.
Stability and Change
Resilience has generally been used to indicate the ability to absorb shocks
with a limited impact on stability and functioning (Linnenluecke, 2017;
Roe & Schulman 2008; Walker & Salt, 2006; Williams et al., 2017) as
well as the ability to recover and learn from the shock (Ramanujam &
Roberts, 2018; Ruiz-Martin et al., 2018). In other words, in various
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definitions and disciplines, resilience entails change from an initial state
to a final state via adversity response. Change is, therefore, the first
fundamental constituent of resilience.
Change can be conceived of as being necessarily entailed by adversity,
because if a system does not change, then one could argue that it never
faced the sort of adversity for which resilience is needed. Moreover, if
it does not change, then it will probably fail, because adversity does not
allow systems to remain unaltered over time. If for some reason a system
neither changes nor fails, then we would argue that it does not display
resilience, but mere survival. Thus, survival is not the key to resilience.
Resilience goes beyond mere survival because it requires that the perse-
verance of being is characterized by change. Likewise, radical change is
incompatible with resilience. In fact, we would not call something that
changes completely in order to survive resilient, as it would no longer
relate to a previous state or function but to something else entirely.
There have been several attempts to theorize about the degree of
change that is included in resilience. Like most definitions, the first and
more general attempt held that resilience represents either a process of
‘bouncing back’ or of ‘remaining within a threshold’ (Table 1.2); ‘passing
the threshold’ was to be understood as too much change to constitute
resilience. From a complex systems perspective, Walker et al. (2004)
note that both resilience and adaptability have to do with the dynamics
of a system or a closely related set of systems. For them, transforma-
bility refers to fundamentally altering the nature of a system, yet the
dividing line between ‘closely related’ and ‘fundamentally altered’ can
be fuzzy and subject to interpretation. Folke et al. (2010, p. 3) argue
that resilience builds on adaptability and transformability, as it is ‘the
capacity to change [also through transformation] in order to maintain
the same identity’. In regional science studies, several authors (Boschma,
2015; Hu & Hassink, 2017; Pike et al., 2010) adopt a distinction
between two kinds of change within the context of geographic resilience,
‘adaptation’ and ‘adaptability’; the former relates to maintaining existing
economic paths/trajectories or ‘exploitation’ (March, 1991), while the
latter pertains to the creation of new regional growth paths or ‘explo-
ration’ (March, 1991). In other areas, transformation and transformability
are more explicitly mentioned and linked to resilience. The literature on
urban ecosystems (e.g. Gotham & Campanella, 2010) explicitly acknowl-
edges transformability among the various types of change; more recently,
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Satyal et al. (2017) showed how transformative resilience can consist of
regional pathways of evolution.
A second fundamental constituent of resilience that mirrors the first
is continuity of essence. In all cases, resilience is related to a subject—be
it an individual, organization or system—that undergoes some degree of
change but, nevertheless, maintains a continuity of essence throughout
this evolution. This means that, having changed, either the subject
or an external observer can recognize that the same entity is still
present following a series of internal and external adversities. Considering
both the constituents of resilience together, resilience encompasses both
stability and change (Fig. 1.1).
In their conceptual framework aimed at both grounding and trig-
gering a more resilient European society, Manca et al. (2017) proposed
a distinction between absorptive, adaptive and transformative capabilities
that support resilience. In the field of organizational resilience, Frig-
otto (2020) specified the following resilience outcomes that result from
different levels of change (and as a function of the novelty of adversity
triggers): absorptive, adaptive and transformative resilience.
Progressing our theoretical elaboration on the essence of resilience and
the different kinds of change that resilience encompasses, we posit the
following typology. If we position the combination of stability and change
on a continuum where at the extreme ends there are either only stability
or only change, resilience concerns only the area in which there is a blend
Fig. 1.1 Resilience as the overlap or interplay of stability and change (Source
Authors’ own)
1 RESILIENCE IN ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIETIES … 15
of stability and change. Building on Frigotto’s work on novelty (2020),
it is possible to define different types of resilience, encompassing not only
specific outcomes but also changing processes and antecedents. Along this
continuum, we can position three main types of resilience (Fig. 1.2).
Absorptive resilience reflects the fundamental stability of a system and
concerns the ability to return rapidly and efficiently to the original state;
change is limited in that it is both temporary and produces a near-zero
impact (Linnenluecke, 2017). Stability is not challenged; it is refreshed
or refined by perfecting competencies, and the previous state is restored.
Building upon the work of Folke et al. (2010), resilience in this case can
be defined as ‘absorbability’. In the metaphor provided by the ball-and-
cup model (de Bruijne et al., 2010, p. 17), the cup represents the stability
of the system, whereas the ball represents a social entity that is altered by
some force. Resilience is then measured by the time the entity takes to
absorb change.
Adaptive resilience includes both stability and change at a consistent
level; it refers to a system’s ability to produce buffer capacity, withstand
shock and maintain function during a transition to a new state. In this
case, change is persistent and consistent even though it does not chal-
lenge the essence of the social entity. In the ball-and-cup model, this
type of resilience is represented by the width of the cup, meaning that
while persistent change of functioning is necessary, it is still found in the
same context. In real-world situations, resilience is measured by robust-
ness, which is the amount of change that an entity can face within the
given context. In Folke et al.’s (2010) terminology, this type of resilience
is characterized by both adaptability and flexibility.
Fig. 1.2 Resilience realm and types (Source Authors’ own. Legend: L = Low,
M = Medium, H = High)
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Transformative resilience shows the ability of the social entity to
interact with disturbances and impact on the system’s change. In this
case, the essence of the social entity is challenged; as the context changes
dramatically, there is a high risk that it will be thrown into a completely
different reality, where points of reference and consolidated functioning
are revolutionized. In the realm of organizations, we could argue that
in this case, institutional settings are changing. The social entity must
undergo a profound renewal while a continuity with the past can be
clearly traced at some level. This renewal acknowledges that the entity has
also interacted with the changing context (co-evolution takes place) and
that the revolutionary potential of the context is scaled back. In complex
systems language (Walker & Salt, 2006), this type of resilience would
keep the entity away from the dramatic and totalizing change entailed by
passing the threshold. It is consistent with the definition of resilience as
‘adapting within a threshold’; however, it acknowledges that the threshold
might change over time and that resilience occurs when the social entity
is able to respond to that challenge by remaining within the renewed
threshold. Folke et al. (2010) refer to this ability as ‘transformability’.
At the organizational or system level, transformative resilience occurs
in relation to changes in institutional settings (cf. North, 1990) and is
measured by the ability to transform together with the setting in order
to maintain a position within the threshold—what systems theorists term
‘co-evolution’ (for a fascinating account of such processes within the
context of organizations and markets, see Padgett & Powell, 2012).
Adversity and Novelty
While change and stability can be used to typify resilience, they can also be
used to characterize its triggers or antecedents, i.e. adversities. Different
kinds of adversities require different levels of change and stability and,
therefore, resilience. Adversities vary according to their determinate-
ness, being well-known or unknown, expected or unexpected and/or
surprising. Giustiniano et al., (2018, p.17) claim that resilience is ‘not
only a matter of learning but also of ‘learning to learn’, including the will-
ingness to continuously engage in experimentation and embrace novelty.
According to Kayes (2015, p. 17), novel experiences are characterized by
a lack of apparent task constraints, which means that successful resolution
must go beyond typical expertise or established routines. In such situa-
tions, neither the goal to be achieved (‘what’) nor the path to solving
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the problem (‘how’) are clear, in this way they resemble ill-structured
or ‘wicked’ problems (Rittel & Weber, 1973). Finally, Kayes (2015,
pp. 18–20) points to four types of learning mechanisms: direct expe-
rience, counter experience, evidence and trial and error or exploration.
Studies have ascertained that different organizations adopt and excel at
different types of learning (March, 1991) and that context-specific and
locally embedded learning styles emerge over time (Powell, 1998). These
styles, in turn, enable organizations to develop distinct preferences or
habits when it comes to gathering, processing and acting upon different
types of knowledge (Kayes, 2015, p. 21). We follow Frigotto (2020) who
proposes that the concept of novelty be used to characterize disturbances
and to explain different resilience types in relation to triggers.
Defining resilience in terms of novelty produces three main advan-
tages (Frigotto, 2020). First, it allows us to clarify how resilience can
be conceived of as a source of stability by ensuring the maintenance of
functionality despite adversity, and as a source of change by stimulating
positive adaptation and thriving after adversity. Second, novelty is a rela-
tive concept that reflects the state of the art of knowledge (Frigotto,
2018); resilience that refers to novelty is not defined as a fixed set of
‘must haves’ in relation to a closed set of situations but as a changing
ability that is renewed continuously according to new challenges. Third,
novelty is also relative in a further sense: since knowledge is not homoge-
nously distributed, novelty does not appear equally to every entity because
it maps onto one’s own knowledge. As a result of differences in their
knowledge, entities will perceive different novelty differently. A defini-
tion of resilience grounded in novelty articulates that resilience stimulates
learning in various forms (e.g. from others that already know) and at
different levels (e.g. new knowledge for some or all).
Building upon the work of Levinthal (2008), novelty can be defined as
the opposite of knowledge; novelty consists of what is not known. It can
be observed in many forms and at many levels; it has been understood
as both an ingredient and as an outcome of change (Frigotto, 2018).
Novelty is pervasive, appearing in details or in dramatic changes, and thus
can be considered a continuous variable rather than a dichotomous one
(Frigotto, 2020).
When we assess the novelty of adversity triggers, we consider three
different aspects that reflect novelty dimensions (Frigotto, 2018). First,
triggers might be novel, meaning that they are not known and vary
according to how distant they are from what is already known; this
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reflects the degree of novelty. For example, when New Public Manage-
ment (NPM) was recommended as the appropriate approach for public
administration (cf. Christensen & Lægreid, 2011), it was perceived as
having a high novelty degree in relation to public administration theo-
ries: it brought principles of management into the public sector that
dramatically changed the idea of how public institutions are and should be
managed. Conversely, today, the introduction of new efficiency or effec-
tiveness measures represents just an add-on to that framework, which
scores lower in novelty degree.
Second, novelty is spatially and temporally relative, so the same
instance might appear novel to some observers and not to others, and
it might appear differently in different times, for example, in Europe, the
way we see lockdowns since the COVID-19 pandemic. Before January
2020, the idea of a lockdown was largely seen as an unnecessary measure
in the contemporary, developed world: it was perceived as something
obsolete, concerning the plagues of past centuries, most recently around
1920, or ‘remote’ and ‘far-away’ China. When a lockdown was imple-
mented in Italy in March 2020, it appeared as a major novelty—nobody
really knew what lockdown meant or entailed for their everyday behaviour
or for the whole economy. Then the lockdown measures slowly spread
across Europe, and countries began considering them appropriate and
indispensable. A lockdown is no longer a major novelty. When we
consider the future (we are writing in June, 2020), a lockdown in the
autumn of 2020 seems like a minor or medium novelty. Societies have
built up rich knowledge on what the lockdown is and means, and they
can also prepare for it in advance. The lesson from this is that novelty
should always be assessed in relation to a specific observer at a specific
time; otherwise, it is easily misjudged in retrospect. This is what we mean
when we refer to novelty’s relativity .
Third, novelty awareness refers to whether the lack of knowledge
corresponding to novelty is perceived or not—a ‘known unknown’ or
an ‘unknown unknown’ (Logan, 2009). Building upon the previous
example, the World Health Organization, as well as other institutions,
warned the world’s governments of the risk of pandemics in previous
years. This would lead one to think that the COVID-19 pandemic was
something which many should have been aware. While the pandemic
might have come as a minor surprise to some, to many it was a remote
event, either because they downplayed the warnings or because they
thought that the progress of the contemporary world would somehow
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shield it from catastrophic effects. Awareness reflects the difficulty of
addressing something that we do not know but might exist.
Novelty reflects a condition of the observer that reveals one’s need for
new knowledge by claiming that something is novel to him/her. Thus,
novelty is objectified and transferred to an object. We typically say ‘this
product is new’ or ‘this situation is new’, indirectly claiming that we had
not experienced that product or that situation earlier. This also applies to
characterizing adversity triggers according to their novelty profiles. When
someone says that an adversity trigger is novel, this means that he/she is
not prepared to handle it with his/her current level of knowledge; further,
one either does not know that it exists or that its occurrence is likely.
Building upon these considerations, it is possible to advance three
novelty profiles (minor, medium and major). Novelty profiles reflect
the amount of knowledge that is necessary to make something novel
into something known, predictable and expected, contemplated among
possible cases, manageable and controllable. Resilience types refer to these
profiles (Table 1.3, column 3).
Absorptive resilience addresses disturbances that display a low novelty
profile: they are temporary and concern a narrow range of well-known
external conditions (Holling, 1973, p. 1). When triggers are well defined
within given knowledge (low novelty profile), they can easily be under-
stood and typically even specified into a list, and it is possible to routinely
prepare against them, thus change can be planned and contained. At
the individual level, an example of low novelty profile adversity is stress
related to an important project; at the organizational level, a delay in sales
for seasonal gifts due to a late season; at the system level, the effects of
economic growth in regional and national employment patterns.
Adaptive resilience is associated with a medium novelty profile of adver-
sity triggers, meaning that these are not well known but can either be
understood and framed using available knowledge or else they require
refinement or moderate knowledge development. In the language of
James March’s exploitation and exploration trade-off (1991), for adap-
tive resilience, learning takes place through the exploitation of existing
knowledge. At the individual level, an example is a job change; at the
organizational level, the need for a new product differentiation; and at
the system level, the quest for new regional growth patterns based on
smart specialization.
Transformative resilience responds to triggers with a major novelty
profile. These are challenging triggers, such as ‘sharp shifts,’ ‘regime
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shifts,’ or ‘critical transitions’, and concern a variety of adversities that are
typically both unpredictable and unexpected (Folke et al., 2010). Building
on March’s exploitation and exploration trade-off (1991),transformative
resilience entails exploration of new knowledge because learning encom-
passes all aspects of the social entity and entails the acquisition of solutions
that are distant from those building the stable response system. At the
individual level, an example is divorce, which can challenge people’s
internal balance; at the organizational level, a change of customers’
preferences; at the system level, Brexit.
Temporality
Resilience is only demonstrated over time. Thus, in order to define
resilience, we need to take temporality into account. As a complex and
dynamics process, resilience encompasses different types of nonlinear
interactions among sub-elements, both internal and external. What is
more, such interactions are laden with contradictory aspects associated
with adaptive and proactive prespectives on resilience (Giustiniano et al.,
2018, p. 20), suggesting the importance of approaching the phenomenon
from a processual prism. Hence, resilience ‘is perceived not as a state of
being, a disposition or a structural property, so much as a processual prac-
tice (Feldman & Orlikowski, 2011) of becoming (Tsoukas & Chia, 2002)’
(Giustiniano et al., 2018, p. 20; emphasis added).
Building upon the works of Frigotto (2020) and Fisher et al. (2019),
our perspective encompasses adversity triggers, resilience outcomes, and
resilience mechanisms and positions them on a timeline (Fig. 1.3).
Considering the chronological deployment of resilience, Fisher et al.
(2019) distinguished resilience into mechanisms that take place right after
adversity triggers have hit and outcomes that take place after recovering
from adversity. The authors also talk about ‘resilience promoting factors’,
which are ‘characteristics and features of the self or one’s environment
that can promote the likelihood of successful adaptation’ and also specify
that they ‘serve as valuable targets for interventions aimed at increasing
resilience’ (Fisher et al. 2019, p. 25). They acknowledge that these factors
impact resilience mechanisms while adversity triggers hits, however, they
neglect their own temporal dimension. We acknowledge that these factors
also have a temporal deployment and that they are put in place delib-
erately or simply exist before the resilience mechanisms are activated.
This form of resilience pertains to ‘the potential for adjusting patterns
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Fig. 1.3 Resilience temporal dimension (Source Authors’ own, following Fisher
et al., 2019; Frigotto, 2020)
of activities to handle future changes in the kinds of events, opportuni-
ties and disruptions experienced’; therefore, it exists before disturbances
call upon them (Woods, 2019, p. 53). We term the actions that take place
before the occurrence of triggers, and that support resilience mechanisms,
resilience foresight . Thus, our definition of resilience is temporally defined
as follows (Fig. 1.3): resilience foresight (before); resilience mechanisms
(during) and resilience outcomes (after).
Regarding the ‘final state’ (s2) at which resilience outcome stabilizes,
there are two main perspectives in the literature (Duchek, 2020). The
first states that an entity is resilient if it returns to the initial state; here,
the emphasis is on resuming standard performance (Lengnick-Hall et al.,
2011). The second understands the resilient entity as one that has coped,
thrived and reached another state; this has been interpreted by some as
entailing higher performance levels (Burnard & Bhamra, 2011; Hamel &
Välikangas, 2003). A further position allows the resilient entity to ‘bounce
forward’, i.e. grow or become stronger for future challenges (Giovan-
nini et al., 2020; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007). Some authors subordinate
resilience to a stable or increased performance despite adversity. Others
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associate resilience with a more neutral idea of evolution or a broader
conception of development at some level. For instance, for Vogus and
Sutcliffe (2007, p. 3418) the concept of organizational resilience entails
‘the maintenance of positive adjustment under challenging conditions
such that the organization emerges from those conditions strengthened
and more resourceful’. Moreover, resilience enhances and emphasizes the
ability of systems to resist despite adversity, and, in other words, might
seem to suggest survival. Nevertheless, mere survival does not entail
resilience. In our perspective, resilience can be associated with any of these
three main situations if the system is characterized by both stability and
change (Fig. 1.2): (i) the initial and final states, after adversity triggers
have hit, are the same; (ii) the final state is better than the initial state;
(iii) the final state is worse than the initial state (Fig. 1.3). While resilience
has a positive connotation, it is to be interpreted in terms of the main-
tenance of essence combined with change rather than an assessment of
the state based on other criteria—e.g. job satisfaction (individual level),
business leadership (organizational level), or economic or social welfare
(system level).
Absorptive resilience responds to disturbances with a low novelty
profile that can be easily anticipated, making resilience foresight processes
consist of risk assessments and contingency plans. Mechanisms enacted
in response to adversity could therefore be learned in advance so that
during the period of adversity, the depth of the nadir is smaller, recovery is
quicker, and the resilience outcome includes the little changes that derive
from experiencing and practicing what is known in theory.
Adaptive resilience concerns a medium novelty profile of adversity that
can be addressed by leveraging the relativity dimension (looking at avail-
able knowledge from others) or by targeting the ‘known unknowns’.
Resilience mechanisms are somewhat limited in terms of finding, imple-
menting, or including novelty, but the nadir is typically small. The
resilience outcome reflects important changes the social entity has imple-
mented while responding to adversities and that persist also in the ex-post
phase. These changes might set s2 at different levels even though it is
reasonable to think that it would typically not be the case of s1=s2.
Transformative resilience is associated with triggers with a major
novelty profile that can be tackled in foresight only through a substan-
tial effort to address the ‘unknown unknowns’. Mechanisms that respond
to adversities might be very hard to find and implement, so the nadir
might be very deep. The resilience outcome might vary substantially but
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encompasses significant changes that can end into very different outlooks
of the social entity being considered.
Scales of Resilience
While clear in principle, when analysing social entities, it is not straightfor-
ward to grasp when change and stability are both present or under which
circumstances change leads to the abandonment of a previous essence; so
that either a red thread between the past and present cannot be detected,
or in which change has not occurred at all and the persistence of the entity
is simply accidental.3
Taking an example from the organizational realm, many corporations
go bankrupt as a result of technological and market disruptions, with only
a handful being able to survive more than half a century (Peters et al.,
1982). In contrast, a handful of businesses have been able to successfully
adapt by moving into new markets and by adopting different ways of
organizing. Nokia has become a landmark case of resilience. In the 1860s,
Nokia was a pulp and paper company. It gradually moved into the rubber
and cable businesses, followed by electronics (TV and ICT) and network
and mobile technologies in the 1990s and lately the consumer market
(Borhanuddin & Iqbal, 2016). Kurikka et al. (2018) present Nokia as
a case of regional resilience while Nair et al. (2014) as a case where
resilience was missing. Nokia experienced tremendous change throughout
its existence, and whether it still preserves a continuity of essence can be
debated. Moreover, the outcome of this evaluation might be different
depending upon who is assessing it (company members—top manage-
ment/employees, shareholders, stakeholders, Finnish/global society) and
on what level (business competition, innovativeness, societal role). For
instance, one could argue that, while it has changed in terms of busi-
ness, Nokia has remained an important contributor to Finland’s GDP and
labour market. The Nokia case illustrates the difficulty of setting abso-
lute, clear-cut parameters for assessing the resilience of real organizations,
individuals and social systems.
3 As Walker et al. (2014, p. 3) stated, ‘Because of the possibility of multiple stable
states, when considering the extent to which a system can be changed, return time doesn’t
measure all of the ways in which a system may fail—permanently or temporarily—to retain
essential functions.’ See also Folke et al. (2010, p. 4).
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Carpenter et al. (2001) contend that resilience changes depending on
the temporal, spatial and social scale at which the measurement is made.
On the temporal scale, in prehistory, the adoption of iron axes facili-
tated the emergence of the agricultural economy, as forests could be cut
more easily and quickly to create fields. In this sense, the use of iron
axes supported resilience at one time. Nevertheless, it also resulted in soil
infertility, which demonstrates that resilience at one time may come at the
expense of resilience at another (Carpenter et al., 2001, p. 767).
On the spatial scale, resilience can at once take place in one place
and not in another. During the COVID-19 pandemic, this point was
largely debated when the effectiveness of different national strategies
was discussed. Consider two countries with potentially similar conta-
gion incidence: as of the time of writing (summer 2020)—Sweden and
Norway. Sweden displayed one of the world’s highest mortality levels
(4874 deaths) while the nearby Norway recorded 242 deaths (Lindeberg,
2020).
Finally, on the social scale, it is argued that resilience can be analysed
at three main levels—i.e. individual (micro), organization (meso) and
system (macro)—and that resilient entities (e.g. organizations and soci-
eties) can translate or incorporate resilience from one level to the other
(Kayes, 2015, p. 16). Giovannini et al. (2020, p. 7) claim that a resilient
society is one in which individuals are resilient, and public intervention
should enhance and complement people; although societal resilience is
not the sum of individual resilience as social ties, community-level capac-
ities and institutions play a role. Conversely, Carpenter and colleagues
(2001) stress that these levels do not entail consistency with one another,
as smaller systems are nested in larger systems, and as a result, they
coevolve and interact in nonlinear and unpredictable ways (Walker et al.,
2004), showing that the micro–macro relationship of levels in resilience
is complex.
The cases presented in this edited volume lend credence to these scales
and demonstrate empirically that it is always necessary to specify which
time, space and level of analysis is being referred to when discussing
resilience.
Rationale and Scope of the Volume
This edited volume brings together scholars in the fields of human
research management, public policy, regional studies and organization
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theory around the concept of resilience. This is done in an effort to
provide a more holistic understanding of this complex phenomenon from
a multi-sectorial, cross-national and multidisciplinary perspective. Each
chapter brings to the book a contribution on resilience that is built in rela-
tion to their area of research and to specific key references on resilience
largely adopted in that area. Overall, the volume builds a conversation
across the diverse specializations and attentions provided by each chapter.
Also, and more broadly, the authors contribute both to theory testing
and development and provide key empirical insights useful for societies,
organizations and individuals that are experiencing disruptive pressures.
Diverse chapters are held together by a clear organization of the volume
across levels of analysis (resilience in organizations and the organizational
fields and societies in which individuals and organizations are embedded
in) and by an original perspective on resilience that we derive from our
review of the literature and existing knowledge gaps, according to which
we position and connect each of the individual chapter contributions.
In this book, resilience is investigated in cases that display a substan-
tial level of publicness. This pertains to the concept introduced by Barry
Bozeman. Bozeman and colleagues have long advocated for a move away
from the traditional binary distinction public vs. private (e.g. Christensen
et al., 2007; Farnham & Horton, 1999) towards the notion that all orga-
nizations are in essence public, given that they are all affected by the
technical and institutional environments in which they operate (Bozeman,
1984, 2004; Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994). In short, for Bozeman
the key is not whether organizations are public or private, but to what
extent their goals, structures and activities are determined by political
and economic authority in the form of state regulations and other forms
of coercive behaviour. ‘Publicness is not viewed as an absolute quality
but as a dimension. The dimension is defined by the organization’s mix
of economic and political authority as a basis of its activity’ (Bozeman,
2004, p. 78). The degree of publicness is then defined by the extent
to which externally imposed political authority affects organizational
activities—goals, mission, funding, strategy, management, etc.
The cases presented in the individual chapters, which span across the
public and private sectors, vary in terms of publicness. Yet, because
this dimension makes our cases ‘revelatory’ for the holistic study of
resilience (Yin, 2009 [1984]), they ‘offer high potential for developing
new insight into an understudied phenomenon’ (Langley & Abdallah,
2011, p. 118). That said, the majority of the chapters focus on cases that
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are consistently subject to environmental adversities and disturbances, as
they are, by definition, subject to external and highly political drivers.
Thus, because of their inherent publicness, not only do these contexts
allows us to focus on the effects of external dynamics in resilience, but
also enable us to compare cases that cut across a multiplicity of sectors and
national contexts. In a nutshell, our argument is that publicness stimulates
resilience most, because it entails a higher level of exposure to external
requirements for change. Yet, as a downside, it also entails a higher risk
of paralysis or inertia if and when resilience is not cultivated.
Presentation of the Chapters
The heart and empirical foundation of the edited volume is structured
into two main sections with five chapters each; the first concerns resilience
in organizations, and the second concerns within organizational fields
and resilience in societies. The case chapters present a variety of adversity
triggers that illustrate different novelty profiles (Table 1.4).
In the first section, Chapter 2 addresses the organizational ability
to conduct problem solving and learning in the midst of a crisis by
exploring the case of a fire brigade’s reaction to a novel and unexpected
cause of a fire. We see how organizations can face unknown problems
that are mistakenly taken as known. Not recognizing the novelty of the
problem can lead to failure, as the organization follows rules and norms
that are not appropriately adapted to the situation. Hence the ability to
rapidly detect novelty and be able to insert new findings quickly and
effectively into the problem representation throughout the organization
is essential to building resilience. While there are lessons in this case
that can help organizations to cultivate resilience, the chapter focuses
on resilience in the midst of a crisis. It addresses resilience mechanisms
that can be adopted to address major novelty and elaborates on struc-
tures and practices that can be developed in advance to support resilience
mechanisms.
Chapter 3 brings us to a military context, in which traditional rule-
following is the expectation; however, we see that the Austrian military
seeks to instil in its soldiers the ability to deal with surprising situa-
tions. Drills and rule-following have limits even in highly structured
organizations like the Austrian military. Resilience requires the ability
to understand when to break rules, and paradoxically, the military has
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developed a unique form of drill (preadaptive drill) to allow for decision-
making in complex situations and to develop resilience foresight. During
drills, soldiers learn mechanisms that can be acquired in advance in rela-
tion to different novelty profiles of adversities. Drawing on the biological
resilience literature, the authors use the concept of ‘exaptation’—using
old means to achieve new ends (Gould & Verba, 1982)—to explain how
this works.
Chapter 4 traces boilermakers in a naval shipbuilding project. The
context of temporary organizing under which the boilermakers operate
allows the authors to address resilience in situations in which there is not
a ‘shared culture’ of routines and habits, which is what Chapters 2, 5
and 6 presuppose. Concerning mainly resilience mechanisms, Chapter 4
presents how occupational groups working together for the construc-
tion of complex products, i.e. ships, build resilience by setting up special
coordination mechanisms. The latter bring together the different groups
around one priority that is, avoiding coactivity constraints that are related
to unexpected events and challenge workers’ safety. Adversity, in this
chapter, is understood as coming from complex tasks that are undertaken
by independent actors, which inevitably do not go exactly according to
plan, but which could result in calamitous accidents or a non-functional
ship if not addressed. In other words, there is an invisible threat. Treating
it this way emphasizes how resilience can be built ex-ante.
Chapter 5 looks closely at two public agencies—one dealing with
coordination for resilience and the second with public transportation.
There is a deliberate attempt to build resilience into these two types of
public agency. The authors treat resilience as a practice rather than as
a behaviour to emphasize the dynamic interplay between structure and
action. Particularly important here is the idea of ‘teleo-affective struc-
tures’, which introduce emotive elements and extend behavioural drivers
beyond rules and norms. The chapter distinguishes between cultivating
resilience for predictable situations—in which adversity can be antici-
pated—and those that are the result of a complex environment, in which
it cannot. Here again we see the theme of control as a threat, this time
expressed not as acting according to norms or micromanagement, but as
following prescribed actions. The chapter focuses on resilience foresight
and presents organizational arrangements adopted by public organiza-
tions to produce resilience before adversity triggers actually occur. The
authors show that foresight was triggered in different ways in the two
organizations that they studied: one created dedicated crisis management
32 M. L. FRIGOTTO ET AL.
teams to develop the capabilities needed to be resilient, and the other
redefined organigrams and engaged in task distribution.
Chapter 6 looks at public managers in New Zealand in a general
public sphere context. The authors focus on deliberate attempts to build
resilience. Adversity in this case comes as the result of an ambiguous
and complex context, one in which an overexertion of control, through
micromanagement, can lead to failure. Unlike in Chapter 2, there is no
surprise to uncover and ‘know’ but rather a situation of task complexity
in which uncertainty continues to prevail over time. The authors treat
resilience as a capability that can be learned and harnessed through lead-
ership. The chapter addresses resilience in foresight: employees prepare
their resources to be ready to adapt and flourish at work and when faced
with challenging circumstances.
The second section of the volume includes cases that position resilience
on a macro level within organizational fields and in society. Chapters in
this section are clustered into those that address intra-system resilience
and those addressing inter-system resilience. Chapters 7, 8 and 9 belong
to the first set, as they analyse one system intended as a whole sector.
Chapter 10 analyses several systems that coevolve with each other in a
region, and Chapter 11 concerns the whole economic dynamics of the
region.
Chapter 7 contributes to the literature on resilience foresight, as it
discusses the evolution of universities as institutions, and to mechanisms,
as it identifies the archetype of the post-entrepreneurial university as more
consistent with threats deriving from general institutional change. In this
chapter, the authors demonstrate how the concept of an entrepreneurial
university, and the political and economic pressures driving it to become a
global archetype, embeds logics that if pursued are likely to undermine the
resilience of universities. Drawing on complex systems theory, the chapter
looks at how the broad aims of efficiency, diversity and unified actorness
are misconstrued in the entrepreneurial university literature and suggests
ways to reconfigure universities to be resilient by orienting them to loose
coupling, slack and requisite diversity.
Chapter 8 examines the linkage between identity and resilience at a
Scandinavian university. By looking at a series of critical junctures in
which external adversity coming from the government and the private
sector threatened to undermine the university’s identity, it explores the
possibility of understanding resilience through a dynamic process orga-
nization identity formation and evolution that brings together both the
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internal cultural and teleo-affective structures discussed in Chapter 5 with
externally determined possibilities for legitimacy. Addressing both mech-
anisms and outcomes, it elaborates on the role of organizational identity
in resilience, as identities constrain and enable social agents’ attempts to
respond to environmental imperatives and to enact the resilient behaviour.
Chapter 9 provides a historical analysis of the evolution of the opera
organizational field in Italy, and fosters a discussion on the actual
resilience of the sector in relation to the prominent changes that trans-
formed both the society and the opera over time. It discusses the
outcomes of the resilience of the operatic sector throughout its history.
While challenged by deep societal, cultural and economic changes, the
opera went through a transformative resilience that required scaling down
its importance as a cultural expression, and this translated into the reduc-
tion of the number of opera houses and of their funding. The authors
conclude that the operatic sector is still wandering between different
target publics that can support its existence—ranging from tourists to
citizens, from intellectuals to lay people, from young people to adults—
and that for this reason, its resilience, as the ability to combine change
with essence, is continuously threatened by the option of becoming the
Disneyland of the opera, focusing on mere reproduction and business-
drawn entertainment.
Chapter 10 examines regional higher education institutions (RHEIs)
in peripheral regions of both Finland and Estonia. While most of the
literature on resilience focuses on a single type of entity or system, this
chapter addresses universities as nested subjects of two different societal
systems, higher education and the region, which each create a distinct
form of adversity. Resilience comprises the co-evolution of RHEIs with
the region in which they are positioned, as well as with the higher educa-
tion system in which they operate. It is analysed in terms of mechanisms
concerning the governance that regulates interactions among institutions,
such as resource allocation decisions and core competencies.
Chapter 11, via a historical analysis, presents how a vibrant and
culturally-disctinctive economic region the Basque region, was able to
navigate through economic and institutional changes. This case shows
the link between resilience and governance systems, especially industrial
and innovation policies. Building on the field of evolutionary economic
geography, it explores both the unexpected and predictable threats to
regions that can come from recessions, crises and structural changes to the
broader national and global economy. The authors distinguish between
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situations in which regions maintain previous economic specialization and
those in which they shift towards new paths; they call them ‘adaptation’
and ‘adaptability’—citing Boschma (2015)—two forms of resilience that
refer to the three abilities of the conceptual typology presented above:
absorbability, adaptability and transformability.
Final Remarks
In this edited book, the chapters present cases that display a high degree
of publicness (Bozeman, 2004), a dimension that pushes social entities to
cultivate resilience.
The chapters are grounded in different disciplinary perspectives or
research streams that address organizations and societies. The result is
a multidisciplinary perspective on resilience that enhances best practices
and cross-fertilization of findings, theories and methods throughout the
social sciences.
According to Collin (2009, p. 103), multidisciplinarity refers to cases
in which different disciplines work independently on different aspects of a
project and within their boundaries. In contrast, interdisciplinarity refers
to the reciprocal recognition of contributions and perspectives within
different disciplines, while transdisciplinarity refers to the integration of
such perspectives into a harmonized, coherent whole.
Our aim is to trigger future interdisciplinary and/or transdisciplinary
research that produces a holistic understanding of resilience and to
support policymakers, managers, regional/local planners and scholarly
communities in pursuing resilience as important for our present and
future organizations and societies. These imperatives have become ever
more urgent as individuals, organizations and societies deal with the chal-
lenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic alongside the grand challenges
facing humankind, with climate change at the forefront.
We presented our perspective on resilience along two key phases.
First, we reviewed the literature on resilience and identified change and
stability, as well as the temporal dimension, as its most fundamental
traits. Then, we elaborated the absorptive, adaptive and transformative
resilience typology and the temporal sequence of foresight, mechanisms
and outcomes. This novel theoretical and analytical framework allows us
to map resilience consistently onto a variety of cases and to maintain a
general ‘umbrella-concept’ that unifies them.
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Second, our organizing principles act as a ‘lens’ through which the
individual chapters can be interpreted and compared to generate a holistic
perspective on resilience while respecting the specific conceptual and
theoretical perspectives and postulates being followed by the individual
authors in their respective contexts.
The final chapter of this edited volume reassesses and discusses the
core conceptual and theoretical premises sketched out in this introduc-
tory chapter against the backdrop of the empirical contributions of the
individual, case chapters and the volume as a whole. In so doing, we
hope to provide a valuable platform for future studies and policy debates
on this critically important societal phenomenon.
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triggers (Fisher et al., 2018). Resilience addresses both exceptional and
devastating events, as well as a larger set of disruptions and disturbances
that in various ways do not match with those occurrences that ‘the system
is designed to handle’ (Boin et al., 2010, p. 8). Wildavsky (1988) added
a relevant distinction between adversities that can be foreseen (and that
belong to the area of ‘anticipation’) and those that consist of unknown
challenges that are unanticipated before they become manifest (that map
into the area of resilience). As such, novelty is a grounding condition
of disturbances or adverse triggers (Frigotto, 2020). Novelty can assume
different degrees up to an extreme at which it consists of something that
is not deemed possible. This range implies that organizations need to
prepare themselves to face what is so unknown that it is not thought of
(Frigotto, 2018).
From this perspective, resilience consists of the ability to detect the
novelty that can be triggering adversities; as such, it is an ability that is
essentially undetermined and ill-defined, as Perrow (1999) and Wildavsky
(1988) revealed. Weick developed this conceptualization further by
reframing adversities as ‘the unexpected’, namely, in terms of what is not
expected and not thought, given the present approach to giving sense
to the world known as ‘sensemaking’ (Weick, 1993; Weick & Roberts,
1993; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001). Through this lens, resilience is also ‘less
deterministic’ (Linnenluecke, 2017, p. 8) and highly dependent on the
moment and the context in which resilience is enacted. The inclusion of
novelty into resilience requires organizations to acquire a mindset that
deems the unthinkable possible and to structure themselves into specific
roles, procedures and units that support this mindset coherently with the
posture of ‘expecting the unexpected’ postulated by Weick and Sutcliffe’s
contribution in 2001.
In addition, in the field of crisis management, the two prevailing
approaches to increase the ability to deal with emergencies are the plan-
ning and analysis of contingencies (Boin & McConnell, 2007; Levac
et al., 2012). Both approaches try to increase organizational resilience
by preparing the management systems to deal with known and recurrent
crises; nevertheless, they are substantially ineffective when organizational
resilience depends on the ability to cope with novel and unexpected
adversities and consists of learning capabilities (Lalonde, 2007).
In this chapter, we illustrate and theorize the difficulties that novel
and unexpected emergencies pose to organizations and that make them
actually struggle to be resilient. We build on the framework outlined by
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Simon (1991) to explain how organizations learn to deal with novel prob-
lems; this framework dates back to Simon and Newell (1971). In this
framework, decision premises affect the representation of the problem
and, ultimately, the possibility to detect, interpret and respond to novel
situations. From this perspective, the ability to revise the initial deci-
sion premises, i.e., to expand the perceptual limits of observation and to
conceive a novel representation of the problem, provides the foundation
of the ability to detect unknown situations and, ultimately, to be resilient
in the face of novelty in adversities.
We theorize organizational resilience as pertaining to the ability to
revise decision premises in the face of novel and unexpected adversities by
combining the resilience literature with Simon’s contribution. We develop
this conceptualization into a set of structural elements that can be adopted
by organizations to build resilience. First is a mindset that contemplates
the unknown among the possible situations to be faced and stimulates
the revision of decision premises. Second, the organizational role of the
‘Challenger of Decision Premises’ (CDP) is deliberately designed to chal-
lenge the existing decision premises to consider novelty that might not
be apparent.
In the next section, we report the real case of a fire emergency that
occurred in Italy in 1993.
We introduce this case in the front end of our chapter with an illustra-
tive purpose (as in the tradition of, for instance, Weick, 1993) to display
the specific issues that novel and unexpected emergencies pose to orga-
nizations and their attempts to be resilient. Third, we build on Herbert
Simon’s learning theory on the solution of new problems, adapting it to
the context of emergency management to provide our theoretical frame-
work of resilience in the face of novelty adversities. In the fourth section,
we develop the role of the ‘Challenger of Decision Premises’. Finally, after
having outlined the theoretical perspective building our model, in the
last section, the case of the fire illustrated in section two is recalled with
explicit reference to the proposed theoretical framework.
The chapter concludes by arguing that organizations can prepare and
be more resilient in dealing with new emergencies. In this case, prepared-
ness means learning to revise the decision premises and develop a new
appropriate representation of the situation while the novel emergency is
being addressed.
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Fighting an Everlasting Fire
This section presents the narrative of a firefighting intervention operated
by a brigade in Northern Italy as an illustration of the issues that the
unexpected raises in the ability of organizations to detect and respond
to adversities. This incident was disclosed by the Fire Chief and the
Deputy Chief of the Fire Department that operated the intervention, in
the context of an open interview that occurred in 2015. The interview
was contextualized in a larger research project aimed at grounding, in the
empirical experience of nearly 40 years of firefighting activity, what novelty
consists of in the context of emergency management. The following
narrative reports a case in which novelty is presented in context, providing
the background for our theoretical elaboration. In the last section, the
case will be revisited and related to the theoretical contribution developed
throughout the chapter.
One evening in November 1993, a fire broke out in an industrial plant
producing frozen meals in Bolzano, Italy. It was a long and complicated
intervention, lasting 11 hours. After 7 hours, the fire was still spreading;
the high heat produced structural damage to the building, hampering
firemen operating in the face of over 360 degrees Celsius for a long time.
However, we are not retelling it in this context for the exceptional risk it
produced but because this case illustrates the essence of the unexpected
in the view of the professional firefighters involved, i.e., the difficulty in
understanding and making sense of the situation.
In this intervention, a brigade of 10 firemen was sent out; the Fire
Chief (FC) acted as incident commander,1 and his Deputy as senior
Officer (DC). Since the fire was large, other firemen were recalled from
off-duty. It was already dark when they started to fight the fire, and a
very dark and intensifying smoke hampered the detection of fire and the
ability to tackle it directly. Therefore, they first started to fight the fire
from outside; then, as is routine in these cases, the fire squad opened the
windows and started fans to remove the smoke and identify the origin of
the fire. They located the core of the fire and attacked it from both the
inside and the outside. However, when they thought they had tamed the
fire, the unexpected occurred:
1 The “incident commander” is the person in charge of the solution of the emergency.
The role is specifically important for large emergencies involving several organizations, as
this person is in charge of coordinating the efforts.
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FC: “At one time, and I remember that perfectly well, this fire was
more or less clear where it was; then suddenly another one started,
in a different place. Later, a second outbreak and then a third,
somewhere else. Then, while operations were in progress, a further
outbreak was reported in the basement, where we had just passed.”
At this point, the officers started re-analysing the situation, but the
understanding they had built up to that moment and that had led them
to attack the fire showed several discrepancies:
FC: “I must say that I was very confused, I remember, very confused,
because the first outbreak could actually be there, I explained it to
myself. The second one was already a bit anomalous, but it could be
related in some way to the first. But the new outbreak, after three
quarters of an hour of intervention, two floors below the first fire?
that was really strange.”
In addition, a new outbreak has been reported in the basement, where
the incident commander just passed by; that piece of evidence did not fit
a logical explanation of how these new fires could have started:
FC: “It was strange because we in the basement had seen three bags
of potato starch used to prepare the gnocchi that were soaking wet
because the water from the pipes had leaked from the second-floor
walls to the basement. We had walked in the pulp of wet starch,
doing: splosh-splosh. […] In short, the situation was no longer
correct.
DC: “At least at first analysis, there was no logical correlation between
the first fire and the following ones.”
In this situation, they started exploring all the possible explanations:
FC: “So, when you hear that down in the basement it burns again, you
ask yourself, how is that possible? How can it be? […] In short, one
evaluates several hypotheses to give a reason to what is happening.”
DC: “At first, I […] had assumed that there was a channel connecting
the second floor with the basement, and that something had fallen
down that burned. For example, an elevator or a conduit.”
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However, their assessment was made difficult due to the lack of
information. For example, in this case, maps of the building were not
provided.
A large part of this analysing activity was performed in teams, at
the Incident Command Post, a temporary direction unit that is estab-
lished near the site to coordinate operations. Information on operations
converges to this post, where commanders reason on why each action is
performed and thus update their picture of the situation.
FC: “The scene is put together one piece after the other. And then
you start discussing; ’But what can it be?’ You try to integrate
the current understanding with additional information […]. For
example, it is possible that someone in the crew already knows the
building for having made inspections for fire prevention. All this
information is then shared.”
During this discussion, all the details were assessed, and the multiplicity
of observers was exploited. In this case, while it is normal that workers
and managers of the factory remain around the building or even inside in
the areas that are not on fire, both FC and DC noticed that they had met
a man several times during their inspections.
FC: “I may be confused, I may have been in the wrong direction, but
there were two of us and we both noticed the presence of this person.”
They set a context to validate the hypothesis that that man could be
an arsonist. They asked the police to hold him for an identity check;
thus, had they not observed any new outbreaks in the meantime, this
holding would have supported the arsonist hypothesis. The hypothesis
was validated and, in fact, it later came out that the man was a former
employee that had been fired shortly earlier. Therefore, it was understood
that there was someone who was setting the fire in new places while their
intervention was in progress.
The Challenge of New Emergencies
Organizations coping with novelty may increase their resilience in essen-
tially two ways. First, they can react to novel emergencies as they happen
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by adapting their response to the needs imposed by the new situation
(that is part of a processual resilience); second, they can work before
the emergency occurs, trying to enlarge the solutions to all the plau-
sible novel emergencies they can think of (that is part of the ex-ante
elaborated resilience-promoting factors) (Fisher et al., 2018). Emergency
management systems can apply both of these solutions, also in combi-
nation. However, the latter approach has been well developed by both
scholars and practitioners, unfolding under the themes of ‘anticipation’
(Wildavsky, 1988) and ‘preparedness’ (Hémond & Robert, 2012; Perry
et al., 2001). Likewise, the issue concerning how to support and to
design an organization that is able to detect and respond to novel and
unexpected emergencies is still an open question in both the literature
and from practitioners’ perspective. In particular, in the literature on
resilience, there are studies that conceive of resilience as an ongoing
activity that takes place together with the unfolding of events (Frigotto,
2020; also see first chapter of this book), some of them linking resilience
to mindfulness, i.e., the ability to sustain awareness of the present moment
(Frigotto & Zamarian, 2015). These studies underline that processes and
structures in organizations devoted to building reflection and designed to
diversify perspectives help enhance resilience. They explain how organiza-
tions can continuously support resilience while standard operations are
being performed by means of maintaining structures that are focused on
different domains or by supporting reflection on the existing procedures
while supporting experimentation and tolerating error.
In other words, they recognize that organizations need to combine
what March (1991, p. 71) defines as ‘exploration’ and ‘exploitation’,
intended respectively as pointing at ‘search, variation, risk taking, exper-
imentation, play, flexibility, discovery, innovation’ or at ‘refinement,
choice, production, efficiency, selection, implementation, execution’.
The extant literature elaborates on how to combine exploration and
exploitation within the same organization (e.g., O’Reilly & Tushman,
2013 on ambidexterity). However, it does not explain with sufficient
depth, at a more micro level, how these activities are combined in the
decision-making behaviour of the same individual and within the same
organizational team.
Our idea of organizations learning from novel emergencies as they
happen draws on Simon’s (1991) theory of learning. Simon conceives of
decision-making as an inferential process based on premises derived from
norms and goals (Cohen, 2007). Problem solvers rely on norms, beliefs
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and goals that are taken for granted. However, solving new problems
implies violating existing norms or reconsidering predefined goals.
This formulation seems particularly appropriate to analyse problem-
solving in crisis management. In fact, Roberts and Wernstedt (2018)
observe that emergency management systems consider how to choose
between available alternatives without explicitly taking into account values
and norms that constrain those decisions or to what extent the decision
process consists of automatic actions. Similarly, Simon’s framework on
solving new problems acknowledges the importance of these premises
(Simon, 1957, 1991).
In the field of emergency management, the concept of decision
premises has been used to explain how stable structures, such as disaster
management systems, can react in a flexible approach to facing unex-
pected events (Grothe-Hammer & Berthod, 2017), such as sudden and
large inflows of refugees (Meyer & Simpsa, 2018). An account of fail-
ures in dealing with unexpected crises as reported by Page et al. (2006)
while investigating the Hurricane Katrina incident notes that decision
premises are often deformed by several factors: (a) former commitments
to past choices, (b) negative information avoidance and defence of prior
choices, (c) delusion of control over uncontrollable events and (d) wishful
thinking.
To understand the challenges that new emergencies pose to emergency
management organizations2 and to analyse what specific issues they pose
in terms of resilience, this chapter takes a problem-solving perspective
(Dynes, 1994; Simon, 1957, 1991) and conceives new emergencies as
new problems to solve. Unfortunately, problems setting is itself a prob-
lematic issue, and identification and definition may not necessarily result
in a classification task. In real situations, the available information (i.e.,
contradictory, partial, and unreliable, etc.) and the evolving conditions
make it more difficult for the decision-makers to understand whether the
ambiguous and unclear situation is familiar or novel.
Therefore, decision-makers perceive unclear and ambiguous stimuli
that make them confront three possible alternatives: inaction, routinized
response, or original solution (Billings et al., 1980). Inaction means that
the organization does not react, because nothing has been detected and
2 In this chapter, we refer to emergency management organizations to indicate a class of
high-reliability organizations (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001), that is, organizations that operate
in complex and high-risk environments and still perform effectively and make few mistakes.
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therefore an emergency is not even perceived. Routinized response is
the familiar response that the organization executes when the situation
is perceived as familiar. Finally, an original solution is triggered when the
organization detects that the situation is different from usual ones and
that it requires a new problem formulation. Hence, solving new prob-
lems and learning from novel situations needs three major conditions to
occur. First, the organization has to be able to perceive that the situa-
tion at hand is different from the usual ones. Second, the organization
has to be able to react by adapting its response to the situation. Third, to
be resilient, the organization needs to react and respond in a timeframe
consistent with the survival of the system. To accomplish the first steps,
problem solvers need to develop a problem representation, a process that
is analysed in the next section.
Acquiring New Problem Representations
According to Simon and Newell (1971), problem solvers usually do not
have full knowledge of the environment they operate in; therefore, they
normally create a representation of the problem. To do so, problem
solvers tend to use a base of knowledge they already retain in their various
memories; they can rely on pre-acquired knowledge of the task envi-
ronment they are operating in and on their own past experience with
similar tasks and with components of the whole task they are facing. Addi-
tional sources of information are programmes (i.e., standard operating
procedures) and more abstract pieces of knowledge that do not pertain
to a specific situation but that are nevertheless considered relevant. For
instance, when confronting a novel emergency that may affect an unde-
fined number of people, an emergency management system that is still
trying to identify the causes may adopt standard procedures to mitigate
the negative effects of the hazard (Simon, 1991). A further source of
knowledge that problem solvers can use is simulations, which can help
generate hypothetical or counterfactual thinking.
If problem solvers are not able to gather any relevant information,
they can try to construct a representation of the problem in a more
abstract form. For instance, a city emergency management team may not
have prepared a plan for dealing with blackouts, but in the event of a
blackout, the team can reason in abstract terms about the main conse-
quences produced by a prolonged lack of electrical power and plan the
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response, the priorities and the actions to undertake to mitigate the effects
of the crisis.
To conceptualize novel situations, building on Simon (1991), we need
to define the conditions that allow the actors to create cognitive represen-
tations of new problems. One of the most problematic situations is faced
when actors fail to perceive the novelty and thus treat what is different
and new as something familiar. To avoid this failure, decision-makers
need to construct a representation of the problem that does not exclu-
sively derive from an existing corpus of knowledge; this condition can be
achieved in two complementary ways: by focusing on new information or
by acquiring new sources of information (Simon, 1991).
Normally, problem solvers approach a situation that looks familiar by
means of the usual representation of the problem. This approach should
indicate an appropriate solution. Nevertheless, when the problem is novel
and different, the decision-makers may notice anomalies in how the situ-
ation is characterized or evolves. If the anomalies persist, decision-makers
start doubting the current representation of the problem. To define a
novel problem representation, the decision-makers need to reconsider the
decision premises, which are composed of the following: beliefs; organiza-
tional arrangements (such as roles); communication channels; and, more
generally, pieces of knowledge that are taken for granted when decisions
are made. Following Simon (1991), we contend that decision premises
are a fundamental element in this respect, as decision-making consists of
a process of inference.
According to Cohen (2007), decision premises should be studied as
a unit of analysis to understand organizational behaviour at large. For
instance, authority can be framed as the acceptance of premises set by
hierarchical superiors. Similarly, trust can be defined as the acceptance of
premises by others without further inquiry.
Given the importance of decision premises in building a new repre-
sentation of the problem, it is necessary to understand how the deci-
sion premises are formed. In organizational settings, communication is
extremely important with respect to the formation of decision premises
in at least two ways. First, decision premises are shared within the
organization through communication channels. Second, communication
responsibility and communication channels are also elements forming
the decision premises; what makes legitimate the communication and
its content is also subject to decision premises. Therefore, any solution
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that organizations may consider to revise the decision premises should
incorporate communication.
According to Simon (1991), to elaborate a problem representation that
is useful to deal with novel problems, problem solvers have two comple-
mentary options. First, they can learn how to use an existing problem
representation and to explore its limits. For instance, problem solvers may
allocate some attention to assessing to what extent this representation
is coherent with pieces of evidence of the current situation. This effort
exposes the decision-makers to the usual two types of errors. A type 2
error (false negative) exists when our representation fails to acknowledge
actual states of the problem; a type 1 error (false positive) exists when the
representation considers states of the problem that do not exist. In other
words, the first option consists of assessing to what extent the representa-
tion of the problem is still useful to understand the situation. The second
option consists of creating a new representation for the novel problem.
Nevertheless, creating a new problem representation is only the first step
that organizations can undertake. The next is to enable organization
members to learn how to use the new problem representation.
How Simon (1991) describes the process through which problem
solvers approach a novel situation guided by decision premises can be
reformulated in cognitive terms as a sensemaking effort (Weick, 1995),
that is, an attempt to make sense of something that is not immediately and
clearly understood. Weick (1995, p. 4) agrees that sensemaking involves
‘placing stimuli into some kind of framework’ that is provided, in Simo-
nian terms, by the decision premises. In fact, decision premises define the
boundaries and context for the processes of cue noticing, filtering and
classifying that are essential elements of sensemaking. Trying to capture
the complexity of sensemaking in a synthetic image, Weick (2001) links
sensemaking to cartography and to the effort of orienting within a situ-
ation that seems to be underdefined, unclear or equivocal. Along with
this image, we observe that Simon’s decision premises provide the initial
coordination system that problem solvers adopt to orient themselves when
facing a novel situation.
An additional and convincing bridge connecting, problem-solving
perspective and sensemaking is provided by Schön (1983, p. 40), who
observes that ‘problems do not present themselves to the practitioners
as givens. They must be constructed from the materials of problem-
atic situations which are puzzling, troubling, and uncertain. To convert
a problematic situation to a problem, a practitioner must do a certain
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kind of work. He must make sense of an uncertain situation that initially
makes no sense’. In Simon’s (1991) language, decision premises serve as
building blocks to do that kind of work.
What we have thus far outlined to explain how organizations approach
novel problems by acquiring and developing appropriate problem repre-
sentations is not limited to a cognitive dimension but rather involves
precise and observable patterns of behaviour that Simon associates with
the idea of organizational roles.
The Structure of Roles
According to Simon (1991), organizational roles depict the role
embodied by single individuals in organizations or defined by a set of
tasks. ‘Roles tell organization members how to reason about the problems
and decisions that face them: where to look for appropriate and legitimate
informational premises and goal (evaluative) premises, and what tech-
niques to use in processing these premises’ (Simon, 1991, pp. 126–127).
From this perspective, roles are not systems of ‘prescribed behaviours’, as
they are typically considered but are rather systems of ‘accepted decision
premises’. Roles instruct people on how to reason about the representa-
tion of the problem and the decisions—where to look for appropriate and
legitimate informational and goal premises and what techniques to use in
legitimating these premises.
Roles imply responsibilities, division of labour and coordination mech-
anisms that regulate organizational behaviour. They can be general in
nature and persistent across time and organization. For instance, in busi-
ness firms, some roles, such as selling, production, and accounting, etc.,
historically tend to always be present and are defined in functional terms.
In the field of emergency management systems, crisis management has
been traditionally conceptualized by decomposing the overall problem
into four interrelated subproblems: preparedness, mitigation, response
and recovery. This cognitive representation of the management of crises
provides the scaffolding to create distinct roles and decision premises in
each of these four elements.
In some cases, such as in military or military-like organizations, roles
are formally and explicitly defined hierarchically. Alternatively, roles can
emerge by imitation from other organizations that are taken as models.
For instance, a well-known role system in emergency management, such
as the Incident Command System (ICS) developed in the USA in the
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1970s, has been subsequently adopted by other countries and eventually
became an international standard (York & MacAlister, 2015).
As a further example, firms that build their competitive advantage
on safety, efficiency and/or customer satisfaction underpin differentiated
roles that eventually contribute to generate that distinctiveness (Simon,
1991). Roles are connected to specialization and to the development
of domain-specific knowledge that is coherent with the goals of the
firm. Consistent with this line of thought, we can also assume that
organizations may create new roles to redefine their goals.
The Role of Challenger of Decision Premises
Among the new roles that existing organizations can adopt, we are inter-
ested in roles that increase the organizational ability to perceive, react and
learn how to cope with novel problems deriving in particular from new
and unexpected emergencies. From the perspective of Simon’s (1991)
decision premises, novelty requires emergency management organizations
to redefine the decision premises they use to make sense of the world
(Weick, 1995). This approach implies, first, acknowledging the idea that
not all possible emergencies are already known, even though the organi-
zation has already acquired a considerable amount of knowledge through
previous experience, and that the problem representation that was built
by relying on that knowledge is not always useful. A second implica-
tion for emergency management organizations concerns how they can
prepare for novel emergencies. In fact, a resilient response to novelty is
not attained by preparing the organization response in advance, given
that the emergency is not known in advance and cannot be anticipated.
Instead, the response has to be elaborated during the setback. As deci-
sion premises are discussed and reconstructed in relation to novelty, the
actions and the states of response and recovery are learned throughout
the crisis. However, this learning does not imply that nothing can be
done before the crisis. In contrast, the elaboration and exercise of a reper-
toire of standard responses provides the necessary ingredients for further
combination and ex novo generation of responses when novelty is faced.
In addition, preparation can consist of training the ability to challenge
decision premises, as they are typically taken for granted (Frigotto, 2018).
Under such revised decision premises, emergency detection ceases to
be a simple task of classification, where the decision-makers use contextual
information to identify which type of crisis they are facing. In contrast,
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it becomes a task that concerns the acquisition of continuous aware-
ness on the decision premises that underpin organizations’ decisions and
operations. Nevertheless, decision-makers may not be able to assess that
novelty is implied in the current situation; they may perceive the situa-
tion as implausible or unthinkable and therefore out of the spectrum of
possibilities. Alternatively, they eventually may not perceive it at all. In
other words, once new and unexpected emergencies are deemed possible,
then the emergency recognition cannot be simply reduced to technical
rationality and requires the ability to scrutinize and make sense of weak,
contradictory and evolving cues (Weick, 1995). Not only the situation
itself may appear novel to the decision-makers but also their own actions
may produce unintended consequences.
Because of these reasons, to increase resilience in facing novel and
unexpected crises, organizations may introduce a dedicated role in charge
of challenging decision premises that is responsible for continuously
doubting the conventional representation of the situation while it unfolds.
We represent this role in Fig. 2.1. Consistent with Simon’s (1991)
perspective, we modelled this role within a role system that results from a
division of labour aimed at letting individuals specialize in specific areas.
Each role features a set of accepted decision premises coherent with the
Fig. 2.1 The challenger of decision premises as a role (Source Authors own
elaboration)
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need to monitor and explore a specific subset of problems. Decision
premises are ‘sticky’ and partly define each role and, consequently, the
expectations that others have of the actions of the person occupying that
role. Therefore, all else equal, we cannot expect roles to evolve signifi-
cantly on their own. The process of challenging the decision premises,
then, is paramount for the ability of the organization to face novel situ-
ations, as a novel situation, by definition, is a situation that falls outside
the scope of the existing decision premises.
Coherently with this Simonian approach, decision premises are legit-
imized through a learning process. Each role, as we noted above,
encompasses a set of decision premises that are considered legitimate
as long as they allow the decision-maker to produce outcomes that are
coherent with the design of the role he/she was assigned and, in turn,
as long as the role thus played is coherent with organizational goals.
The legitimacy of discrete, individual actions is thus mainly a matter of
conformity. The ability to face novelty at the organizational level is clearly
outside the scope of these actions. Suchman (1995), examining the strate-
gies that organizations employ for maintaining legitimacy, underscores
the need to exert bridging efforts that can encompass logics that are
different from the ones currently prevailing within the organization/role.
One significant example of bridging effort of this kind is the so-called
‘doubting Thomases’ that have the explicit mandate to question others’
taken-for-granted assumptions (Ashforth & Gibbs, 1990). In Fig. 2.1,
for the sake of clarity, we represent the process of challenging decision
processes as pertaining to a new role (i.e., Challenger of the decision
premises, or CDP).
An explicit mandate, however, does not translate automatically in the
needed level of legitimacy to act in this fashion. March and Simon (1958)
clarify that problem-solving activities can happen because of a process
that they call ‘recognition’. In this cognitive process, problem-solving
actions and problem situations are matched. This process appears obvious
for standard roles stemming from division of labour, however, under-
standing why it can be applied to a role characterized as being devoted
to discussing accepted decision premises requires a further step. In fact,
we are talking about a role that aims (as a rule) to apply the recognition
process to situations that are (or could be) novel. In fact, we claim that
the process of challenging decision premises can work under the logic of
recognition in two distinct cases. The first such case is when an event, or a
series of events, had dire consequences for the survival of the organization
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and the organization itself only admitted a standard problem-solving logic
based on division of labour, roles with sticky decision premises and the ex-
ante conviction that all relevant contingencies had been taken care of. In
case of failure, it is reasonable to believe that the organization would not
only revise the decision premises of each role, or even redesign its system
of roles, but also integrate a different logic in decision-making. A second
case is the case of organizations facing such an unforgiving environment
that constantly discussing the decision premises regulating its problem-
solving processes represents a basic strategy to face the risk of annihilation.
Further, we should observe that only relying on the principle that a person
embodying this role needs to be recognized as an authoritative source of
knowledge and competence would entail an inherent element of frailty
for the organization.
From this perspective, reasoning about a problem essentially means
ascertaining a) where to look for appropriate and legitimate decision
premises and b) how to process these premises; what other and apparently
unrelated contexts may provide alternative decision premises that seem
appropriate? Under different premises, what boundaries of the problems,
previously unforeseen, become evident? What new states are unveiled?
What future consequences can be inferred? What new domains of exper-
tise gain a critical importance in identifying a solution? Filling this role
implies a legitimate challenge to the explanations of the situation that
seems to fit most of the evidence and thus urges consideration of new
information premises that are otherwise underweighted or missing and
the processing of these premises to construct novel representations. To
reach this goal, we propose to introduce a new role, associated with the
following specific duties: setting novel and different decision premises
that provide the grounds of assumption upon which rest formulating and
endorsing problem solutions that would otherwise be rejected, as they are
not compatible with the conventional beliefs.
Whoever exerts this role has the responsibility to question the accepted
decision and goal premises that provide the grounds for any decision-
making. In addition, this role implies the ability to develop a new
representation of the problem and to use it for the decision to be made.
Consequently, problem-solving is not conceived of as a linear sequence
of phases but rather as an iterative and circular process, where premises
are constantly being questioned as well as the co-evolution of premises,
problems and solutions.
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In addition, the role also implies enabling organizational members to
learn how to use the new representation of a novel problem. In terms
of organizational learning, this role entails two complementary processes:
connecting new information and knowledge first to the existing culture
and second to the existing role system. This process can be hard to
undertake when organizations assume that, because of their expertise,
everything is already known, and further explorations of the problem may
unveil some inconsistencies in the problem representation.
Emergency management organizations can quickly react to critical
events by executing complex responses involving various organizations
or subunits; nevertheless, this expertise requires relying on a shared
and consistent problem representation that may be endangered by new
representations.
A Theoretical Perspective on the Everlasting Fire
Conceptualizing organizational resilience as a process of learning to solve
novel and unexpected problems led us to consider the combination of
decision premises, problem representations and role systems, as proposed
by Simon (1991), to explain the organizational capability of dynamically
solving new problems. In many instances, resilience is portrayed as the
ability of an existing structure of roles to be robust in the face of adver-
sity (Linnenluecke, 2017). In our approach, in contrast, resilience consists
of the ability to change by means of learning to scrutinize and chal-
lenge the current system of decision premises. To acquire this form of
resilience, organizations may deliberately introduce and support the CDP
role described above.
The case presented at the beginning of this chapter (second Section)
concerned an emergency management organization facing a novel emer-
gency that lies outside the realm of organizational decision premises. After
having outlined the theoretical framework, the case is commented below,
and further theoretical development is provided.
At first, the emergency resembled a normal fire; nothing was discon-
certing or unexpected. Nevertheless, during the operations, firefighters
began to notice some discrepancies between what they observed and what
they expected. These discrepancies were initially explained according to
the usual decision premises. Confronted with the first anomaly, actors
thought that they had not seen the fire when they had gone through
the basement because of the dense smoke. Confronted with the second
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anomaly, firefighters thought that fire does not spread from top to
bottom. However, from previous experiences, they knew that such a
spread could happen through conduits; often, these conduits are not
visible. Confronted with the third oddity, that a person was repeatedly
seen walking inside the building, firefighters guessed that this was perhaps
an employee, as often happens in plants; they also considered the possi-
bility that, because of the smoke, the person in question was not always
the same. In terms of sensemaking, the discrepancies triggered a need
for explanation (Weick, 1995), which is initially found within the space
of the possibilities consistent with the assumed premises. In terms of a
trade-off between exploration and exploitation (March, 1991), at the
beginning, the problem solvers try to explain the situation by relying
on the decision premises and, therefore, by exploiting a consolidated
problem representation. Since the discrepancies persist, problem solvers
also explore alternative possibilities not backed up by assumed premises.
In other words, what we observe is an ambidextrous response, consisting
of both exploitation and exploration, that enriches the organizational
response and, ultimately, its resilience.
The fundamental discrepancy that forced firefighters to question their
representation of the problem was timing; after many hours, the fire had
not yet been tamed. The longer the fire lasted, the more relevant the
discrepancy appeared. Eventually, all the discrepancies were account by,
but to make sense of them and to formulate the hypothesis that the
arsonist was still around to light additional fires, firefighters needed to
reconsider their problem representation by including a possible state that
was not initially conceived. In fact, arsons were certainly included into
the problem representation conceived by an experienced fire brigade;
nevertheless, the accepted decision premises considered the model of
an arsonist that lights the fire and then flees the scene. In this case,
the fire flared up in a way that was considered inconsistent until the
firemen formulated an alternative (novel) hypothesis that contrasted with
the accepted decision premises and acted to test the former.
In devising the hypothesis that the arsonist was still lighting fires, the
Fire Chief and his Deputy played the role of the CDP. As a matter of fact,
they tried to think beyond the consolidated problem representation and
learned to solve the novel emergency while it was unfolding. Moreover,
while they noticed the discrepancies, they also started challenging their
own decision premises. They considered a novel representation of the
problem and used that representation to conceive and execute an action
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(i.e., asking the police to stop the suspect with an excuse) that could
allow them to learn whether their hypothesis was supported by additional
evidence. The cycle of sensemaking is then complete (Weick, 1995); the
surprise generated by the discrepancies moves beyond the need for expla-
nation and, instead, triggers a sequence of actions that eventually produce
a revision of the decision premises.
This case suggests further reflections on the role of the CDP that we
outlined to increase organizational resilience in dealing with novel and
unexpected emergencies.
First, thinking out of the box implies questioning the current system
of knowledge, that is, decision premises and accepted representations of
the problem. Legitimacy is a critical aspect of this process and of the
CDP role. Not surprisingly, in this emergency, the role was filled by
experienced officers at the top of the hierarchy. Nevertheless, we wish to
emphasize that these conditions are not necessary requirements to fill the
role, provided that the CDP role is legitimated by the hierarchy. Second,
challenging the decision premises is not the only main task of the CDP;
this role implies that organizations learn and use new problem represen-
tations constructed on revised decision premises and behave accordingly.
To reach this collective achievement, the CDP may rely on organizational
communication.
Conclusions
In this chapter, we conceived of organizational resilience as the ability
to perform the exploration of a new set of alternatives to solve novel
problems when the exploitative application of the current set seems
unexpectedly ineffective (March, 1991); at that point, discrepancies are
noticed, and they may trigger a revision of the decision premises. Building
on Simon (1991) and his insightful remarks on the importance of decision
premises to guide organizational behaviour, we can anticipate and explain
why organizations may face fundamental difficulties in integrating two
distinct perspectives, such as proactiveness and reactiveness, in the context
of conflicting decision premises. On the one hand, resilience is intrinsically
a processual property and is connected to the unfolding of the events; on
the other hand, what the organizations learn to increase their resilience
in dealing with a novel crisis is a capability that will be available ‘ex-ante’
and that we associate with the introduction of a CDP within the role
system. The case being explored contributes to a richer understanding
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of resilience when organizations are dealing with novel or unexpected
crises. We argue that preparedness can enhance resilience, when and if
it includes learning on how to solve new crises while they unfold. We
defined a particular profile within the organizational role structure, the
CDP, that may be decisive to identify solutions that initially were not even
considered as they were not part of the representation of the problem.
By designing behaviours and roles that support the challenge and refor-
mulation of decision premises and that can be learnt before novel and
unexpected adversities take place, but also by leaving their processual
deployment and specific content to the time slot when adversities hit, our
chapter contributes to the understanding of resilience as a phenomenon
that occurs and can be designed both in foresight and while adversities
take place.
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As soon as this so-called layer touched me, I was overthrown, because it was
much bigger than I thought it was.
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These quotes from a ski-hiker describing how he got hit by an
avalanche exemplify the context focused upon in this chapter. Such a situ-
ation of surprise leaves no room for beforehand planning or preparation,
evaluation and reflection of the event. To survive, the ski-hiker must be
trained in certain rules, but he has to simultaneously expand his option
space where rules are misleading.
In the current volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous environ-
ments (D’Aveni, 1995; Fiksel, 2015), under strong competitive pressures
(Asano, 2012), organizations are required to cope with crises (Kahn et al.,
2013), economic distress (Klehe et al., 2012) and surprises (Buchanan &
Denyer, 2013; Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2008). The resulting interest in the
value of resilience (Moenkemeyer et al., 2012; Välikangas & Romme,
2013), led to calls for additional research into the antecedents of success-
fully managing surprise (e.g., Meneghel et al., 2016). On the organiza-
tional level this also provides the motivation to explore the relationships
and trade-offs between exploitation of existing knowledge and organiza-
tional codes and the exploration into new domains of knowledge through
organizational learning (March, 1991).
In this chapter we focus on the role of rules in exploitation processes
in surprising situations, and in processes of exploration in the sense of
expanding the actor’s option space where directly applicable rules are
lacking or where the rigid following of rules may be detrimental. The
goal of this chapter is to answer the following research question: What
is the relationship between types of skill development and resilient action
in surprising situations? For this, we explore the link between types
of training and background knowledge and resilient action. We begin
with an overview of current research on resilience, adopt a definition of
resilience and resilient action. A summary of literature about rules and
routines follows and we link these concepts by focusing on a specific
mode of skill development, called drill. In the Empirical Study section, we
describe the research setting and methods we used to collect and analyse
data. Results of the analysis, summarized in the Findings section, are then
used to create a model of relationships between modes of skill develop-
ment and resilient action in situation and surprise. Finally, we discuss the
implications of this research.
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Theoretical Background
A diverse set of research deals with both the necessity and the rigidity
of rules or routines of individual actors and organizations. This has
been examined already from various perspectives, such as organizational
learning (March, 1991), organizational routines (Feldman, 2000, 2003;
Feldman & Pentland, 2003), and by studying the interplay between
rule-following and rule-breaking (Ortmann, 2010). Literature on sense-
making, such as by Weick (1995), provides further options for exploring
the conditions and antecedents for dealing with unexpected situations,
particularly by emphasizing the influence of the actor’s identity. Some-
what contrasting the primary focus on the organizational level of these
contributions, we focus on the individual and view the organization as
the context for resilient action.
Resilience and Resilient Action
Resilience has been the subject of research for decades, with a large
number of definitions being formulated in various research fields and
from different perspectives (Linnenluecke, 2017), sparking the forma-
tion of multiple branches of resilience research. One of these branches
describes resilience as the ability of a system to bounce back to its orig-
inal state after encountering adversity (Sawalha, 2015), with some authors
asserting that more resilient systems do not only return to their previous
state, but come out of the adverse event more prosperous than before
(Carvalho et al., 2012). Another branch views resilience as the ability of
a system to remain within a certain threshold when faced with adversity.
Gaillard (2007) claims that a system is resilient as long as it maintains
its original function or identity despite adversity. This may be achieved
through adjustments within the system which enable the system to adapt
(McCarthy et al., 2017; Ortiz-de-Mandojana & Bansal, 2016). In this
chapter, we adopt the view of resilience as the ability of a system or an
individual to remain within a certain threshold following adverse events,
this threshold being represented by the system’s or individual’s ability to
continue operations and maintain its identity.
Means of achieving resilience are also being debated. One line of
research suggests that resilience is a result of the implementation of
certain structures, strategies (Somers, 2009) and culture (Daskon, 2010)
within an organization. Others suggest that resilience results from
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behaviours at the individual level, which enhance the ability of the entire
system to withstand adversity (Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011). We propose to
reconcile these two views by adding to the above definition resilience to
be potentially supported by specific organizational conditions. This defi-
nition of resilient action thus corresponds to the use of the term in, for
example, Smith et al. (2014), who suggest that specific resilient practices
maintain resilience, or Smith et al. (2013), who reserve the term resilient
action for actions which address a specific safety barrier.
Antecedents of Resilient Action
The Role of Rules
Knowledge is the ability to draw distinctions between concepts within a
certain domain of action based on context and theory (Tsoukas, 2005).
According to Gatarik and Born (2012), knowledge is composed of
four components: expert knowledge (including experience and expertise),
procedural knowledge (including rules and routines), folk- and cultural
knowledge and explanatory meta-knowledge. First, we focus on rules,
which can be defined as repetitive, unchanging patterns of behaviour.
Tsoukas (2005, p. 74) refers to rules as ‘generalizations connecting types
of behaviour by types of actors to types of outcomes’. In this sense,
Tsoukas emphasized the role of a decision-maker’s ability to distinguish
such situations that fit the type of behaviour mandated by a rule. Based
on this distinction, an individual would then decide whether to follow a
rule.
Rules provide a means to coordinate and control processes, streamline
decision-making by providing a pre-determined response and protect an
organization from uncertainty by fixing certain parameters and providing
the possibility of predictable behaviour in uncertain situations (Becker,
2004). Additionally, rules may act as shock absorbers at the organizational
level by gradually aligning certain aspects of each rule to current demands
of an organization’s environment (Berente et al., 2016). Moreover, rules
can be a resource when attempting to balance and manage conflicting
goals in an organization, even allowing an organization to accomplish
multiple conflicting goals at the same time by facilitating new connec-
tions between members of an organization (Salvato & Rerup, 2018).
Certain routines can also lead to new outcomes and novel solutions in
organizations (Deken et al., 2016).
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Rules can be broken, which traditionally is negatively framed in the
organizational literature as a form of deviance (Martin et al., 2013;
Tyler & Blader, 2005). Ortmann (2010), however, claims that the
possibility of rule-breaking is necessary for the effective functioning of
organizations. This is due to what he refers to as drift, incremental
changes in rules which result in rules no longer fulfilling their purpose.
Thus, following rules without reflection may have disastrous results.
Ortmann (2010) provides examples of such cases, such as friendly fire
occurring in Iraq, with more in literature (e.g., Oliver et al., 2017, 2019;
Schakel et al., 2016).
The idea that rules can change over time is supported by Feldman
(2000), who argues that the changes result from agents following rules
while reflecting on the outcomes. If following a rule has unintended
outcomes or does not show the intended outcomes, or if agents perceive
a potential of the rule to lead to greater outcomes, they change the rule.
These changes occur gradually over repeated instances of rule-following,
possibly benign and unnoticed (Feldman, 2003). However, as Ortmann’s
(2010) concept of drift emphasizes, these small changes may accumu-
late to the point of no return. A similar effect has been shown on the
organizational level for the trade-off between exploration and exploitation
already in March’s (1991) seminal work. The short-term benefits of rule
following, in March’s terms following the organizational code, are offset
by a lack of code development which is only possible through deviation
from rules.
Kœnig et al. (2016) distinguish two types of rules: complex rules which
cannot be expected to be followed strictly and absolutely, as they are too
specific to fit a large number of situations; and basic rules, which can
be expected to be followed strictly by every competent actor, because
they are broad enough that they will fit essentially any situation in such
a way that strictly following the rule will lead to the fulfillment of its
original purpose. To illustrate this distinction Kœnig et al. (2016, p. 5
citing Reynaud, 1993, pp. 35-36) use the complex rule of speed limits and
the simple rule of stop signs in traffic. The rule of speed limits in traffic
cannot be expected to always be strictly followed, as such strict adherence
would defeat the original purpose of the rule: to increase road safety. For
example, when overtaking, adhering to the speed limit would make the
manoeuvre take longer, thus reducing safety. Contrary to this, the basic
rule of stop signs can be expected to always be strictly observed, ceteris
paribus, as it is broad enough that following it never hurts its original
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purpose. As such, Kœnig et al. provide an interesting third perspective
into the debate about adherence to rules by confirming that there are
indeed rules that need to be broken when the situation demands it; but
that there are also rules that should never be broken. However, the idea of
basic rules works with the assumption of unchanging circumstances and
competent actors. In volatile environments where circumstances change
often, even basic rules may be required to change to adhere to new
facts. Alternatively, a repertoire of basic rules may be created from which
members of an organization can choose a basic rule to follow appropriate
to the situation at hand.
The Power of Drill
Rules are also viewed as a container through which knowledge is shared
(Kieser & Koch, 2008). A widely used technique for transferring rules is
drill, used successfully in sports (Reade et al., 2008), in disaster response
(Alim et al., 2015), in military training or when teaching mental proce-
dures, such as mathematical operations (Hsiao et al., 2018). We use the
term “drill” metaphorically to generalize it to all methods of repetitive
training either at teaching settings or jobs, which require trainees to
rehears methods, rules, tactics and behavioural patterns over and over
again until these patterns can be exercised in an automated manner. By
making lower level processes effortless and automatic, drill allows more
cognitive capacity to be used for higher level thinking. Additionally, drill
supplies actors with a repertoire of broad patterns of behaviour and rules,
from which those actors can subsequently choose a response appropriate
to their situation. This is in accordance with the notion of basic rules
(Kœnig et al., 2016), which are broad enough to be strictly followed.
However, drill has also been criticized in the sense that simple drill leads
to rigid patterns of thinking and action, reducing flexibility and poten-
tial for novelty (Lehtinen et al., 2017). On the other hand, research
in teaching mathematics has shown that if properly supplemented, drill
can result in innovative solutions (Baroody, 2003). This resonates well
with the notion that knowledge is comprised of multiple components
(Gatarik & Born, 2012), as simple drill transfers only one of these compo-
nents, rules. The other components then need to be transferred in some
other way as a supplement to drill.
Training for resilience using drill has, so far, received little attention,
with research focused instead on training using scenarios of escalating
situations (e.g., Bergström et al., 2011), mental therapy and control of
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thought patterns (e.g., Reivich et al., 2011), or coaching (e.g., Grant
et al., 2009). Robertson et al. (2015) offer a systematic review of
resilience training interventions used in organizations. The connection
between outcomes of drill and resilient action also received little attention.
Furthermore, it remains unclear what kind of supplementary knowledge
allows use of drilled procedures to create new solutions. This chapter
fills this research gap by revealing the link between drill supplemented by
background knowledge and resilient action in the field in a military orga-
nization. Although change of rules has received attention (e.g., Feldman,
2000; Feldman & Pentland, 2003), little has been revealed about how
the purpose of a rule may change. For exploring into this we build on the
concept of exaptation.
Exaptation
The term ‘exaptation’ is used to refer to the process of using old means to
achieve new ends. As an example, Gould and Vrba (1982) tell the story
of the exaptation of feathers. The original function of feathers was ther-
moregulation. Only later have feathers been exapted for flight (Gould &
Vrba, p. 11). Exaptation as a concept has since made the leap into other
areas of research, such as innovation management and entrepreneurship.
In innovation management and entrepreneurship, exaptation has been
demonstrated as an important process in the creation of new products
and new market niches, with cases such as Viagra, a drug originally devel-
oped to counter heart disease, being exapted as a means to combat erectile
dysfunction (Dew & Sarasvathy, 2016). Additionally, Ching (2016) found
that exaptation has a positive effect on organizational performance by
allowing organizations to make use of their old assets or perceived junk
in new ways, thereby opening new possibilities.
New insights and ideas often emerge as a result of knowledge exchange
between actors from different backgrounds (e.g., Andriani & Cattani,
2016). People come up with new theories and ideas as they perceive
reality. These possibilities cannot be fully transferred onto them from
other actors or rules, there are always potential new possibilities that
emerge from actors’ interactions with their environment, if those actors
are given the freedom to make these interactions and the option of
making use of new possibilities when they find them (Felin et al., 2016).
Exaptation occurs when old assets are used for new purposes. These assets
include such that were designed for some purpose, assets that were origi-
nally by-products, or assets that had an unknown purpose or no purpose
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at all (Garud et al., 2016). This may also apply to knowledge and talent,
if organizational conditions allow it. In our case, exaptation is used in
the context of learned procedures being used in novel ways to achieve
previously unforeseen results. Thus, rules can be the source of not only
exploitation, the use of already known solutions, but, through exaptation,
also a source of exploration, the creation of new solutions (March, 1991).
Empirical Study
As the empirical context we chose the Austrian Military due to the nature
of the environments in which it operates, such as the Golan Heights in
Syria, Kosovo, or Chad; places where stakes are high and unexpected
events occur frequently, providing a rich source of data about managing
surprise. The history of the Austrian Military reaches back centuries,
presently relying on professional soldiers, employees and conscripts to
achieve its goals. It cooperates with numerous international organizations
in peace-keeping missions around the world. The Commander-in-Chief is
the Austrian Federal President, though the power of supreme command
rests in the hands of the Minister of Defence. The military receives its
resources from the federal budget, and its employees are state employees.
The goals of the military are set by the interests of the Republic of
Austria. From the point of view of publicness, defined as ‘the degree to
which organizations are affected by political authority’ (Bozeman, 1987,
p. xi; cf. Walker & Bozeman, 2011), this makes the Austrian Military
public to a large degree, as a significant portion of its goals and means
to achieve them are determined by political authority. However, through
certain elements such as cooperation with private entities, for example,
interpreters in missions and deployments, the military maintains a degree
of privateness.
We rely on theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007),
selecting a setting that matches the described problem. Finding patterns
that are outside the scope of ordinary management allows us to place into
perspective data that would average out across large categories (Starbuck,
1992). By using an extreme setting, we may uncover what makes indi-
viduals, groups and organizations able to cope with surprise. Studies of
high reliability focus on environments where high reliability is necessary
(Achour & Price, 2010; Gittell et al., 2006).
Another reason for selecting the Austrian Military, as opposed to other
military organizations, is their unique style of leadership and approach to
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training. This doctrine, referred to in this text as mission command tactics
(Auftragstaktik in German), equips the Austrian Military with high flexi-
bility by allowing autonomy in the decision-making of frontline members
in their area of influence (Wittmann, 2012), contributing to the orga-
nization’s ability to cope with surprise and requiring all members of the
Austrian Military (further referred to as ‘officers’) to be highly trained and
well informed. Thus, the setting should provide data concerning methods
of employee development.
Research Setting
Respondents for semi-structured interviews were selected based on open-
ended pilot interviews with the Editor in Chief of the Austrian Military
Journal at the Austrian National Defence Academy, with representatives
of the Department for Security Policy and the Department of Plan-
ning and Evaluation at the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports. The
pilot interviews resulted in contacts to respondents for semi-structured,
narrative-based (Czarniawska, 2004) interviews which provided the core
of our data, and in combination with documents also provided triangula-
tion for the ideas that emerged from the qualitative analysis (Jick, 1979;
Suddaby, 2006).
Ten respondents were included in semi-structured interviews. These
were all men of diverse educational and professional backgrounds and
military rank. Seven were commissioned officers (COs), three were non-
commissioned officers (NCOs). The NCOs graduated from the Army
Sergeant Academy (Heeresunteroffiziersakademie) in Enns, Austria. The
COs were subject to six years of training and education, including
one preparation year, a Bachelor program of three years, and a Master
program of two years.
Data collection began after receiving a list of respondents and took
place over a period of two months, between November and December
2017. Interviews lasted between 90 and 130 minutes. All interviews were
recorded with prior acceptance of respondents, transcribed and sent to
their respective respondents for confirmation of accuracy. Data-collection
stopped after ten interviews, based on simultaneous data analyses of
interviews and supplementary documents revealing category saturation
(Strauss & Corbin, 1990).
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Analysis
Analysis of interview data follows grounded theory (GT) (Glaser &
Strauss, 1967) using techniques of constant comparison, theoretical sensi-
tivity, theoretical sampling and theoretical saturation. First-order cate-
gories are generated from personal interpretations of events by people
who experienced them (Van Maanen, 1979), utilizing MAXQDA soft-
ware which facilitated the identification of nestings and overlaps among
codes. Based on first-order interpretations, second-order concepts were
formulated, which offer a deeper and more theoretical insight into the
observed phenomena and their relationships. Two coders met regularly
with other members of the research team to gain insight and to be
challenged to find alternative explanations for findings. Inter-coder agree-
ment checks were performed to ensure trustworthiness of the research
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985).
Findings
We describe the results of our data analysis on the level of second-
order concepts leading to a model which connects training practices and
behavioural patterns that aid with resilient action in unexpected situations.
Although officers train a wide range of routines to guide behaviour, they
encounter contexts in which they cannot follow trained procedures. In
such circumstances, officers must rely on reflection and evaluation to find
new solutions. These include engaging in a set of routines in circum-
stances different from situations which those routines were created for, as
well as completely new actions.
Background Knowledge
…they have been briefed thoroughly on the political situation, which parties
exist, we had briefings on each and every minister. We had it before we
deployed, and we had it within the mission. And whenever newcomers came,
we briefed them again. [R1—01:02:33]
The Austrian Military functions in contexts where it is difficult to
predict consequences of actions. Background knowledge of rules stands
at the centre of these predictions. It allows the existence of the specific
organizational conditions of the Austrian Military and enables behavioural
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patterns of its members. Therefore, officers are armed with knowledge
from various fields relevant to their deployment, such as local geography,
politics and national culture. This additional background knowledge
allows them to evaluate their situation with greater richness, as they can
contextualize situations appropriately.
One respondent described how during his deployment, he intended to
build positive relationships with locals, believing it would contribute to
the mission. However, he ran into cultural differences, giving an example
of men holding his hand when they walked together down the street.
Thanks to his background knowledge of the area and local culture, he
knew this was a sign of trust. Therefore, he tolerated the behaviour, as he
didn’t want to lose the trust of the locals and exhibit hostile behaviour.
Officers are briefed on the history of the conflict that they are trying to
resolve. This contextual knowledge allows them to judge the relevance of
information. Respondents described situations where context knowledge
enabled them to decide correctly, such as whether a course of action which
would lead to escalation is appropriate. Similarly, economic and social
knowledge is also used to judge whether following guidelines benefit the
objective of a mission. A respondent describes how he repeatedly had to
make the decision whether to arrest certain types of criminals. He argued
that while arresting criminals was generally the right thing to do, in this
case, the criminal activity in question was the primary source of income for
the majority of the country’s citizens. Systematically arresting these crim-
inals would thus result in an increase in overall poverty. The respondent
therefore sought different solutions.
Officers obtain background knowledge through a combination of
organizational systems of training, and of personally motivated engage-
ment. Regular debriefing takes place following every mission. During
debriefing sessions, assessments are made of what did or did not work
during the mission, and why. Briefing sessions also happen at the start
of a mission, which also repeat every time new officers arrive at the area
of deployment, so that they all have the necessary background knowl-
edge. The basis for these briefings, as well as ground rules of engagement
and common practices, is regularly updated based on new knowledge.
As for background knowledge obtained through personal engagement,
this can take place in the form of talks with individuals from the area of
deployment, such as expats or refugees. Officers understand that back-
ground knowledge is included in their training because wrong behaviour
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at the wrong time can lead to failure of a mission. Additionally, back-
ground knowledge also allows officers to reflect on their situation in
greater detail. This combined with the knowledge of the limits of appli-
cability of routines results in the ability to make good decisions even in
volatile situations.
Training
You grip (parachute string) in your right hand, you pull first right, wait two
seconds, then you pull left. It works automatically, you do not need to think
about it. [R7—00:27:51]
Officers undergo rigorous training to ensure that they are prepared for
any challenge. Training takes years and covers a lot of ground. One might
say that training in the Austrian Military never ends, as the respondents
underwent multiple extra training courses over the duration of their mili-
tary service. Even during deployment, they keep training and learning
new things.
Outputs of training in the Austrian Military include automatized action
and possession of background knowledge. Automatized action is the
result of drill, a type of training which consists of repeating the same
set of steps. Based on data, two interconnected types of drill were identi-
fied, pure drill and preaptative drill. Pure drill refers to the basic military
training consisting of repeated sets of steps. These sets are repeated until
they can be executed without thinking, thus making mental capacity avail-
able for other cognition. Pure drill has the goal of enabling automatized
action, its result can be compared to a guitarist switching the positions of
his fingers between chords. A guitarist thinks about which chord to play,
not where his fingers need to go. Officers describe experiencing a similar
feeling, acting out certain sets of procedures without thinking about
the individual steps. Pure drill is also used to teach rules of behaviour
in certain situations, what kind of information is necessary for certain
decisions, or use of certain equipment. New drilled procedures can be
developed during deployment. One respondent stated that they organized
a competition with such a goal, which resulted in techniques discovered
during the mission being incorporated into drilled procedures.
Learning only through drill may have unintended consequences. A
respondent described a situation that almost escalated due to soldiers
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following drilled behaviour. Coming suddenly under fire from an
unknown assailant, the soldiers prepared their guns and almost opened
fire. However, in this case, returning fire would have been the wrong
decision. The respondent told his soldiers not to fire and found out
that the person firing at them was a panicking policeman. To prevent
escalations in such situations, drill is supplemented with education of
background knowledge, resulting in preaptative drill. Supplementing pure
drill with background knowledge thus results in a readiness to adapt to
new situations before these new situations occur.
The second possible supplement to pure drill is experience of new
contexts. This gives officers opportunities to consider the application and
limits of routines. Unexpected orders require a check of drilled procedures
and routines for the possibility of their application and their limita-
tions. Exposure to different contexts in training and experience enhances
analogical capabilities which have been found also as part of exaptative
innovation (Mastrogiorgio & Gilsing, 2016, p. 1422), where the ability
to link different domains of knowledge and experience creates the possi-
bility of ‘creative synthesis’. By combining drill and context learning
of background knowledge, officers receive experience of congruity by
repeatedly applying routines, as well as experience of disruption of
congruity by breaking routines in new contexts. This process has been
labelled punctuated incongruity by Patil and Tetlock (2014).
Stabilizing the Action System
…I said to myself: wait a minute. What is really important for you now,
that the space is narrow, that is not really important. I get enough air, I
can move…you must just work through these structured procedures. [R7—
00:15:55]
Officers need to cope with situations that put them under high mental
and emotional pressure, yet they rarely panic or become disorganized.
Instead, respondents reported that even in situations of high stress,
they were able to remain calm. They maintain their calm using specific
techniques, such as situations assessment, which is trained through drill.
Aside from the drilled situation assessment technique, respondents
developed a practice of short-term self-induced tunnel vision. The indi-
vidual focuses his attention on one point, such as basic biological
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functions. After that, the individual expands his focus, thereby preventing
himself from being overwhelmed by simultaneously occurring stimuli.
Short-term tunnel vision may seem like it would prevent individuals from
forming a complete picture of their surroundings. However, for example,
Weick (1993) demonstrates that an unstable action system and lost sense
of reality leads to a breakdown in operations. Without stabilizing via
short-term tunnel vision, the individual would already be unable to take
action. Additionally, once stability of the action system is lost, it is very
difficult to gain it back again. This means that it may be more beneficial
to lose a few seconds of awareness and stabilize the action system, than it
is to lose a long time of awareness to lack of stability.
Automatized action contributes to stabilizing the action system in a
completely unknown situation by allowing officers to cool down, reflect
on the situation and stabilize while simultaneously taking steps to reduce
the severity of the situation; such as when an officer was able to figure out
the reason why his reserve parachute would not open after his primary
parachute failed in freefall, while he was undertaking the drilled steps for
opening the parachute. Because officers do not need to think about these
first-reaction steps, they can instead focus on maintaining their stability,
calming down and reflecting. Thus, automatized action may function as
a shock absorber.
In addition to drilled procedures, horizontally expanded expertise, i.e.
learning about things from outside one’s primary domain of expertise,
allows for successful coping with situations that are completely unpre-
dictable and new. A respondent described how his horizontally expanded
expertise allowed him to maintain focus in a new situation. He under-
went a training course about landmine injuries, which falls outside his
primary domain of expertise, by looking at pictures of such injuries. This
course proved essential, as he encountered a landmine accident during a
mission after passing the course. The respondent decided to treat victims
until help arrived. Though the injuries were gruesome, the respondent
was able to keep calm and work through the procedures.
Expanding Option Space
I just came up with that. I thought, how can I get rid of this as soon as
possible, as simply as possible? [R6—00:25:13]
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Officers often find themselves in situations that can be characterized as
existing in Fog of war, i.e. an environment where information necessary
for timely decisions is not readily available. There is uncertainty, which
may be reduced with routines and preparation. There are, however, situa-
tions where this isn’t an option. One case is situations that have occurred
unexpectedly and for the first time, so there are no specific routines to
follow. Another case is when the routines are in place, but the situation
differs sufficiently from the model situation upon which the rules were
based, so the routines do not fit. After the action system is stabilized, it is
decided based on sufficient background knowledge whether the routine
should be followed, or whether new solutions need to be found. In such
cases, officers conduct an analysis of the situation, which serves as basis
for future behaviour and is part of automatized behaviour. During the
analysis, multiple factors are considered, including the consequences of
various options of future action. The result of the analysis is usually a
new solution. Expanding the option space provides the opportunity for
learning on the individual and organizational level. Once a new solution
is found, the individual or group remembers it and may use it again in the
future. As for organizational learning, debriefing sessions are one example
of processes that allow it.
Coming up with the solution is made possible in part by hori-
zontal expansion of expertise during training. In addition to finding new
solutions, analyses enable individuals to choose the right sequence of
automatized steps in the right situation. In this context, respondents
likened drill to a toolbox from which the right tool is chosen for the
right situation. This choice of tool is dependent on sufficient background
knowledge about the tool and the situation. If there is enough time for
evaluation and reflection, officers rely on a supporting staff composed of
Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) who provide the analysis and a set
of viable solutions. The officer then chooses an option from the set or
rejects them all and comes up with his own solution. However, respon-
sibility for the decision lies upon the deciding officer. This structured
process generally leads to decisions of higher quality. If there is no time
for this approach, the individual must decide alone while maintaining a
structured approach, made possible by remaining mentally stable and by
possessing knowledge of which factors are relevant in a specific situation.
Officers of the Austrian Military are required to possess this knowledge.
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A Relational Model Between Skill Development
and Resilient Action in Surprising Situations
Our findings show that drill takes the form of teaching routines through
repetition, as well as the form of education of background knowl-
edge as a supplement to routines. Drill prepares actors for well-known,
expected and recurring situations. Beyond that, drill has implications
for dealing with the unexpected, providing officers with the knowledge
of routines. This knowledge of drilled procedures enables automatized
action, building on autonomous cognitive processes, referred to as Type
1 thinking (Kahneman, 2003; Laureiro-Martínez & Brusoni, 2018). In
situations where pressure might lead to panic, automatized action absorbs
shock, stabilizes the action system and provides a first response. Possession
of routines increases the ability to stabilize the action system, a common
behavioural pattern identified in successful dealing with unexpected
events, and allows for greater control over one’s cognitive processes
(Kahneman, 2003).
Drill is supplemented with background knowledge through education
to enable reflection during action, re-interpretation and exaptation of
those routines. For example, one respondent used his knowledge of aero-
dynamics and trained practice of moving one’s body in the air for the
purpose of opening his reserve parachute when it initially failed to open.
Supplementary background knowledge transforms pure drill into preap-
tative drill, by serving as a basis for reflection of potential consequences
of actions, limits of rules and their applications in situations of low pres-
sure. This allows for decision-making in situations of low pressure beyond
simple rule following and exploitation of routines. The preaptation of
drilled routines may facilitate innovation, expansion of option space and
change of drilled procedures. Even in situations of high pressure, back-
ground knowledge allows for expansion of option space by providing
context.
Exposure to new situations provides context to knowledge acquired
in training. Obtained expertise allows more appropriate use of drilled
routines, if expansion is vertical by repetition within the same type of
situation. However, if expertise is expanded horizontally, across different
situations, it allows exaptation of learned practices and innovation, as was
the case with Respondent 7 who used a rope to send signals instead of
a malfunctioning radio. The relationships between the forms of training,
knowledge and behavioural patterns supporting dealing with unexpected
























Fig. 3.1 Relationships between types of skill development and resilient action
in situations of surprise (Source Authors’ own work, based on research data)
events are visualized in Fig. 3.1. In surprising situations, pure drill
supplemented by background knowledge allows automatized action and
exaptation of previously learned procedures, thereby allowing actors to
stabilize and reflect upon their situation. If this stability and reflection is
maintained, appropriate and potentially new solutions may be found that
enable actors to maintain operations and identity despite the mental and
temporal pressures characteristic of surprising situations.
Discussion and Conclusion
Our research highlights the underappreciated role of drill in dealing
with unexpected situations. We distinguish pure drill, capturing its tradi-
tional meaning, and preaptative drill, referring to findings in evolutionary
biology (Gould & Vrba, 1982). We assume that there are certain forms
of drill, analogical to repeating cycles of variation, selection and reten-
tion, which provide surplus skills, which eventually prove to be exaptative.
Although the concept of exaptation has been explored in organizational
literature before in studies of innovation (e.g., Dew & Sarasvathy, 2016),
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this study is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to demonstrate the
impact of training on the ability to deal with unexpected situations. Our
results show that drill, even the pure one, may function as a source or
even means for exaptation by providing a pool of learning experiences.
Seemingly redundant learning experiences obtained through drill might
help to expose and to transfer these patterns or explanatory structures
to different contexts. Thus, drill provides tests of the impact of implicit
explanatory background knowledge and thus facilitates the adaptation of
these patterns. Furthermore, our research results show that rules can act
as a shock absorber, which is in line with previous findings (e.g. March &
Shapira, 1987). However, we expand upon this notion by showing that
rules help absorb shock not only by adjusting themselves at the organiza-
tional level over time, but also by providing the possibility to act on the
individual level while thinking about the current situation and coming
up with new ideas. We also shed light on the role of rules in exploration
processes (March, 1991) as a facilitator of finding new solutions.
This chapter contributes to discussion of training and manage-
ment development, presently mainly focused on cognitive learning and
single events of experiential learning (e.g., Shotter & Tsoukas, 2014;
Waddock & Lozano, 2013), by revealing possible links between different
types of drill and the ability to manage surprise. The results show that
both forms of drill contribute to managing surprise. Pure drill provides
behavioural patterns and skills, which enable automatized action in situ-
ations where pressure is too high for reflection. Automatized action is
a result of exaptation of behavioural patterns gained through pure drill.
Pure drill can be enhanced by background knowledge of rules through
education and experience, leading to preaptative drill. Education about
explanatory background knowledge leads into the research of cognitive
science (e.g., Born & Gatarik, 2013; Bruner, 1990) leading to an ability
to understand when and why behaviour should follow a given stimulus.
Preaptative drill therefore facilitates coping with unexpected situations in
which individuals still have time and internal stability to reflect.
The study findings suggest that incorporating explanatory background
knowledge of learned behaviours into training may contribute to coping
with surprise. This topic deserves further exploration, including the pres-
ence and impact of preaptative drill in other fields, e.g. how education or
background knowledge can be effectively integrated into organizations’
training systems. The links between background knowledge in training
and behaviours leading to successful coping with unexpected situations
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need to be reinforced with further research. This can be realized using
investigations similar to the one described in this chapter, within new
contexts, such as business organizations, and organizations in cultures
different from the organizational setting investigated in this study. These
investigations should focus on discovering cases that either support or
refute the links suggested here.
The fact that our data are derived from the military contexts implies
both limits and additional conclusions. Owing to its high degree of
publicness (Bozeman, 1987), certain limitations are placed on the
Austrian Military and its members, such as Rules of Engagement
for certain missions, international law, or guidelines of international
mission coordinators, such as NATO. Although these limitations certainly
constrain decision-making, they may also guide it and serve as additional
rules in the already wide toolset of military servicemen in surprising situa-
tions. Adherence to these kinds of rules does, however, contribute to the
uniqueness of the Austrian Military as a subject of research, and their exis-
tence should be kept in mind when interpreting the results of the research.
The public sector in general, including such heterogenous fields like the
military or health care, is highly institutionalized and regulated through
a plethora of rules. Thus, the discussion of rules in this chapter and the
insights into drill as a source of exapted rules has special relevance for
this sector. In addition, however, other sectors which are usually consid-
ered to be more dynamic and where both rules and drill are frequently
dismissed as hindering adaptation to new developments might reconsider
the necessity for drill.
Although our research focuses on the antecedents of individuals’ ability
to handle surprise, some broader conclusions at the organizational level
can be made. So far, an organization’s explorative capabilities have been
proposed to be dependent primarily on structural conditions, such as its
ambidexterity (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004) or environmental moderators
(e.g., Jansen et al., 2006). Our results suggest that training and back-
ground knowledge for continuous development of organizational code
may simultaneously enhance an organization’s capability for exploitation
and exploration. In these contexts, rule-breaking has obtained overly
negative connotations in literature and in practice. We follow up on the
idea of rule-breaking with the notion of preaptative drill, which points to
the necessity of both rule-following and rule-breaking, the latter being
contingent upon sufficient background knowledge. The findings of our
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research especially highlight the role of explanatory background knowl-
edge as essential for resilient behaviour in critical situations. Together with
drill to learn rules, for which we used the term exaptative drill, this could
be also paraphrased as reflective and corrective use of rules. Such utiliza-
tion of rules depends on knowledge of how those rules were created to
understand the limits of the application of rules based on context. How
the neglect of context-dependence may lead to disasters has been shown
prominently in several reports (e.g., Weick, 1993).
Generalizing from individual behaviour, which was the focus of this
chapter, we propose that enabling for reflective correction in the appli-
cation of explanatory knowledge provides the basis for survival even in
rigid organizations and can help stabilize the system and secure resilience
in critical, unexpected situations. Our findings, summarized in Fig. 3.1,
provide some guidance for designing training systems and policies. Drill
should not only be established to train behaviours in single situations,
but the context of training shall be changed to allow to test behaviours in
different situations and to force reflection on the power of drilled proce-
dures. This provides rules and trained procedures with a surplus as a first
basis for exaptation of rules. This may be combined with courses and
seminars which provide background knowledge on the coming about of
rules, their history, and their ultimate goal.
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Oliver, N., Calvard, T., & Potočnik, K. (2017). Cognition, technology, and
organizational limits: Lessons from the Air France 447 disaster. Organization
Science, 28(4), 729–743.
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CHAPTER 4
Building Resilience in Temporary
Organizations: Lessons from a Shipyard
Anne Russel, Stéphanie Tillement, and Benoit Journé
Introduction
This chapter discusses the organizational and occupational dimensions of
sustained reliable performance (Perrow, 2011) in temporary organizing
contexts. Studying organizations through a temporary lens (Söderlund,
2000) has enabled the identification of clear differences between perma-
nent organizations, mainly characterized by “production processes and
continual development” (Lundin & Söderholm, 1995, p. 439), and
temporary organizations, characterized by having a predetermined life-
time. Temporary organizations have been defined as new forms of orga-
nizations that adapt to deal with new “problems concerning the complexity
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and the uncertainty of the task, the complexity among the interdependent
activities, the task’s uniqueness, the lack of standardized procedures and the
temporary nature of the task” (Söderlund, 2000, p. 64). Thus, it seems
that temporary organizations and temporary forms of organizing are an
appropriate solution for dealing with organizational complexity.
The aforementioned authors also show that complexity presents a risk
for organizational performance and can impact the organization’s ability
to adapt to a frequently changing environment or to a new industrial
tempo. In our case, we suggest switching from a temporary organization
perspective (often restricted to project-based organizations in the project
management literature) to the more dynamic approach of temporary orga-
nizing. We define organizing as the emergent process of production of
an organization by the organizational actors and through the reflectivity
of actors (Weick, 1979).
Other authors emphasize the safety issues that stem from organi-
zational complexity. Indeed, normal accident theory (NAT) (Perrow,
2011) and theory about high reliability organizations (HROs) (Weick &
Roberts, 1993) show how major accidents can be caused by complexity.
NAT demonstrates that complex and tightly coupled systems, such as
in nuclear power plants, are exposed to a high level of risk and will
inevitably have accidents. Perrow shows that, in the case of the Three
Mile Island accident, it was the characteristics of the system itself that
made the accident inevitable.
In contrast, the resilience engineering perspective (Furuta, 2015; Holl-
nagel et al., 2006) views resilience as part of a systemic process which
aims to prevent major accidents from happening: “From a systemic view,
resilience is the intrinsic ability of a system to adjust its functioning
prior to, during, or following changes and disturbances, so that it can
sustain required operations under both expected and unexpected conditions”
(Furuta, 2015, p. 446). The different conceptions of resilience that are
held by the resilience engineering theorists and the high reliability theo-
rists emphasize the importance of its temporal dimension. High reliability
theorists seek to understand the principles that organizations rely on to
manage the unexpected: while developing a very dynamic approach, they
oppose the anticipation of events to their containment. Resilience is one
principle that can be used to contain unexpected events when they occur
and is therefore associated with re-activeness. In their view, resilience is
mainly an ex-post strategy. Hollnagel et al. (2006) and Furuta (2015)
4 BUILDING RESILIENCE IN TEMPORARY ORGANIZATIONS … 93
adopt a more holistic perspective of resilience which encompasses antic-
ipation and therefore goes beyond the dichotomy between ex-ante and
ex-post dimensions of resilience. In this chapter, we adopt the resilience
engineering perspective, which encompasses what happens before, during
and after unexpected events. More precisely, we adopt Hollnagel’s vision
of resilience as enabling safety by “looking at what goes right” rather than
“what goes wrong” (Hollnagel, 2016, p. 189).
It therefore seems that, when dealing with issues related to high levels
of safety in complex settings, it is longstanding organizations with strong
organizational routines that offer the most appropriate forms of orga-
nizing. However, few researchers have looked at how actors in temporary
organizing contexts, where routines and habits are not shared by all
members of the organization, enhance and sustain resilience when facing
uncertainty in safety–critical contexts (Saunders, 2015; Saunders et al.,
2016). For instance, in complex projects, where work is always singular
and is distributed between several companies and occupations, a common
organizational safety culture or individual sensemaking appear insufficient
to support reliable performance.
This chapter addresses this gap in the literature by demonstrating that
temporary organizations can also use resilient mechanisms to deal with
major safety issues, and that temporary forms of organizing can help
complex projects to be efficiently and safely carried out. In this perspec-
tive, we define project resilience as the ability of a project to prevent major
accidents from happening while maintaining its intended level of indus-
trial performance. We examine this proposition by studying the case of an
inter-organizational and safety–critical project: the construction by a ship-
yard of a series of ships. This project is managed by a public organization
but involves many private contractors and a wide array of occupations.
Thus, inter-organizational and inter-occupational coordination are crucial
for reliable performance. As a temporary organization which must ensure
a high level of safety while maintaining performance in an uncertain situ-
ation, under time pressure, this case is particularly relevant for enriching
the literature on project resilience.
In such temporary settings, where permanent and more temporary
forms of organizing must be coordinated, we argue that the occupa-
tional dimension is essential to enhancing resilience and sustaining reliable
performance. Looking at the meso-level, i.e. the professional occupations
involved in the project, we question how temporary forms of organizing
and occupational groups together contribute to the resilience of the whole
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project. We show that the ability of the project to coordinate temporary
organizing forms is key to achieving (safe) performance.
In HROs, safe performance is achieved by developing a strong organi-
zational safety culture that is shared by all members of the organization.
By contrast, we show that in complex and temporary projects, safe perfor-
mance is achieved by articulating a wide variety of organizational actors
who do not share the same occupational cultures and habits and who
become involved for different periods of time. Building on the concept
of communities of practice developed by Lave and Wenger (Lave, 1991;
Lave & Wenger, 1991) and on the articulation work literature, we show
that the articulation of work between various levels of participation helps
the project to be more efficient and to ensure occupational and organi-
zational safety, highlighting the link between high-quality activity and the
safety of future users of the ships.
The chapter discusses the mechanisms and conditions that contribute
to organizational resilience in temporary organizations. Through the
study of a construction project that has to deal with complexity and safety
issues, we demonstrate the key roles that temporary organizing and occu-
pational communities play in the project’s resilience. More precisely, this
chapter addresses the following questions: How is resilience expressed in
temporary organizations? Can temporary forms of organizing be compat-
ible with sustainable occupational expertise? Under which conditions can
temporary and more permanent forms of organizing be coordinated to
ensure safe organizational performance?
By studying the case of a specific occupational group—the boiler-
makers—we show how they prevent major accidents by continually antici-
pating, adapting and reacting to normally disturbed situations. Taking an
ethnographic approach (Garfinkel, 1967; Van Maanen, 1979) based on
the observation of the routine daily activity of the field actors, we high-
light that in complex projects resilience is first enhanced by the use of
temporary organizing forms that provide greater flexibility and help the
project to adapt to a discontinuous production flow. We then demon-
strate that resilience is also built at an occupational level. Adopting an
occupational lens (Brown & Duguid, 1991; Gherardi, 2018) shows the
extent to which resilience, seen as the situated ability to anticipate and
adapt to safety issues, is embedded in a long-term trajectory. The occu-
pation thus appears to enable the existence of a common set of values
and principles around which workers belonging to various companies
and working under different contracts can come together. Finally, we
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demonstrate that the project’s resilience is conditioned by the ability of
the project’s management to coordinate different expertise and levels of
participation. The chapter concludes by discussing the implications of
considering resilience in temporary organizing contexts.
Ensuring Resilience in Temporary
Organizing Contexts
Unlike permanent organizations, which have stable processes and
personnel that enable enduring work routines and knowledge to be devel-
oped, temporary organizations “bring together a group of people that
are unfamiliar with one another’s skills, but must work interdependently
on complex tasks” (Bechky, 2006, p. 3). Söderlund (2000) proposes a
typology of permanent and temporary forms of organizing which are
categorized according to two main criteria: the structure (permanent or
temporary) and the type of participation (permanent or temporary). This
typology gives rise to four forms of organizing: temporary organizing
(temporary structure and temporary participation); project organizing
(temporary structure and permanent participation); temporary employ-
ment (permanent structure and temporary participation); and permanent
organizing (permanent structure and permanent participation). So, in
this first perspective, an organization that corresponds to one of these
four organizational forms can be considered as temporary since either its
participation or its structure has temporary aspects.
Another view of temporary organizations proposes taking a more
processual perspective, which focuses on the role of the “individual
and collective agents” (Bakker et al., 2016, p. 1708) and considers the
structural dimension as an evolving rather than a stabilized component.
Consequently, in adopting a processual lens, these authors use the term
organizing instead of organization to show the constantly evolving nature
of the organizational forms studied. Therefore, for them, clear differenti-
ation between permanent and temporary organizing may not be relevant.
Rather, they consider that “in temporary organizing, what is permanent
and what is temporary are sometimes fuzzy and often intertwined” (Bakker
et al., 2016, p. 1708), and they contend that temporary organizing
should be understood as a complex mix of temporary and permanent
elements. This second definition of temporary organizing proposes a
deeper understanding of the phenomenon and encourages further studies
to analyse more accurately the dynamics involved (Bakker et al., 2016).
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In this chapter, we adopt a processual view of forms of temporary
organizing to study how the permanent and temporary dimensions are
effectively intertwined and how this contributes to project resilience.
Indeed, temporary organizing can be considered to be a mechanism for
resilience that is employed by certain organizations when facing normally
disturbed situations and evolving in more dynamic and changing contexts.
This enables the mobilization of a more agile workforce (outsourcing,
contracting, etc.) and of more adaptive structures (group projects),
oriented towards shorter-term tasks. Temporary organizing is therefore
a way of dealing with organizational complexity, such as that relating to
the uniqueness of tasks or the interdependence of activities (Söderlund,
2000).
Interestingly, this stream of the literature seems to associate tempo-
rary organizing with support for resilience, whereas researchers who have
studied HROs consider that it is the permanent nature of organizations
that supports resilience. Indeed, according to high reliability theorists,
the success of HROs in ensuring continuous high levels of safety while
constantly experiencing high levels of technological risk and unpredictable
events is partly explained by the fact that they have developed a strong
organizational safety culture and strategy (Milch & Laumann, 2016).
Weick and Roberts (1993) emphasize the roles of individual mindfulness
and heedful interacting as pillars of resilience in highly disturbed contexts.
More recently, Weick and Sutcliffe (2015) put forward a set of principles
that support high reliability through anticipating the unexpected events
and reacting to them once they have occurred.
In line with the situated and dynamic organization approaches, we
therefore focus on the organizational, interactional and individual mecha-
nisms that constitute pillars of resilience in temporary organizing contexts.
We draw our inspiration from the five pillars of reliability defined by
HRO researchers (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2015) while adhering to Holl-
nagel’s concept of resilience, which includes strategies for anticipating and
adapting to unexpected events (Hollnagel, 2016). Saunders (2015) is one
of the few authors who has considered how to apply HRO principles to
safety–critical projects and remarks that, in the case of temporary projects,
“these [high reliability] practices were often fragile, with much depending
on the tenacity and strength of will of individual project managers rather
than being embedded in the organization’s culture and memory” (p. 1262).
In our view, this fragility is linked to the specific features of temporary
organizations. Complex industrial projects, in particular, bring together
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different skills and specific working practices. Hence, in settings that
are characterized by disorganization and organizational differences, it
appears that organizational or individual sources of resilience are not
fully applicable (Milch & Laumann, 2016). Furthermore, in the face of
increased inter-organizational complexity and unstable work processes,
Milch and Laumann (2016) show that it is more difficult to build, main-
tain and develop steady interrelations and knowledge. They highlight the
phenomenon of dilution of competences, which arises from the fact that
contract workers are unfamiliar with the local work environment and lack
industry-specific knowledge and experience. The challenge is how to build
and sustain these skills and expertise in the face of temporariness and
fragmentation.
We argue that the resilient capability of complex projects relies not
only on their use of forms of temporary organizing but also on the occu-
pational groups who develop long-term and inter-organizational skills.
Consequently, deepening our understanding of the role these groups play
may improve our knowledge of how this particular organizational form is
able to maintain a high level of safe performance.
Coordination Between Occupational
Groups as a Source of Project Resilience
By focusing on the occupational dimension, our approach is in line with
the practice-based view of safety and reliability (Gherardi, 2018; Gher-
ardi & Nicolini, 2000; Tillement et al., 2009). Through the practice lens,
safety and resilience are seen as a “collective knowledgeable doing [that
emerges] from the working practices of a community” (Gherardi, 2018,
p. 12). Following the concept of communities of practice (Brown &
Duguid, 1991; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Wenger, 2010), these authors
highlight the role of occupational identity in developing resilient capa-
bilities to deal with unexpected situations. Bourrier (1996) identifies
coordination processes between occupational groups as being one of the
main success factors for dealing with complex and risky events such as
outages in nuclear power plants. Her analysis also shows the importance
of the coordination of scheduling and carrying out maintenance work.
However, her approach to coordination is based more on a strategic anal-
ysis of power relationships between groups than on professional cultures,
knowledge and expertise.
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Taking the case of a modernization project by a rail company, Tille-
ment et al. (2009) highlight the limitations of written procedures for
reacting to incidents and insist on the importance of the situated and
sophisticated skills developed by each occupational group, which are
based on practical and relational knowledge mediated by discursive and
material artefacts such as plans or installations. Observing two different
teams, they show that the resilience of the project’s organization is
supported by occupational communities that are able to deal with unex-
pected events by developing flexibility through sharing a “coherent vison
of the work to be done and the methods to be used” (p. 246) and by iden-
tifying the most competent member to solve the problem. However, in
Tillement et al.’s (2009) case, if resilience is enhanced inside each team,
different “occupational groups have divergent representations concerning
the nature of occupations and on the appropriate risk control practices”
(p. 250); indeed, sharing practices across boundaries is a key issue in
inter-organizational projects.
Kellogg et al. (2006) note that coordination across occupational
boundaries is difficult because “expertise and interests [are] ‘at stake’
for community members” (p. 26). They demonstrate how the company
members they observed develop coordination practices, similar to
Galison’s (1999) concept of a ‘trading zone’. In this perspective, ‘enacting
a trading zone does not require equivalence or similarity of interpreta-
tions or interests […] Instead, members of different communities coordinate
their actions temporarily and locally, navigating their differences in norms,
meanings and interests only as needed’ (Kellogg et al., 2006, p. 39). In the
same vein, Bechky (2006) shows that in temporary organizations, coor-
dination between the various stakeholders is permitted through a role
structuration, where individuals play a predetermined role and adapt their
attitude to the particular situation they face. This coordination ability,
based on dual behaviour which combines occupational belonging and
the ability to adapt, appears to be a condition for ensuring resilience in
temporary projects.
Methods
To understand how temporary organizing and occupational groups mutu-
ally support organizational resilience, we draw on an on-going longitu-
dinal case study of a particular occupational group—the boilermakers—in
a naval construction project, an activity which is carried out both by
4 BUILDING RESILIENCE IN TEMPORARY ORGANIZATIONS … 99
internal teams belonging to the principal company and by teams of
contractors. The principal company is a shipyard. It is an old semi-
public company whose activities and funding depend to a large extent
on governmental decisions. We chose the boiler-making activity for two
reasons. Firstly, the activity, which mainly consists of installing the pipes
in the vessel, is key to the safety of the ship in the medium and long
terms. The quality of the installation and the welding are critical to
ensuring safety and avoiding the occurrence of major accidents. Secondly,
as boiler-making work is fragmented into many operations and between
various teams and companies, managing co-activity with other occupa-
tional groups (e.g. painters, mechanics or electricians) is essential but
very complex. Since co-activity and complexity increase the possibility of
unexpected events happening (LePlat & Faverge, 1967; Perrow, 2011),
resilience is crucial for carrying out the activity efficiently and safely.
Data Collection
We draw on the data collected by one author who was involved from June
2018 to July 2019 in a major research programme, which was carried out
in two main phases. In the first phase of the study, she met with several
middle managers in the department in charge of installing all the pipes in
the vessel and she observed coordination meetings. She also conducted
interviews to better identify the safety and industrial issues they were
dealing with. This first phase allowed her to obtain a global understanding
of the construction project and to more clearly identify the type of
complexity involved in the project. During the second phase, she succes-
sively followed three teams of boilermakers who were employed by three
different companies. Two were subcontractors and the third was a team
employed by the principal company which was responsible for the whole
construction project. She spent five days with each team, following their
shift schedules and shadowing them (Journé, 2005; McDonald, 2005)
on the construction site. This enabled her to identify how they worked
and organized themselves, which difficulties they were facing and which
other occupational groups they interacted with. She completed her obser-
vation through individual semi-structured interviews with team members
in order to collect more information about their professional background
and experience. Interviewees were selected in such a way as to obtain
a representative sample which would reflect the various profiles and the
divergent views of the global organization. Finally, in order to validate
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Table 4.1 Data collection summary
her research assumptions, she presented them to the workers during the
interviews and subjected them to the workers’ views. This allowed her
to consolidate and adjust her findings. She also discussed her hypotheses
with the company’s middle management (Table 4.1).
Data Analysis
The researcher’s observations were all documented in field notes and
the interviews were fully transcribed. She categorized these data manu-
ally in order to evidence the role that the principal company and the
boilermakers each played in project resilience. The field notes constitute
the primary source of information, and they helped to clarify the orga-
nizational context in which the project took place and to identify the
articulation issues between the organization’s formal rules and the boiler-
makers’ occupational practices. They were useful for describing how the
various groups of actors worked, coordinated and communicated with
each other. The field notes were complemented by the interviews, which
provided more information about the actors’ motives and preoccupations.
They were essential for understanding why middle management and team
workers behave differently and do not share values and habits across orga-
nizations. They also helped to correct certain assumptions that stemmed
from the observation phase. Finally, discussing her assumptions with the
boilermakers and the installation managers helped the researcher to refine
her classification work and to distinguish between what was shared by
members of the team and occupation and what was more specific to an
individual or a restricted group.
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Empirical Findings
This section shows the role of three main actors and their respective prac-
tices in enhancing resilience. The actors are the project organization, the
occupational groups and the installation managers. Each actor contributes
to resilience through specific processes. First, the project organization has
designed an adapting structure in which the actors are prepared to perma-
nently adapt to changes and evolutions in the shipyard’s organization.
Second, the occupational groups maintain a high level of expertise in a
sustainable way. Finally, the installation managers articulate the project
constraints with the occupational working practices. These results provide
the answers to the three questions posed in the Introduction to this
chapter.
Achieving Resilience by Adapting the Workforce to Carry Out
a Technologically and Organizationally Complex Project
The naval construction project studied here presents a huge technological
challenge for the principal company responsible for its completion. The
project involves building a series of vessels whose technology is completely
new and unique. The company last undertook such an ambitious project
several decades earlier. At that time, building vessels with high levels of
industrial and information technology was the company’s core activity,
and it recruited a large number of employees in professions and occupa-
tions required by the construction projects. Many employees were manual
workers involved in building and assembling the various components
of the vessels. They belonged to a variety of professional occupations:
painting, boiler-making, electrical work, welding, etc. The different occu-
pations required for the various construction steps are shown in Table
4.2.
Most of the workers were permanent employees of the principal
company, which also relied on outsourcing for small parts of the project.
However, decades later, when the new project began, the company had
lost many manual competencies; as its core activity now relates more to
new technological issues, the number of manual workers employed has
reduced considerably. The company was therefore facing two major chal-
lenges. Firstly, as its internal workforce had progressively moved to ship
repair and maintenance tasks, it had lost some of its occupational exper-
tise and its ability to build entire ships. There was also a lack of competent
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Table 4.2 Professional occupations and activities
and experienced managers who were capable of leading large construction
projects. Secondly, as the number of manual workers had considerably
reduced, the company now had to rely on a large number of contractors
and subcontractors to help it meet its deadlines. The contractors thus play
a new role: they do not provide the lost expertise which was previously
available inside the company; instead, they help the company to re-acquire
the expertise that it has lost but that the contractors have maintained. The
contractors are therefore also a source of training for the company, which
is able to learn from the contractors’ experience in different industrial
settings. Outsourcing thus constitutes a form of temporary organizing
(Söderlund, 2000) which directly contributes to a first component of
project resilience: its ability to meet fixed objectives, i.e. building a series
of vessels.
The complexity of the naval project lies in its volatility: the activities on
the construction site are constantly changing in such a way that no two
days are alike. This also means that as each vessel progresses through the
construction process, some stages require the presence of certain occupa-
tional groups that were needed less in earlier stages or will be needed in
subsequent stages. For instance, the role of the shipwrights is crucial for
building the overall structure of the ship, but once the project reaches the
assembling stage, the shipwrights are less present. As in many projects, the
principal company thus has to adapt the workforce to the demands of the
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project. A solution was to engage contracting and subcontracting compa-
nies which could provide a temporary workforce when needed. This pool
of adaptive resources thus directly contributes to the performance of the
project, as they create a continually available and adequate workforce to
do the necessary work without exceeding the estimated budget.
We also observed that the projects employed different types of
outsourcing practices to meet its organizational needs, which we cate-
gorize into two types: long-term contractors and occasional contractors.
The former are those who have worked on the ship construction project
for a long time. They have developed a good knowledge of the organi-
zational rules and of the way the project is structured and led. As they
collaborate on a regular basis with the principal company, they tend to be
responsible for project tasks that last for several months. The occasional
contractors do not work for the project on a regular basis and consti-
tute a more heterogeneous group of workers. Some of them only work
on the project for a few days, while others come and go, spending a few
weeks or months at the construction site each time. Their knowledge of
the project is thus more limited and so the principal company cannot
rely on them to the same extent. However, the occasional contractors are
also a necessary workforce for the project because they help the principal
company to cope with the many issues and unexpected events that are
inherent in technically complex industrial projects: manufacturing errors,
changes of schedule, plan modifications, on site installation problems, etc.
Using temporary forms of organizing that complement the permanent
organization appears to enhance project resilience, allowing it to adapt
the required workforce to the production flow of the project.
Occupational Groups Contributing to Resilience by Maintaining
Operational Expertise Throughout the Project
The teams of boilermakers we studied belong to one community which
share common practices and values and have the same vision of how
a good job should be carried out. In this section, we first show why
the boilermakers constitute a community of practice in the sense devel-
oped by Lave and Wenger (1991), where they are united around a
shared domain of interests, the same community and a common set of
practices. We then highlight how these characteristics contribute to the
project’s performance and safety: by enhancing its flexibility and reac-
tivity, the community contributes to the project’s overall performance,
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and, by developing a deep sensitivity to practice, it acquires a situated
understanding of occupational and industrial safety issues.
The three teams of boilermakers we studied belong to three different
companies and work under different contracts: some of them are directly
employed by the principal company (team C), others are contractors
(teams A and B) and a few are subcontractors who are temporarily
employed by a contractor (teams A and C). They also have different
levels of knowledge of the project, different kinds of previous experience
and different occupational backgrounds. Despite all these differences, the
boilermakers are part of an occupational community in the sense that
they share a set of common values and all agree about what constitutes
good boiler-making and how it should be done. For them, boiler-making
is first and foremost manual work, which they learn through observation
and practice. They consider boiler-making to be precision work that has to
follow an ordered process and requires time to be done correctly. In addi-
tion, they have formed a physical community which gets together during
and outside of working hours and which has created an occupational
network beyond the organizational and project boundaries.
The boilermakers also have a shared domain of interest—boiler-
making—which, in this project and in the particular context of marine
infrastructure, is the activity of assembling, installing and fixing the pipes
in the vessel. Many of them chose to become boilermakers because they
were good with their hands and enjoyed the material dimension of the
job. They have developed a particular boiler-making vocabulary, some-
times using nicknames to refer to particular tools and materials, and they
have developed certain procedures that are specific to the boiler-making
activity.
Finally, the boilermakers share a common set of practices, which we
observed in the three teams studied. A good example of this is the way
each team is structured, following the same hierarchical organization. At
the top, the team manager is responsible for the contractual link with
the principal organization and for coordinating the team’s work progress.
Each team is divided into sub-groups, led by senior boilermakers who
coordinate the work and are responsible for ensuring that the installation
complies with the principal company’s assembly plan; they take responsi-
bility if any errors are detected. Also, in each team the boilermakers work
in pairs, usually composed of a senior and a more junior worker.
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They have also developed the same habits and routines: when installing
a pipe, they generally follow the same steps, i.e. examining the installa-
tion plan, measuring the location where the pipes have to be installed,
loading the pipes, making adjustments when needed, and finally installing
the pipes with the help of the welder. To do their work efficiently, they
also rely on the same tools, which they carry in one of the many pockets
of their blue overalls or in their leather case. These include a pencil, a
small notebook, a tape measure, different sizes of wrenches, etc., and
their mobile phone calculator app. In the following paragraphs, we will
see how this community functioning enables the boiler-making group to
contribute to the project’s efficiency and to meet the expected deadlines.
Firstly, the occupational teams are structured in a way that make
them flexible and enable them to reorganize quickly when faced with
unexpected changes. They are led by senior experts whose technical legit-
imacy is recognized and respected. This enables the teams to react more
thoughtfully and quickly when a problem comes up. This formal organi-
zation, similar in the three teams, favours collective decision-making based
on technical expertise. Indeed, if there is any doubt or disagreement, the
decision will often be taken by the more experienced worker. Further-
more, their organization remains flexible and can be changed according
to the situations that arise. For example, when a particularly technical task
is to be carried out, the manager can decide to pair two senior workers so
that he can be sure that the work will be done perfectly. So, the boiler-
maker teams have a top-down, but not rigid, organization: as the project
progresses and new situations arise, they can redesign their organization
and adapt in a flexible way that contributes to the project’s resilience.
The teams’ efficiency and ability to deal with unexpected situations
also rely on strong leadership, embodied by the team manager or by the
section managers, who generally have previous boiler-making experience
and who are respected and trusted by the other members of the team.
This leadership is essential for the team’s resilience: when the team faces
unexpected situations or great pressure, the team leaders play a key role
in encouraging the other workers and in achieving their shared goal.
Their work follows organizational routines which structure their
activity and give them the opportunity to share their respective knowledge
and experience. For example, we observed that the teams have a daily
routine of taking collective breaks. These breaks are convivial times when
the workers talk about their personal lives, make jokes or complain about
their work problems, depending on the mood of the day. These moments
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have a direct impact on their ability to work together efficiently. Because
they are moments of sharing, they help to reinforce the team spirit and
are opportunities for getting to know each other better. This reinforces
the workers’ ability to trust each other when they are working together
in a risky context.
Finally, the boiler-making community shares common values, attitudes
and concerns about their occupation and its risks which transcend the
organizational boundaries while ensuring a high level of industrial safety.
A first challenge for the workers when they arrive on site is therefore
to learn to adapt to the constant changes without putting themselves in
danger. To avoid accidents, the workers develop a sense of awareness and
learn to always be careful to look out for any structural changes. For
instance, when a boilermaker arrives in a particular section of the site, he
looks at the area and checks if there have been any changes since he was
last there. Likewise, he will be very careful about where he puts his feet;
if a tool, a cable or an air duct is lying on the floor, he will systematically
take it away and try to hang it on a scaffold.
Another major preoccupation of the practitioners is industrial safety,
which ensures that their work is safe and under control. By establishing
routinized checking procedures and by continually practising these, they
develop a more situated and embedded understanding of the potential
risks. As different occupations can be working on the same line of pipe at
the same time, the workers have to deal with work fragmentation. In this
context, checking procedures ensure global coherence, which has a direct
impact on the industrial safety of the installation process. The boilermak-
ers’ technical expertise also lies in their ability to use the various tools
they need in their daily activity. However, practice is essential to acquire
some skills, and takes time. For instance, it takes at least six months for
a beginner to be able to correctly chamfer a pipe, and the boilermakers
believe it takes 10 years to become a senior boilermaker and 15 or 20 years
to be an expert. It is also through practising that the workers learn which
tools are more appropriate to ensure a better quality of installation, which
directly contributes to industrial safety.
To conclude, the boilermakers constitute a community of practice
which develops an in-depth understanding of the project’s risks and
constraints. This contributes to the project’s resilience by ensuring a high
level of performance while maintaining occupational and industrial safety.
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Coordinating Working Practices in Temporary Organizing Contexts:
Support for Project Resilience
We have seen that the boiler-making activity in this naval project is
composed of different teams belonging to different companies, with boil-
ermakers working under different work contracts. This diversity offers
the project some flexibility because it enables the principal company to
continually adapt the number of workers in the worksite according to
its evolving workload. At the same time, to deal with the different rules
and working practices between the various teams of boilermakers, the
company has set up coordination mechanisms that bring together the
different teams of workers around the same priority: avoiding co-activity
constraints. These coordination mechanisms take the form of weekly and
daily meetings attended by representatives of the various occupational
groups co-operating on the shipyard, and we show how they help to
prevent unexpected events and contribute to the workers’ safety.
The purpose of the weekly coordination meeting, which gathers
together representatives of all the occupations and teams working in a
specific ship section, is to monitor the schedule. At this meeting, the
participants review the work to be carried out each day in each sector
by each occupational team. The manager of each team confirms whether
the planned tasks can be done or should be rescheduled. The aim of
the meeting is to avoid co-activity whenever possible and to articulate
the work between the planned and the actual activity, which reduces loss
of time and enhances the workers’ efficiency. However, if an unexpected
event happens, the team cannot wait until the next weekly meeting to
solve the problem and a daily coordination meeting has therefore also
been put in place.
The purpose of the daily coordination meeting is to adjust the planned
work to the situation on site. The daily meeting thus enables greater
situated management of the co-activity between the various occupational
groups by creating space for informal work discussions that overlap with
the formal meeting (box 1). They provide an important opportunity for
the managers to make arrangements and find practical solutions for their
teams.
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Box 1: Informal talks during a coordination meeting
As the coordination meeting drags on, two managers in charge of
two different teams of boilermakers start a discussion on co-activity
issues in their sector:
Manager A: When will you finish the welding on pipeline B32?
We really need to start the installation on B33.
Manager B: This afternoon, I hope, but it depends on the air
ducts. I’m not sure that Logistics have activated them. Always the
same problem…
M A: How many of you are there just now?
M B: Three with the welder.
M A: Ok. There can be six of us. So maybe my guys could start
the measurements right now.
M B: Ok, my guys are cool so no problem if your guys work in
the same sector.
M A: Great.
By setting up various coordination meetings, the principal company
can better anticipate the frequent organizational changes that are inherent
in complex industrial projects and find collective solutions when blocking
points arise (box 2).
Box 2: Coordination meetings managing occupational issues
Tuesday:
8:30: The Installation Manager meets the Team Manager in
the team workspace. The Team Manager informs the Installation
Manager about a pipe-installation issue: a piece of pipe is too long
and needs to be recut on site because it has already been welded.
This problem has held up the team since the beginning of the
morning.
8:45: The Installation Manager and the Team Manager go
and see the pipe on board. They realize that this operation risks
damaging the painting. Moreover, a scaffold is preventing the boil-
ermakers from cutting the pipe. The Installation Manager needs
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the opinion and authorization of the Section Manager to take a
decision.
9:00: The Installation Manager participates in the daily coordi-
nation meeting and shares the pipe issue with the other members.
For the Section Manager, the priority is to reach the next milestone:
he advocates for the quicker solution, which seems to be cutting the
pipe on board. The Installation Manager in charge of the painting is
worried about the potential damage. He suggests the boilermakers
use a saw instead of a grinder to cut the pipe. Finally, the Installa-
tion Manager in charge of the scaffolder team plans an intervention
in the morning.
9:30: End of the daily meeting. The Installation Manager calls
the Team Manager and tells him they can cut the pipe with a saw
once the scaffolds are removed.
10:30: The scaffolders go on board and rearrange the scaffolds.
11:00: The boilermaker in charge of cutting the pipe arrives on
board and realizes he doesn’t have a saw. It takes him almost an
hour to find the right one.
13:00: End of the working day for the boiler-making team. The
boilermaker hasn’t finished the work.
Wednesday:
9:30: The boilermaker finishes cutting the pipe with the saw. He
informs the Team Manager, who remarks that the event has caused
a delay to the schedule.
10:00: The Team Manager shares the information with the
Installation Manager who has just left the daily meeting. The Instal-
lation Manager informs the Coordination Manager, who makes a
change to the schedule.
The second role of the weekly meeting is to ensure the occupational
safety of the workers by defining the organizational conditions that enable
safe co-activity. For example, when the boilermakers and the welders are
working together, the painters may be prevented from working because
the welding sparks will damage the painting. In this case, the solution may
be to install a temporary separating wall so that both occupations can
work at the same time without any risks. These coordination practices
thus contribute to the progress of work on the construction site; they
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allow the project to be more resilient by improving its overall performance
and by anticipating potential accidents.
Discussion and Conclusion
Resilience in the Tension Between Permanent and Temporary Forms
of Organizing
Researchers have emphasized that new forms of organizing tend to be
more fragmented and temporary (Kellogg et al., 2006) in order to
enhance flexibility and performance. However, most works have studied
resilience in long-standing organizations from a systemic perspective.
They have shown that both anticipation and adaptation are supported
by strong organizational routines (Hollnagel et al., 2006). Even if the
literature on temporary organizing and the literature on resilience are
rarely articulated, they emphasize near-opposite views of the foundations
of resilience: flexibility on the one hand, stability on the other hand.
Based on this observation, we seek to combine these two research areas
by studying how resilience can be expressed and enhanced in contexts
where temporary forms of organizing articulate with the sustainable struc-
ture of occupations. We study the construction of a new series of ships
by a shipyard, where occupational groups, notably the boilermakers, are
temporarily involved and gathered together in a project-based organiza-
tion. Taking a dynamic approach, we define temporary organizing as a
complex and always evolving mix of temporary and permanent elements.
This perspective enables us to make three theoretical and methodological
contributions.
First, unlike the cases studied by Bourrier (1996) and Tillement et al.
(2009), the project under study is fundamentally a temporary struc-
ture and does not juxtapose with a larger routinized or bureaucratic
organization. Moreover, every worker is a temporary worker in this
project-based organization. Thus, the challenge for resilience is not to
articulate the permanent and temporary organizational structures, but to
articulate a temporary project organization with more permanent occu-
pations. In the cases studied by Bourrier (1996) and Tillement et al.
(2009), organizational resilience is threatened by the rivalries between
historical occupational groups that are representatives of the permanent
structure and the emerging ones that are representatives of the project-
based organization. Our case differs from theirs and highlights another
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configuration: since all the workers are involved temporarily in a transient
ship construction project, there are no major conflicts or rivalries between
the various occupational groups. All the workers are gathered around the
same object, the ship, which plays the role of a boundary object (Bechky,
2006; Leigh Star, 2010). In our case, the tensions do not lie at the inter-
occupational level but, rather, at the inter-organizational level. We observe
tensions which are associated with power relationships between the boil-
ermakers of the principal company and the contractors, and symbolic
dimensions: the former consider themselves as more legitimate, with the
latter being seen as a secondary workforce. In this particular organiza-
tional configuration, the relations between occupational groups, which
favour robust coordination mechanisms, support resilience rather than
constituting vulnerability.
Second, we show that resilience is also grounded within each commu-
nity of practice, which transcends organizational boundaries and thus
contributes to the project’s overall coordination ability. The community
of boilermakers we observed is similar to the communities described by
Brown and Duguid (1991), who define them as “more fluid and inter-
penetrative than bounded, often crossing the restrictive boundaries of the
organization to incorporate people from outside” (p. 49). Similarly, the
boilermakers’ occupational groups are constantly evolving. The arrival of
newcomers and the discussions and sharing of various experiences help
to enrich their knowledge and expertise. This learning process (similar
to apprenticeship) is embedded in the legitimate participation of the
members of the community of practice (Lave & Wenger, 1991) and thus
is conditioned by the possibility of the actors being fully integrated into
the community’s social life and sharing its occupational values.
Finally, from a methodological point of view, our study highlights the
value of adopting a meso-level of analysis to study the practices and
processes that enhance resilience. Surprisingly, this level of analysis is
rarely used either in the temporary organizing literature (Bakker et al.,
2016) or in the resilience engineering’s perspective, which has mainly
focused on the organizational or individual dimensions. Our group-level
analysis enables us to show in greater detail how the various commu-
nities of practice manage to coordinate their activity, and to highlight
the role of discussions and inter-group communication in dealing effi-
ciently with unexpected situations. This demonstrates in a more situated
and deeper way the organizational mechanisms of resilience by describing
the concrete adaptation and reaction practices developed to deal with
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unexpected situations. From a longer term perspective, this practice-based
view of resilience emphasizes the role of occupations in supporting long-
lasting learning dynamics, which are able to go beyond the temporary
forms of organizing that lie both in the project structure and in workers’
participation.
Managerial Contributions
In safety–critical projects such as the one under study, resilience partly
relies on the involvement of key individuals who perform an inter-
facing role between project managers and occupational groups. However,
frequent turnover hinders the ability of the workers to build sustainable
resilient practices. Moreover, the frequently changing structure of the
project organization tends to result in disengagement from the long-term
goals. It is thus crucial to reflect upon the organization’s ability to build
long-lasting learning dynamics that can ensure enduring organizational
resilience. We propose two conditions for the organization to maintain
its resilient capacity in the long term: keeping key individuals in lasting
positions and retaining key competences throughout the project.
First, coordination between the occupational groups and project
management mainly relies on the key role of the installation manager
and on his ability to interact efficiently with the team manager. As the
installation manager needs time to acquire his coordination ability and to
become familiar with the technicalities of the boilermakers’ work, staying
longer in his position could contribute to enhancing resilience in the
longer term. This observation reveals a major discrepancy between the
perspective of the project managers, whose goal is to use this position to
educate the newcomers about the site constraints before they join the field
offices, and the perspective of the workers, who need a single and reliable
interlocutor to respond efficiently to the project managers’ requests.
Secondly, as contract workers possess rare competences, they can easily
negotiate a better salary or a better position with the highest bidder.
In this context characterized by high levels of competition, the principal
company must develop a competence retention strategy to avoid ‘losing’
the more competent workers. Workers give two main reasons for leaving a
project: the feeling of not being involved in the whole project and the lack
of technicity and diversity of the tasks. Thus, involving contract workers in
the global project and informing them about the overall contribution of
their work is making to the project are essential for project resilience. This
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entails building partnership relations with contractors, based on long-
term contracts and on shared training programmes. The ability of the
project to retain competences also relies on the workers sharing their
knowledge and training in order to become multi-skilled experts. In a
time-pressured context of occupational distribution, the experts lack the
time to train the beginners. As a consequence, we recommend that the
work of the occupational groups should be considered as a global process
of legitimate peripheral participation in communities of practice (Lave,
1991).
Limitations and Avenues for Further Research
In our study, we focused on one specific occupational group, i.e. the boil-
ermakers, which enabled us to highlight foundations of resilience linked
to learning dynamics (similar to apprenticeship) that enable the devel-
opment and maintenance of shared and situated practices. For future
research, it would be interesting to study another occupational group,
such as electricians, in order to test the generalization of our results on a
larger scale. In addition, studying the practices of different occupational
groups in parallel might enable a better understanding of the basis of
inter-occupational coordination. Finally, as we paid little attention in this
study to contractual agreements and their effects on coordination, this
could merit further study. Finally, our case focused on a complex project
that was led by a semi-public nature organization, which contracted out
activities to private companies. To better qualify the effects of the degree
of publicness (Bozeman & Bretschneider, 1994) on project resilience, it
could be interesting to compare this particular case with other cases where
projects are led by private companies.
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CHAPTER 5
A Practical Perspective on Resilience
in Organizations: The Interplay Between
Structure and Action
Anouck Adrot, Oriane Sitte de Longueval,
and Alexandre Largier
Introduction
In many sectors, organizational resilience represents a useful way to
bounce back from incidents and promote activity continuity (Lovins &
Lovins, 1982, cited by Wildavsky, 1988). Accordingly, a large spectrum
of tools, norms and standards—what we label here as ‘frameworks’—has
been produced and internationally appraised. However, frameworks do
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not always fit into organizational settings, and gaps can emerge between
resilience frameworks on the one hand and resilience in action on the
other. Moving away from strict rules does not necessarily result into
a negative outcomes (Walls & Hoffman, 2013). However, discrepan-
cies between resilience frameworks and action can generate uncertainty.
For instance, they can undermine overall confidence in an organization’s
ability to prepare for, detect and address events (Shrivastava, 1987).
As those insights suggest, there is a need to better understand
how resilience frameworks and action relate to each other in practice.
Previous research has highlighted their interplay through a literature
review (Hale & Borys, 2013) but has fallen short of providing details on
the conditions under which such interplay shapes practice. In this chapter,
we approach organizational resilience through the practice-based lens
offered by Schatzki (1996). Approaching resilience as a practice allows
us to focus on the interplay between action and structure. By doing so,
we distinguish on the one hand structural aspects of resilience and, on
the other, enacted resilience (that we approach as action). Based on such
conceptualization, this chapter addresses the knowledge gap identified by
with the following question: What is the nature of the interplay between
structure and action that both comprise resilience as practice?
To properly investigate this question, our analysis is based on two
empirical cases from two French organizations: a public administration
in charge of coordinating resilience at a regional level (Fed), and a service
in charge of Crisis Management Teams (CMTs) in a public transportation
company (Ral). These two organizations developed knowledge intensive
capabilities in order to frame, experiment and develop resilience. While
they adopted radically different practical modalities in settling resilience
capabilities, they experienced similar difficulties that we analyse in this
chapter.
Our findings detail the interplay between structure and action that
both comprise resilience as practice. More specifically, our findings outline
how, at the initial steps of an organization’s framing of resilience, general
and practical understanding can shape action while coming at odds
with the organization’s teleo-affective structure. By drawing on prac-
tice theory, the chapter opens the black box of resilience as a practice.
Our findings inform discussion on three major points: (i) resilience, as
a practice is evolutionary and complex; (ii) organizations need to fully
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consider resilience’s teleo-affective structures before designing organiza-
tional resilience; and (iii) proponents of resilience and their agency are
essential.
Organizational Resilience and Practice
For two decades, the notion of resilience has gained momentum
(Manyena, 2006). Increasing attention from authorities, the public and
organizations towards the concept stems from growing likelihood of
unexpected but highly destructive events. Resilience can be defined as ‘the
ability of an entity, individuals, community, or system to return to normal
condition or functioning after the occurrence of an event that disturbs its
state’ (Wiig & Fahlbruch, 2019, p. 1).
Organizations are particularly vulnerable because a large spectrum of
events can disrupt their activities and significantly impact their functioning
without notice. Organizational environments have also grown complex:
threats of a diverse nature now impact each other and organizations have
progressively become vulnerable (Perrow, 2006). This has strong impli-
cations for organizations’ awareness of their inner vulnerabilities, threats
and the need to develop organizational capabilities to handle them.
In this context, organizational resilience was defined as ‘a deliberate
effort to become better able to cope with surprise’ (Lovins & Lovins, 1982,
cited by Wildavsky, 1988). This effort corresponds ‘to the maintenance
of positive adjustments under challenging conditions such that the orga-
nization emerges from these conditions strengthened and more resourceful ’
(Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007, p. 3418). Because the characteristics of disas-
ters are changing and bringing unforeseen events (Djalante & Lassa,
2019), a practical adaptation of resilience frameworks by organizations
is of paramount importance. While the absence of any framework can be
a major impediment to the implementation of resilient practices, an overly
tight normative framework can prevent the emergence of resilience.
In line with this view, the two definitions provided here both uncover
the practical dimension of resilience. Practices correspond to ‘an orga-
nized, open-ended, spatial–temporal manifold of actions ’ (Lindberg &
Rantatalo, 2015, p. 564). Practices are not easy to conceptualize, even
though they contribute to the fabric of organizations as well as their
transformation (Schatzki et al., 2001).
In line with this view, the definition of organizational resilience
provided above highlights how resilience involves ‘efforts’, indicating
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continuous intentional, behavioural and emotional involvement of indi-
viduals and groups of individuals who work for the organization (we refer
to them in this chapter through the term ‘agent’). Resilience is there-
fore not understood as the mechanistic implementation of formal rules
but, rather, as a manifold of actions undertaken by agents. These actions
might remain untracked or uncontrolled and correspond to some sort
of organizational slack necessary for organizational reliability (Schulman,
1993). The latter definition outlines the transformative dimension of
resilience and suggests that, in order to become resilient, organizations
shape their own activities. This transformation targets the development of
both proactive and reactive capabilities, respectively, designed to bounce
forward or bounce back events (Pettersen & Schulman, 2019). Hence
organizational resilience as practice fully participates in the develop-
ment of crucial capabilities, yet still remains challenging to grapple with
empirically.
In our view, considering the practical dimension of resilience helps
address the challenge of how best to approach the situatedness of
resilience. But what is resilience as practice? Both scholars and practi-
tioners lack knowledge of the practical achievement of organizational
resilience (Boin & Van Eeten, 2013; Duit, 2016). Addressing this need,
we detail in the coming section our rationale for drawing on Schatzki’s
view of practice. We then detail this perspective as applied to the question
of resilience, and outline the remaining question regarding the nature of
the interplay between resilience structure, on the one side, and resilience
action on the other side.
Schatzki’s Approach to Practices
This chapter argues for Schatzki’s conceptualization of practices as a
valuable lens to better understand the dynamics underlying resilience.
The practice view of organizations, as offered by Schatzki (2006), posits
that organizational essence lies in its activities. Practice results from the
interplay between its two major components, namely action and struc-
ture, which are both essential to any organizational activity. Figure 5.1
represents the mutual ties between action and structure. On the one
hand, action, which describes what people concretely achieve (for instance
running, filling a form or using equipment), represents the most straight-
forward expression of practice. On the other hand, the structure of
practice corresponds to collective understanding and meaning of what
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Fig. 5.1 Resilience as a practice: social arrangements between actions and
structure, inspired from Schatzki (2002)
is correct or acceptable (Lindberg & Rantatalo, 2015). Practice intel-
ligibility stems from structures, which organise and regulate action.
Reciprocally, action contributes to the delineation of practice structure. In
other words, practices emerge from the influence of structures on action,
and vice versa.
We now consider more thoroughly the major elements that comprise
the structure of resilience as practice. In Schatzki’s terms, practices are
made of four major components: (1) Practical understanding corresponds
to the practical knowing of what to do in a specific situation. For instance,
practical understanding could be knowing which forms to use in a bureau-
cratic process or even how to send an email. According to Schatzki, the
practical understanding corresponds to the knowledge of how ‘to carry
out desired actions through basic doings and sayings ’ (2012, p.16). This
type of knowledge relies on practical rather than dialogical intelligibility.
From this perspective, practical understanding embeds in action rather
than being driven by formal rules or reasoning. (2) Rules correspond to
the ‘explicit directives, admonishments or instructions that participants in
the practice observe or disregard’ (Schatzki, 1996, p. 1864). Rules play an
essential role in the continuity and intelligibility of practices. However,
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actors can also bypass rules, which means that social action can diverge
from explicit norms and standards. (3) Teleo-affective structures include
a large spectrum of emotions, beliefs and rituals that direct action and
belong to the practice rather than the actors. Actors are not totally aware
of the emotional, affective and teleological dimension of practice. (4)
General understanding corresponds to the shared belief between actors
involved in a practice.
The adoption of a practice-based view of resilience leads to an
important point: resilience evolves through an interplay between struc-
ture on the one hand, and action on the other. Social and material
arrangements bridge (Schatzki, 2002; Suchman, 2007) concrete actions
undertaken by practitioners and the structures that govern these actions
(including norms, rules, protocols, directions from hierarchy, strategic
objectives and methodologies). Approaching organizational resilience
through Schatzki’s lens provides two major sources of insights on
resilience. First, it suggests resilience is part of the social fabric of the orga-
nization rather than a spontaneous reaction to events. Second, it draws
attention to the numerous and invisible ties between structure and action.
Resilience Structure and Action Interplay
Apparent examples of the gap between resilience structure and action
abound in the literature. For instance, in the case of the Bhopal disaster,
Union Carbide hardly considered experts’ recommendations regarding its
daily routine, thereby undermining its capability to deal with the explo-
sion of its factory in December 1984 (Shrivastava, 1987). As another
example, the 2012 Concordia accident resulted from a clear departure
of the ship’s captain from formal frameworks. These two examples echo
Schatzki’s view on the importance of the interplay between resilience
structure and action. This interplay, stemming from social arrangements,
is not always contradictory and might be more complex.
In organizations, informal social arrangements—those primarily
concerning humans, artefacts and things (Schatzki, 2002)—can occur in
relation to a spectrum of topics (Benson, 1977). In situations requiring
resilience capabilities, social arrangements may concern the distribution of
tasks or the nature of emergency practices (Adrot & Garreau, 2010). So
far, social arrangements related to resilience have mostly been observed
in situations where organizations need to address specific incidents.
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They have been less frequently considered in relation to the develop-
ment of resilience capabilities. From existing research on this topic, we
learnt that social arrangements between structure and action related to
resilience play an important role in organizational functioning and repre-
sent an important source of human agency (Reynaud, 1989). In line
with this view, agents need to articulate highly structured frameworks
to emerging patterns of action (Moynihan, 2012). This means that, well
before incidents, organizations ought to overcome a seemingly dichoto-
mous relation between resilience structure and action (Boin & Van Eeten,
2013). To do so, they need to know more about the nature of the
interplay between structure and action, which has remained partially
unexplored so far, In order to address this gap, this chapter proposes
examining two empirical case studies.
Case Studies
This chapter takes a comparative approach to two distinct cases. Because
of constraints around anonymity, we label these two organizational enti-
ties Ral and Fed. Both Ral and Fed are part of larger organizations
that faced unexpected events. In addition, they were both involved in
the development of resilience capabilities. However, Ral and Fed abided
by divergent resilience frameworks. Ral developed an expert-oriented
view of resilience by creating a service dedicated to the management of
crisis management teams (CMTs). By contrast, Fed made the choice of
approaching as transverse matter by developing collaborative and trans-
verse capabilities. We provide in the remainder of this section additional
detail on each case under investigation.
Ral manages crisis management teams (CMTs) and was created by
a formerly public organization specialized in railway transportation. In
recent years, the growing density of urban spaces and cities has resulted
in the French population increasingly relying on railway transportation
for daily needs. In addition to that, the railway infrastructure has bene-
fited from major technological advances. This has made trains one of the
safest modes of transport in Europe. In the busiest regions, even minor
traffic events—such as an electricity blackout, heavy rains or even high
temperatures—can lead to the cancellation of one or several trains, leaving
sometimes hundreds of people waiting in the station. In such conditions,
stations located in the busiest regions of France can be overwhelmed
with users. In the wake of a dramatic blackout that resulted in physical
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violence in a rail station, the organization decided to formulate a strategy
for resilience. A project was launched to build internal expertise. In line
with this vision, Ral was created, comprising teams of experts in charge
of managing critical situations. Thanks to these experts, the organization
increased its capability to manage a safer and also more efficient system of
mass evacuation in case of incidents. When our investigation was taking
place, Ral was composed of 88 employees, half of them coming from
safety professions and the other half from sales professions. They could be
mobilized 365 days a year and 24 h a day. Their deployment was ordered
by a national Operating Manager during the occurrence of an unexpected
incident. When Ral is triggered, its members physically go to the inci-
dent site. There, their mission is double: sales agents provide guidance to
travellers and, if necessary, water and food. Safety agents provide security
through their armed presence and respond to any disruptive behaviour.
Fed is a public organization in charge of resilience and crisis coordina-
tion in one of the busiest regions in France. Its mission is legally defined
at a regional level and targets civil safety, continuity of economic activity
and social well-being in the case of disrupting events such as terrorist
attacks, extreme weather and even flooding. According to French legal
frameworks, management of local events falls under the responsibility of
a mayor (in cases where a municipality is involved) or a prefect (in cases
where the event involves multiple municipalities). However, some events
could require additional equipment to those locally available and involve
regional decision-making. This is where Fed intervenes. In such cases, its
mission is to orchestrate the supply of necessary equipment to alleviate the
economic and social costs associated with an incident. Fed is also in charge
of gathering and transmitting information to regional decision-makers
in a timely fashion, as well as liaison between organizations involved in
the response to an incident. When our investigation was taking place,
Fed was comprised of approximately 80 employees who had each devel-
oped through the years strong but specific expertise on resilience. For
many decades, Fed had favoured siloed expertise, mostly based on specific
hazards, such as floods, chemical risks, etc. Some years ago, though, Fed
initiated an organizational transformation project, taking the opportu-
nity to renew its own vision of resilience. Fed’s new vision consisted
of approaching incidents from a holistic and transversal stance, which
had two implications: (i) implementation of transversal management of
resilience across Fed services (which meant that not only one but all
Fed services were in charge of handling a specific incident); and (ii)
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development of situational awareness within the organization. Situational
awareness allows the anticipation of the cascading effects of one specific
event. It can be illustrated by this short example: a flood can block deliv-
eries and access to commercial activities, thereby significantly endangering
economic activity at a regional level. While Fed was in charge of handling
the cascading effects of events such as floods, it still lacked situational
awareness and collaboration across services before its transformation. This
resulted in Fed’s decision to develop dialogue between its various but
complementary sources of expertise. This combined with Fed’s willing-
ness to diffuse its new vision of resilience and reorganize its processes,
based on the idea that resilience is an important matter for everyone
and requires all services’ expertise and contribution. For this reason,
Fed aimed at overcoming existing expertise silos. Table 5.1 summarizes
the specifics of functioning emerging from Ral and Fed’s organizational
contexts.1
Multiple reasons accounted for our decision to compare Ral and Fed.
First, both organizations shared contextual and structural commonalities,
which allowed us to focus on the differences between their practice of
resilience. In addition to similar size and public nature, they both repre-
sent organizations whose resilience can significantly impact the economic
activity of a European region. Moreover, they both elaborated innovative
visions of resilience in the aftermath of a disruptive event. By innovative,
we mean that they investigated resilience standards and best practices, in
particular by exploring state of the art. Both organizations framed their
own strategy based on shared representation of what resilience should
be. Fully aware of the need to adapt organizational structures in order
to implement a resilience strategy, both Ral and Fed were involved in
projects that resulted in new organizational settings. They both under-
took the implementation of an innovative vision of resilience, thereby
designing new processes, activities and task distribution. For instance, Ral
initiated reflection on the impact of a transportation blackout on well-
being in dense urban areas (as well as the economic impact of people’s
inability to attend their workplace). In a similar way, Fed thoroughly
examined its responsibility in emergency coordination and collaborated
1 Please note that the dimensions of the case studies depicted here correspond to the
main characteristics of organizations investigated in this volume. Additional detail relating
to the transformative dimension of resilience, and public nature of organizations in the
introduction and other chapters of this volume.
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Table 5.1 Commonalities and differences between Ral and Fed
Ral Fed
Sector Transportation Civil safety
Publicness The state is one of Ral’s major
stakeholders. Ral is in charge
of managing transportation





between public and private
organizations to support
regional response to events
Response to incident Consists of supporting the
continuity of transportation
activities and managing
passengers’ flow and evacuation
through the transportation
network
Support to overall regional
activity continuity and civil
safety
Trigger for search for
resilience
Major incident in a station that
impacted both users, personnel
and transportation flows
Organizational diagnosis
and search for productivity
and relevance
Resilience framework Siloed Transverse






Resilience drivers Creation of Ral and Crisis
Management
Teams—CMTs—dedicated to
resilience and developing the




distribution, diffusion of a
crisis-prone culture in a
transversal fashion
with researchers to reflect on its need to better perform its mission.
Another similarity lies in their enthusiasm with respect to their chosen
path for resilience.
Data Collection and Analysis
The authors collected data at Ral and Fed from 2015 to 2018. Observing
Ral and Fed in routine, emergency and critical situations helped triangu-
late data, including interviewees’ claims about their emotions as compared
with their actual experience on the field. For instance, an interviewee once
claimed ‘craving for opening one’s heart to the team’ when meeting one of
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Table 5.2 Data collection
Data source Ral Fed
Interviews 10 10
Observation Team observation > 30 h. The
CMTs’ activities as well as their
interactions were observed in the
train stations through 6 h
observation sessions
Crisis cells > 40 h (in routine,
exercises, large-scale emergencies
and critical settings)
Archives Internal and external archive related
to Ral’s history. Existing research
on Ral and railway management
Internal archive including
returns on experience and
transformation project
the authors for the first time. The observation of the interviewee’s actual
practices and interactions with their subordinates (including the team)
helped refine the meaning of such a claim. Finally, archives have played
an important role in us better understanding the cultural legacy, events
(particularly past critical situations) and past interactions that shaped
the teleo-affective structure of Ral and Fed. Table 5.2 represents data
collection.
The analysis was completed in an iterative and dialogical fashion. By
iterative, we mean that the authors met on a regular basis from the start
of the project. By dialogical we mean that the findings were regularly
discussed between the authors, which supported the refinement of the
initial analysis.
Findings
Based on Schatzki’s thinking, the findings uncover the nature of the
interplay between the structure and action that composes resilience as
a practice. To ensure the clarity of our findings, this section is divided
into four parts that examine the interplay between resilience action and
structures, namely: (i) practical understanding; (ii) general understanding;
(iii) rules; and (iv) teleo-affective structures. In each subsection, we focus
our analysis on the ties between the ongoing flow of resilience action and
one of the components of the structure of resilience practice. Figure 5.2
represents how resilience practice structure and resilience practice action
were connected in Ral and Fed.
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Fig. 5.2 Resilience as practice in Ral and Fed: interplay between structure and
actions (inspired from Schatzki, 2002)
General Understanding
As a reminder, general understanding corresponds to the shared belief
between actors involved in a practice. Both Ral and Fed presented a
general understanding of the ideal of resilience as framed by its propo-
nents. We demonstrate in the following paragraphs how that general
understanding united actors, bolstering motivation and fueling initia-
tives to develop resilience capabilities. Consequently, resilience action was
significantly inspired by general understanding.
Rather than developing its general understanding of resilience from
scratch, Ral based it on existing examples and knowledge. Drawing on
well-known cases of resilience and high reliability organizations (HROs),
Ral framed resilience as a specific source of expertise and collaborative
skills. From this perspective, the founders of the CMTs promoted expert
leadership and encouraged CMTs to act as experts, and rely on self-
evaluation and collegial agreement on objectives. At the same time, the
creation of the CMTs provided to their members a sense of empower-
ment consistent with a general understanding of resilience in HROs. The
CMT members also developed strong affective ties among each other.
These ties, in addition to fostering a strong sense of belonging within
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the service, contributed to uniting the CMT members in a shared view
of resilience as essentially collaborative. This supported CMT innovation
and improvement of their processes.
Based on organizational diagnosis, Fed developed a general under-
standing that resilience was a collective capacity, resulting from decen-
tralized distribution of responsibilities and agile coordination. According
to this view, proponents of resilience in Fed argued that it had to develop
its ability to orchestrate expertise, share information and collaborate, not
only within Fed but also with Fed’s partners. Fed’s proponents had a
strong motivation for diffusing this general understanding of resilience
among its stakeholders and partners. From this perspective, Fed’s general
understanding was a strong driver to resilience action. For instance, Fed
applied successfully for a grant to fund a large-scale crisis simulation exer-
cise that would involve more than one hundred organizations, as well as
the majority of its internal services. Fed invited hundreds of practitioners
to participate and massively communicated on its general understanding
of resilience. This action contributed to strengthening a shared under-
standing of resilience as a transverse matter and had a powerful effect
on action. In particular, multiple unexpected and exogenous events in
the same year (including terrorist attacks, critical resources shortages and
floods) compelled Fed’s members to cope with major stress and encour-
aged collective reflexivity about their practices in Fed. Fed’s members
hoped to act in accordance with Fed’s general understanding of resilience.
When they could not do so, they experienced significant frustration. This
illustrates how the newly generated general understanding of resilience
influenced action.
Practical Understanding
Practical understanding corresponds to the practical knowledge of what
to do in a specific situation. At the initial stages of organizational
transformation towards resilience, Ral and Fed managed to promote a
practical understanding of resilience that aligned with the general under-
standing framed and supported by the resilience proponents. The practical
understanding developed and supported consistency between general
understanding on the one hand and action on the other. However, the
alignment between actions and practical understanding eventually faded
because of two major factors. First, the contingency of actions in certain
events prevented agents’ abiding by the practical understanding. Second,
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ongoing action reframed practical understanding. These factors resulted
in progressive questioning of Ral and Fed’s general understanding of
resilience.
Consistent with the general understanding of resilience, the Ral’s
CMTs increased their ability to handle specific missions related to
resilience, which very few other agents could achieve. For instance, they
developed processes and know-how for mass evacuation and manage-
ment of large numbers stuck on a platform (such as when a train is
cancelled). They became knowledgeable of train stations to the point
where they always kept in mind which train they could rely on to evac-
uate a specific place at a specific time. They elaborated several techniques
to deal with stressed clients and cool down tense situations involving frus-
trated customers. Finally, the CMTs developed their own skills in order
to avoid any member of the team being assaulted or hurt by a customer
(which had happened to train station managers in critical situations). This
practical understanding of resilience shaped action as the CMT members
began to use them intuitively. The CMTs designed such techniques and
know-how across the occupational profiles of their team. For instance,
the CMT members in charge of customer relationship management learnt
basic elements of safety. They were aware that safety is not their source
of expertise and frequently made sure that they were not alone when
interacting with a customer. By doing so, they enacted and reinforced an
expert-oriented vision of resilience. However, the diffusion of resilience
practical understanding across services eventually contradicted Ral’s initial
vision of resilience as strictly driven by experts. Ral acknowledged the
importance of train station managers inspiring and learning from the
source of expertise as constituted by the CMTs. The image of the CMTs
as highly reliable and robust teams also encouraged Ral’s members with
respect to resilience. While Ral’s vision of resilience focused on experts, it
tended to become more transversal as other teams were inspired by CMT
practices.
In Fed, general understanding promoted the development of prac-
tical understanding. Practical understanding concerned good practices to
anticipate economic, social and ethical dilemmas that an incident such as a
hydrocarbon shortage could bring about for the authorities in an econom-
ically productive region. By making the effort to draw a systemic overview
of the effect of a hydrocarbon shortage on the economy, Fed’s agents
managed to identify and alert partners that they needed to involve in a
response in a timely manner. This practical understanding aligned with
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the general understanding of resilience as a shared responsibility. Accord-
ingly, Fed developed experience and a certain level of mastery in the
management of information transmission as well as the command chain
that would result if the region was impacted. It developed information
platforms and technologies that aimed at easing information transmis-
sion within Fed and between Fed and its partners. The implementation
of these technologies resulted in the adoption of new protocols among
Fed’s partners that were tested in large-scale exercises and used during
incidents.
From this perspective, the development of Fed’s practical under-
standing of resilience significantly shaped resilience action. Fed’s practical
understanding was not only formal but also had an informal dimension.
Consistent with the general understanding that resilience relies on coor-
dination between proactive organizations and individuals, Fed’s agents
spent part of their worktime in crisis cells, clarifying incorrect information
that was transmitted through the command chain. This supported trans-
verse coordination. In addition, they developed informal social networks
and collaborative ties with other organizations to promote effective trans-
mission of information. By doing so, Fed developed informal social
bonds and connectiveness (as defined by Putnam, 2000) as a source of
reliance for resilience. This aspect was hardly formally stated by inter-
viewees, but frequently observed in crisis cells. Finally, the practical
understanding of resilience also involved curiosity, in particular towards
alternate modes of information transmission such as social media. Hence,
practical understanding had a framing effect (as approached by Wong-
Parodi et al., 2015) on resilience action. However, in extreme situations
(such as terrorist attacks), Fed also confronted information retention from
partners, which meant that Fed had to deal with partners who radi-
cally departed from its practical and general understanding of resilience.
In addition, emerging resilience action could contradict Fed’s practical
understanding. For instance, during some incidents, some Fed partners
were not able to implement the protocols associated with the use of the
platforms devoted to transversal coordination, and they failed to provide
information. Because of the lack of information, Fed agents could not
support clarification and orchestration of resilience. This reduced the
ability of Fed agents to abide by their practical understanding of resilience.
In the mid-term, this impeded Fed agents’ confidence in resilience prac-
tical understanding and led them to feel less concerned by the need for
transverse coordination or indirectly to promote siloed coordination.
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Rules
In both organizations, the framing and application of the rules related to
resilience relied on support from proponents of resilience. However, they
were at odds with the contingency of actions (including ad hoc action
and others’ action), which generated frustration among agents.
In Ral, rules related to resilience were initially designed by the team
itself, in a collegial fashion. This mindset (as well as the framing of rules
that resulted from it) was in line with Ral’s general understanding of
resilience as a matter of experts. These rules were institutionalized in
the CMTs and had a strong impact on cohesion within and between the
CMTs. These rules also fostered motivation and a sense of empowerment
within the teams. However, it faded when the founders and initial leaders
of the CMTs were replaced by managers who came from other services
and had not experienced the creation of the CMTs as an embodiment of
Ral’s vision of resilience. This eventually generated tensions between Ral
and other services. For instance, Ral had defined the conditions under
which the CMTs were triggered and would take an active role in an inci-
dent. However, these rules did not align with the protocols released and
implemented in railway national crisis centres.
Fed’s general understanding of resilience as a transversal concern
implied that the rules dictating resilience action were predefined at a
minimum level. According to this view, each partner had to determine
its own internal rules and would refer to the framework proposed by Fed
for coordination. This vision was based on the metaphor of an orchestra,
where every agent masters its own course of action so well that the hier-
archy only gives a hint of what needs to be achieved so as to support
coordination. As a result, the rules regarding resilience were defined at
their minimum in order to give room to each coordinating organization
to develop its own additional rules. However, some partners’ rules were
not precisely defined enough to make Fed’s rules applicable. For instance,
in the aftermath of the flooding of an urban area, Fed’s agents were asked
by health care partners to determine which entity was responsible for eval-
uating whether hospitals could be reused or not. While Fed’s rules stated
that each partner was in charge of handling its own assets, hospitals, at
that time, did not benefit from rules to cover this peculiar circumstance.
Facing such divergence between Fed and its partners’ rules engendered
frustration among agents.
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Teleo-Affective Structure
Teleo-affectivity represents a particular component of practice structure.
While a teleo-affective structure has a strong experiential dimension
(driven by emotions and intentions that can emerge on the spur of the
moment), it is also grounded in culture, history and the legacy of organi-
zations. This section explains how the newly created general and practical
understandings of resilience came to be at odds with teleo-affective
structures inherited from the organization’s past.
Ral’s teleo-affective structure was not brand new but rather made
from its organization’s cultural legacy. Ral’s teleo-affective structure can
be characterized by strong delineation of professions and a strict hier-
archy between operational staff and decision-makers. Practical and general
understandings of resilience drew on an ideal of collegiality and empow-
erment of the CMTs. However, the overall teleo-affective structure of
the organization from which Ral was created played an ambivalent role
in the emergence and establishment of resilience as a practice within Ral.
According to the CMTs’ general understanding of resilience, work was
collegial, iterative and involved trial-and-error. However, CMT members
eventually aligned with Ral’s formal and strict hierarchy, as suggested
in both interviews and observations. In a nutshell, the CMT members
had past experience either in safety or commercial activity. While CMTs’
own understanding drew on a spirit of fraternity within teams, the teleo-
affective structure of Ral implied a strong legacy of hierarchy. These two
sets of beliefs and values contradicted each other, generating frustration
within the teams regarding the right place for collegiality in resilience
practice, as well as the correct basis for their identity. At certain points—
especially when the legitimacy of CMTs within Ral was questioned—some
members of CMTs struggled to figure out their professional identity as
either CMTs members or as safety or CRM specialist. These struggles
impeded—and sometimes endangered—CMT cohesion.
In Fed, practical understanding, general understanding and action all
contributed to generating positive emotions between practitioners with
respect to collaboration. However, the teleo-affective structure of Fed
hardly supported such practice because of Fed’s legacy in terms of iden-
tity, culture and professional background. Fed’s teleo-affective structure
was even called into question by the evolution of the legal framework
of emergency management at the national level in France. Legal guide-
lines released in 1996 and 2004 were consistent with Fed’s general
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understanding of resilience and outlined the necessity for organizations
to develop transverse capabilities, risk policy and procedures to handle
rare but disrupting events. In spite of national and local incentives for
transformation, Fed’s agents’ mindset remained strongly influenced by
its teleo-affective structure that comprised values such as hierarchy and
a siloed approach to resilience. For instance, Fed’s firefighters tended
towards a firefighting approach to an incident, while Fed’s members
who had a background as police officers tended to see events from their
own professional perspective. Such teleo-affective structures had a strong
impact on action. In critical situations, Fed’s members still tended to
reflect these siloes and lacked the training and preparation to shift to a
transversal approach to resilience. Fed agents led their counterparts from
other organizations to adopt a systemic, transversal view on events. But in
failing to share this conception, they became frustrated when they realized
that their counterparts (or even some colleagues in Fed) were remaining
stuck in a silo mentality.
The findings of this chapter open the black box of the interplay
between action and structure that lies at the core of resilience prac-
tice. They first reveal the complexity of this interplay, which can be
both synergic and contradictory. More specifically, they outline that the
general understanding of resilience, to some extent, shapes resilience
action. Moreover, practical understanding plays an important role in
resilience practice consistency by interlinking action to general under-
standing. However, action can also shape practical understanding, thereby
inducing inconsistencies within the structure of resilience practice. Action
and its contingency can also come to be at odds with rules. Finally, struc-
ture is not always consistent. The components of structure can contradict
each other with the teleo-affective on one side and understanding on the
other. The following tables sum up the findings. Table 5.3 provides a
summary of the common evolution of the interplay between resilience
action and resilience structures. Figure 5.2 (at the beginning of the
chapter) shows the interplay between resilience practice, structure and
action. Finally, Table 5.4 provides a comparative view on the evolution of
the structures of resilience practice for Ral and Fed.
As shown in Table 5.4, while Ral and Fed promoted seemingly oppo-
site approaches to resilience, but both faced contradictions between
teleo-affective structures and resilience understanding.
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Table 5.3 Overview of the interplay between resilience structure and resilience
action
Structure of resilience as a
practice
Definition Interplay with action






Practical understanding Knowing of what to do in a
specific setting
Shaped action but was also





Rules Normative definition of
action
Went in contradiction with
the flow of resilience
action
Teleo-affective structure Set of emotions, intentions
and cultural grounds that





Ral and Fed represent two different organizations, both characterized
by the emergence of divergences between resilience action and an ex-
ante organizational framework. Rad had elaborated an expert-oriented
vision of resilience, embodied by newly created CMTs. But progressively,
the capabilities developed by the CMTs diffused throughout the orga-
nization. Conversely, Fed had planned the transversal management of
resilience, which confronted the persistence of the siloed distribution of
tasks. From this perspective, Ral and Fed failed to impose their initial
vision of resilience in the long run. The findings of this chapter outline
how arrangements within resilience practice (specifically between action
and structure) eventually led these organizations to deviate from their
resilience vision and frameworks. No matter how compliant or innovative
their vision of resilience was, in the end, the organizations both experi-
enced some contradictions between framed and enacted resilience. This
resulted in conflicts, discomfort, motivation collapse, and productivity
loss. To nuance our view, resilience in practice was not strictly contra-
dictory. Rather, structure and action mutually influenced each other,
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which led to practice evolution. The comparative design of this study
outlines how such contradiction is not inherent to one approach specif-
ically (either expert-oriented or transverse) but rather stems from the
articulation between the organizational framing of resilience and resilience
in action.
Looking more deeply at the two cases under investigation, this chapter
outlines three major points. First, the articulation between resilience
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structure and action is evolutionary. Second, the nature of this articula-
tion is complex. Third, the articulation between the structure and action
underlying resilience practice depends on the role played by resilience
proponents. We detail each of these points here, and, based on this discus-
sion, conclude the chapter by providing practical recommendations for
organizations.
First, the results highlight that the relationship between resilience
structure (including rules, beliefs, visions and frameworks) and resilience
action is not static but rather evolutionary. In both Ral and Fed, the initial
framework of resilience manifested through evolving practice. Resilience
action initially aligned with practical understanding. The spur to action
(such as projects and concrete initiatives) also aligned with resilience
understanding. As highlighted by our findings, general understanding
and practical understanding both represent important drivers for the
translation of a vision of resilience into practice. That said, contradic-
tions eventually emerged between practical understanding and action
or between rules and action. Both Ral and Fed eventually confronted
patterns of action that were dissonant with their practical understanding
of resilience. From this stance, the chapter echoes existing research that
has highlighted the dynamic dimension of resilience (Limnios et al.,
2014). Future avenues to improve our work would consist of drawing a
process view of the interplay between action and structure that composes
resilience in practice. By doing so, we could more precisely chart the
evolution of resilience as practice.
Second, this chapter allows a nuanced understanding of the seeming
contradiction between resilience as framed and resilience as operated.
Previous literature has documented the emergence of gaps between
conception and practices (Wong-Parodi et al., 2015). At first glance,
the contradictions that seemingly characterize Ral and Fed could lead to
the inaccurate conclusion that however resilience is conceived, organiza-
tions shape actual resilience through action primarily. In line with other
chapters in this volume, this chapter suggests that the management of
ex-ante resilience is more complex. Examining more deeply the cases,
we learnt that organizations can initiate innovative avenues for organi-
zational resilience based on both action and structure. This means that
resilience practice simultaneously bears synergies and contradictions that,
in our view, have to be managed to grant a return on investment. For
instance, the evolution of Ral and Fed reveals how the relative inertia
of the teleo-affective structure—at least in relation to resilience—in an
138 A. ADROT ET AL.
organization can be at odds with resilience understanding. Such find-
ings are not surprising and echo previous depictions of teleo-affective
structures as invisible but powerful (Iedema et al., 2006). The teleo-
affective structure does not only bear the values, ideals, emotions and
myths associated with resilience. It also comprises organizational memory,
past structures, values, emotions and interaction patterns. Despite the
innovation and relevance of a plan for resilience, organizational legacy and
structures participate in the framing of practical understanding, general
understanding and rules. For instance, Fed was previously designed in
a siloed fashion to manage incidents and crises. Despite its intention to
approach resilience as a transversal matter, it remained strongly influenced
by the existing structures that it had previously developed that matched
with the silo-oriented view. More than that, siloed expertise proved to
be particularly helpful to Fed, confronting tensions resulting from the
gap between the formal definition of roles and the actual sources of
knowledge.
Third, both in Ral and Fed, resilience was initiated by proponents of
resilience who not only found practical opportunities to promote general
and practical understanding of resilience; as well, these persons trans-
lated a specific vision into concrete action. Their presence and interactions
contributed to the fueling of positive emotions and affective ties, which
could contribute to an evolution of the teleo-affective structure (Schatzki,
2006). By contrast, the turnover of people who initiated resilience vision
significantly impeded its implementation, in particular as organizations
could not deal with contradictions between rules and action or teleo-
affective structure. From this perspective, the agency of proponents of
resilience seems to represent either a strong inhibitor or a strong driver
to resilience implementation and is therefore worth examining. To that
extent, the findings of this chapter converge with previous literature on
the importance of human agency, as well as the importance of institu-
tional work in relation to resilience (Barin Cruz et al., 2016), and the
influence of institutional entrepreneurs in organizational contexts char-
acterized by strong institutional pressure (Battilana, 2006). Putting the
cases of Ral and Fed into perspective through this literature, one can infer
that resilience proponents correspond to crucial drivers for the promotion
of resilience practice (in particular when teleo-affective structure impedes
the shaping of action from resilience understanding and rules). From the
findings of this chapter, one could assume that resilience proponents,
through their contribution to institutional work on resilience, promote
5 A PRACTICAL PERSPECTIVE ON RESILIENCE IN ORGANIZATIONS … 139
resilience practice consistency overtime. Additional research is necessary
to infer, refine and nuance such assumption. From this perspective, we
need to better understand the role of proponents’ agency in addressing
contradictions between understanding and teleo-affective structure. Data
analysed for this chapter does not provide enough detail on this specific
point and, to that extent, we recommend additional investigation of the
role of proponents in resilience practice.
How can organizations address inconsistencies between resilience
structure and action? We identify two practical avenues for organiza-
tions to handle these inconsistencies. We first propose that organizations
develop awareness of their teleo-affective structure—comprising organi-
zational legacy and past experience—when desiging resilience. Through
organizational diagnosis, organizations can scan their own teleo-affective
structures before initiating transformation (reorganization, creation of
processes, teams, structures, etc.). In addition, organizations can reflect
on ways to transform their teleo-affective structure to reduce resilience
practice inconsistencies. The findings of the chapter suggest that time is
important: by the time organizations had framed resilience understanding,
they had developed scant awareness of their teleo-affective structure.
As a sequential organizational diagnosis seems tricky to implement, we
propose that the ‘reflection in action’ perspective on resilience (Yanow &
Tsoukas, 2009) could help raise awareness of the inherent inconsisten-
cies of resilience practice. Second, we recommend that organizations fully
consider the possibility of supporting resilience proponents from an insti-
tutional perspective. In terms of policy and frameworks, the findings of
this chapter suggest that dedicated recommendations regarding resilience
proponents could be enriched and refined. By doing so, organizations
would support institutional work on resilience, in particular by empow-
ering resilience proponents in their narratives. They would also support
the production of general and practical understanding, which represents
the second avenue to maintaining consistency between action and struc-
ture of resilience practice over time. Going further, we suggest that
frameworks and policies provide enough room for human agency to avoid
the rise of inconsistencies between resilience structure and action.
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Resilience in the Public Sector
Employee resilience is essential in public sector organizations, particularly
when demands are high and difficult to meet, and when the environ-
ment is uncertain and continually evolving. Also, many public sector
jobs can be characterized by high, ambiguous, and often competing
demands and ever-changing circumstances; a context where continuous
learning, collaboration and adaptability are essential. Employee resilience,
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and its development, are therefore particularly salient in this context
(Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011).
In viewing resilience as developable, it is not a fixed trait but instead
is a dynamic capability at the individual level, in which employees ‘inno-
vate, adapt to change’, and, arguably, ‘create change’ (Teece et al., 2016,
p. 18). This focus on reciprocal interactions with the environment during
both day-to-day challenges, as well as crises, blurs the distinction between
ex-ante and ex-post resilience. This is because it assumes the requirement
to be resilient to change is continuous in many KIOs, and that in order
to adapt in crisis, a culture where employees can develop their resilience
in more routine circumstances, is required.
Earlier views of individual resilience considered it as a personality
trait, similar to constructs like grit, hardiness, and the ability to bounce
back from hardship (Bonanno, 2004; Credé, et al., 2017; Richardson,
2002). The more modern view of resilience concerns ‘a key capability
enabling employees to manage and adapt to continually changing circum-
stances’ (Näswall et al., 2019, p. 353). This contemporary understanding
concerns the individual’s capacity to engage with work-related personal,
social and contextual resources, and therefore acknowledges the person–
environment interaction in resilience development (Näswall et al., 2019;
Pangallo et al., 2015). It sees resilience as involving particular capabilities
that allow individuals ‘to adapt to challenges and seek out opportunities
for continuous improvement’ (Näswall et al., 2019, p. 354).
The broader interpersonal system of workplaces shapes resilience.
Resilience development involves a constant interaction between an indi-
vidual and their work context (Mansfield et al., 2014). Leadership, social
support and workplace climate and culture, for instance, play important
enabling and motivating roles (Cooper et al., 2019; Khan et al., 2019;
Kuntz et al., 2016; Nguyen et al., 2016). In turn, the development and
enactment of resilience reciprocally contributes to the collective capacity
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We adopt a definition of employee resilience as ‘the capacity of
employees to utilise resources to continually adapt and flourish at work,
even when faced with challenging circumstances’ (Kuntz et al., 2016,
p. 460). It consists of employee behaviours associated with learning,
adaptability and collaboration. This definition aligns well to the frame-
work adopted in this volume. Resilience here can be both an independent
and dependent variable, and likely works in both linear and non-linear
ways. It can be influenced by workplace contextual factors, such as lead-
ership (Nguyen et al., 2016), and is related to outcomes, such as job
satisfaction, engagement (Näswall et al., 2019) and wellbeing (Tonkin
et al., 2018).
Resilient behaviours can lead to, or include, making both radical and
small incremental changes. The behaviours can also be either proactive
(ex-ante) or reactive (ex-post). Logically, these behaviours also provide
a way of dealing with ambiguity and uncertainty. With resilience, smaller
day-to-day challenges build capacity to deal with larger crises. In resilience
enabling workplaces, people are aware of what is happening, are managing
vulnerabilities, and adapt and respond accordingly (Lee et al., 2013;
Mallak, 1998). Consequently, they achieve desirable outcomes, despite
‘adversity, strain, and significant barriers to adaptation or development’
(Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003, p. 94). When a workplace is healthy and
resilient, its people can effectively prepare for, survive and thrive in
challenging environments (Lee et al., 2013; Vogus & Sutcliffe, 2007).
Notably, our conceptualization of resilience does not necessitate a severe
disruption or a crisis for resilience to be enacted; rather, resilient responses
can be developed and used during routine times (Kuntz et al., 2016).
Public sector managers play a pivotal role in enabling employee
resilience. Managers can support employee resilience through mecha-
nisms such as modelling, social exchange, task allocation, process deter-
mination and the setting of rewards (Nguyen et al., 2016; Franken,
2019). More specifically, leadership behaviours influence daily interac-
tions between the employee and manager, and these constant interactions
shape resilience development, both in good and in bad ways. For example,
when managers back staff, foster their growth and build the whole
team, employee resilience grows (Franken, 2019). In contrast, micro-
management and poor support for learning and development undermine
resilience (Franken & Plimmer, 2019).
This chapter begins with a brief description of the research method,
followed by an overview of public sector context and the need for
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resilience. We then move to a discussion on the behaviours associated with
employee resilience capability, followed by recommendations for devel-
oping growth-oriented leadership to enable this capability. This chapter
concludes with a discussion on resilience-enabling leadership, its relation
to the public sector and its values, and its significance in preparing for the
future of work.
Method
In this chapter we draw on our series of studies in the New Zealand public
sector to describe and explain how employee resilience can be enabled by
public sector managers. Specifically we draw on 26 interviews and two
focus groups undertaken in 2017 and 2018 with New Zealand public
servants and line managers (n = 33). Participants came from the areas
of commerce, auditing, policy and operations, reflecting the occupational
diversity of New Zealand’s wider public service (State Services Commis-
sion, 2019). Initial interview information (n = 20) was collected using
the critical incident technique, and subsequently analysed using Saldaña’s
(2015) causation coding technique—to pinpoint the mechanisms through
which certain leadership behaviours can impact resilience. These inter-
views were completed once saturation was reached (Guest et al., 2006).
The final six interviews and the focus groups were used for validating the
preliminary results.
Public Sector Environments and Need for Resilience
Public services are increasingly both expanded and dispersed, and public
organizations are consequently forced to take a more networked approach
to organizational structures and decision-making (Stoker, 2006). These
new networked approaches often consist of collaborative processes both
within and between organizations, that can include private organizations
and stakeholders. The challenge is for public organizations to stay aligned
and accountable to democratic laws and public values, while also exer-
cising more discretion to allow for effective collaboration and innovation
(Bryson et al., 2014; Plimmer et al., 2017a).
The networked approaches mean that stakeholder relationships are
more frequent, deeper and dynamic. They are also often situated in
turbulent and trying conditions. Although governments and societies
understandably expect workforces to meet these challenging demands,
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unfortunately employee capability is often missing in these discussions
(Plimmer et al., 2017a). Instead, public administration reforms have
often focussed on organizational and institutional structure, performance
management, the use of market structures, and appropriate incentives
(Bach & Bordogna, 2011; Christensen et al., 2007; Hood, 2006).
Human resource capability has not really featured, despite its potential
(Plimmer et al., 2017b). Individual level, workplace relevant behaviours
that concern interactions with the environment have not been suffi-
ciently studied, despite them being the fractals from which group and
organizational level capabilities might grow (Hall et al., 2016).
One response to rising demands on public agencies has been to shift
from centralized, bureaucratic forms of public administration to more
decentralized, market-driven methods of organizing (Bryson et al., 2014).
These trends have intensified work, with not just longer hours, but also
the proportion of effective labour performed for each hour (Cameron,
1998; Green, 2004). Increased pressure and controls, cultures that expect
compliance and negative behaviours such as bullying now also seem too
common (Omari & Paull, 2015; Plimmer et al., 2017c). These changes
put pressure on workers (Christensen & Lægreid, 2011a): ‘many large-
scale reforms that have occurred in the public sector have involved a loss
of resources, especially in terms of people, time, and budgetary support’
(Noblet et al., 2006, p. 338). Clearly public sector organizations are
faced with a need for both tight and innovative resource use to cope
with increasingly complex demands. This ever-changing context demands
a resilient workforce:
We have the constant challenge that there’s always churn and change so that
does push us to, “Either you’re resilient or you’re not,” and there’s an element
of that that comes through so some people find policy is not for them pretty
quickly, but those who can survive …well if you survive the first 12 months,
you’ll be fine! [Interview—Manager]
Public sector organizations are both hierarchical bureaucracies and
paradoxically, often decentralized and networked, increasingly resembling
hybrid organizations (Fossestøl et al., 2015). Leadership can occur at any
level of an organization, and many positional leaders lead in ways that
support resilience (Zeier et al., 2018). Some, however, do not (Franken,
2019).
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Resilient Employee Behaviours
There are many conceptualisations of resilience, but the one adopted
for this research is that employee resilience is centred on three core
behaviours: network leveraging, learning and adaptability (Kuntz et al.,
2017). These behaviours are not discrete, rather they relate to and build
on each other, and also interact with the work environment to protect
and acquire job and personal resources, such as connections, feelings of
competence, and control.
For example, working well with others (network leveraging) supports
learning through the flourishing of new, and diverse, ideas. Being adapt-
able can also help learning, as new repertoires are practiced. Adaptable
people often work better with others (O’Connell et al., 2008). These
three behaviours can also help in the acquisition of other resources,
such as skills and connections (Hobfoll, 2011). Resilient behaviours thus
bolster one’s ability to deal with challenges and crises effectively.
Combined, these behaviours represent ‘the capacity of employees to
utilise resources to continually adapt and flourish at work, even when
faced with challenging circumstances’ (Kuntz et al., 2016, p. 460).
Resilient behaviours are separate from, but precede, attitudes such as job
satisfaction, engagement, commitment and wellbeing (Brennan, 2017;
Näswall et al., 2019; Tonkin et al., 2018; Youssef & Luthans, 2007).
The core behaviour of network-leveraging consists of effective collab-
oration between colleagues, sharing knowledge and information and
cooperating across teams, networks and functions (Lengnick-Hall et al.,
2011; Uzzi, 1997). These behaviours help people access and exchange
resources, which in turn makes dealing with challenge and crises easier
(Mitchell et al., 2015). Teams collaborate to use collective competencies
to resolve shared issues and challenges (Hardy et al., 2005):
When I talk about things with other people I get good ideas or like things
become more clear to me so I find that really helpful. You can really get
so much groundwork done working with other people’s [work] that they did
before. [Interview—Employee]
Learning, the second behavioural component of employee resilience,
supports innovation, and helps develop the competencies that are neces-
sary in overcoming, and learning during challenges and crises (Kuntz
et al., 2017; Walker et al., 2020). This ex-ante skill enables individ-
uals to be resilient during routine challenges, build resilience capacity
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before severe crises and be adaptive in the midst of crises. Like network
leveraging, this skill is particularly salient in the public sector, where
under-resourcing and complex demands are common (Cameron, 1998;
Christensen & Lægreid, 2011b). Goals that are learning-centred, rather
than rigid and performance-oriented, foster wellbeing and growth as well
as performance. They support deep and sustained learning that ultimately
build capacities such as adaptive resilience (Winters & Latham, 1996).
The third key behavioural component of resilience is adaptability.
It occurs when employees use their resources (both personal and job-
related) to respond swiftly (ex-post) to changes and uncertainties. Adapt-
ability helps individuals use experiences involving change or challenge in
order to grow and develop personally and professionally (Kuntz et al.,
2017). It also means that employees can effectively adapt to changing
demands and stressors that arise and develop in a particular context.
In doing so, they use learning to improve and modify their adaptive
responses over time.
Table 6.1 exemplifies the behavioural components of employee
resilience, with examples from interviews with public employees and
managers.
These behaviours are all closely interwoven and reinforce each other.
For instance, network leveraging supports adaptability, which in turn
helps learning (Folke et al., 2010). A resilient employee with appropriate
support would collaborate well with others, adapt accordingly and also
contribute to individual and organizational learning. Resilient employees
adapt to changing job circumstances, and acquire and use personal, work,
and social resources well. In contrast, a person who lacks resilience-
enabling support may find collaboration difficult; and not learn easily.
They may also struggle with change.
Resilience is often thought of as an outcome (Zautra & Reich, 2011),
but the capacity itself has strong and significant downstream consequences
for employees and workplaces. Job satisfaction, wellbeing and engage-
ment are three known outcomes of employee resilience (Malik & Garg,
2020; Näswall et al., 2019). A resilient workplace is defined as one that
achieves ‘desirable outcomes amid adversity, strain, and significant barriers
to adaptation or development’ (Sutcliffe & Vogus, 2003, p. 94). It is an
essential capacity in modern organizations, constantly facing change and
challenge.
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Table 6.1 Resilient behaviours and examples
Resilient behaviour Behavioural examples Exemplifying quotes
Network leveraging Collaborating internally with
peers, managers and teams
Collaborating with people and
teams in other organizations




Seeking resources from peers
I thrive off being able to bounce
ideas off other people just more
to make sure that what you’re
thinking and doing is the right
thing
It is kind of a team approach
in going ‘right, what do we
need to do, what bits of
information do we need to get,
who’s going to do what, how are
we gonna pull this all together?’
Learning Using mistakes as learning
opportunities
Re-evaluating performance on a
continuous basis to improve
own work
Using feedback, including
negative feedback, for learning
and improvement of own work
Not just learning from
mistakes but learning from
changes or other ways of doing
things
You can’t function effectively
within the team without being
open to learning on a semi
constant basis
Adaptability Managing resources effectively
in order to cope with high
workloads when needed
Engaging in crisis management
effectively
Using change as an opportunity
for growth
You have to be adaptive all the
time because you know that the
government changes quite a lot
and that’s not really how the
public sector should work…but
it does …
We need to adjust to… be able
to do really in-depth thinking
about issues [and then] jump to
doing discussions with
stakeholders to then completely
changing the direction we were
going to take because it wasn’t
going to be acceptable. So
constant change in that sense
Note Adapted from Näswall et al. (2019) and Kuntz et al. (2017); own data sources
Leadership for Resilience and Growth
Although resilience likely depends to some extent on relatively stable
individual characteristics (Donnellan & Robins, 2010), it is also shaped
by the environment and specifically, leadership (Franken, 2019; Nguyen
et al., 2016). The next section discusses and relates our findings to recom-
mendations for public organizations and their leaders, specifically on how
managers can engage in growth-oriented leadership (Franken, 2019) to
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build resilience in their workforce. Such leadership is relational and reflects
a willingness to attend to the development needs of employees. It reflects
calls for leadership models which facilitate employees’ personal and voca-
tional development (Zhang & Chen, 2013), rather than focusing on task
and goal performance (Hargis et al., 2011; Howell & Avolio, 1993).
Resilience-enabling leadership is associated with the provision of
resources. An employee with a resilience-enabling manager is provided
with clear pathways for personal and professional growth, individualized
feedback, trust and autonomy, as well as a functional norms for teamwork.
These resources are likely to help develop resilient behaviours, maintain
resilience capacity in the face of challenges, and further grow resilience as
a result. This mirrors conservation of resources theory (Hobfoll, 1989),
that when individuals gain resources, they protect and invest in them,
and then become better placed to gain more resources (Demerouti et al.,
2004; Ng & Feldman, 2012). In contrast, a resilience-harming manager
may contribute to a reduction in resources. For example, poor or unclear
feedback might mean that employees ‘are more likely to engage in
feedback avoidance in order to avoid further resource losses from inter-
acting with the abusive supervisor’ (Halbesleben et al., 2014, p. 1336).
They may also be reluctant to show vulnerability, i.e. through problem
solving or experimenting, in attempts to protect any remaining resources
(Halbesleben, 2010). Resource provision, or loss, is relevant to the
resilience development process, and needs to be considered when under-
standing how resilience can be both enabled and harmed by managers in
organizations.
Resilience-enabling leadership is also capability, competence and
confidence-enhancing. Such managers use their authority to develop
adaptive, independent and autonomous employees, rather than relying
on it to perpetuate traditional worker-manager dependencies and main-
tain command and control power structures (Heifetz, 1994; Wilson et al.,
2017). The latter does not help employee growth and development and
is increasingly ill-suited to today’s dynamic environments. Instead, a set
of beliefs and behaviours by managers are needed to foster employee
resilience in subordinates.
Our analysis resulted in four core dimensions of leadership behaviours
that foster resilience: Seeing people as ‘developable’, not as broken or
fixed, Supporting personal goals, Providing both challenging tasks and safe
failures and Managing the whole team (Table 6.2).
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Table 6.2 Leadership beliefs and behaviours that foster resilience




I know the people I’ve grown
and nurtured—and I think it is
my responsibility to grow and
nurture them. I look on
attrition as success… we’ve got
people who don’t want to leave
and are having to grow them to
the point that they do
Manager sees people as
capable of change and
development, relies less on





If [employees] can see this is
what I’m doing, this is the
purpose, but these other things
are out there and I could go
there or do this, it gives them a
sense of what the future could
hold





& Latham, 1996). Non
growth supporting
managers harmed morale,
and were often focussed





They need to know and
understand that they have full
support of their manager and
their colleagues and to know
that by making an error, the
world isn’t going to crumble
down around you















Seeing People as ‘Developable’, Not as Broken or Fixed
If a manager views resilience as developable, they are more likely to try
and foster it. However, we found that managers with a formal hier-
archical approach to their role typically saw employee resilience (and
general capability) in traditional terms: they saw it as fixed and trait-
based, i.e. having natural self-confidence and a proactive personality.
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Table 6.2 (continued)
Core dimension Representative quote Process
Managing the whole
team
I always ask for a collaborative
approach. And you know, bring
them in as part of the situation.
And work together on the result
or an outcome, however we need
to get there
Builds norms for network
leveraging, allows
individuals to benefit from
sharing knowledge and
learning from each other





themselves with the team,
and setting collective tasks
These managers, perhaps conveniently, could not see the pivotal role they
could play in developing resilience.
It might be just that they have a degree of maturity, or that they will keep
things in perspective or kind of, have their own personal ways of managing
stuff. And other people can’t, some people are just total stress bunnies and
react to everything that happens in a negative way. [Interview—Manager]
Although some managers saw resilience as a fixed trait, employees often
saw their psychological state as dependent on how their managers treated
them. They saw their resilience as both developable and damageable by
managers. A quote about the impact of micromanagement illuminates
this:
It takes away self-esteem because they don’t believe in your ability to do a job.
Well when you feel like you’re constantly being checked up on and you’re not
allowed to just go up and meet with people or do things without them being
there, you know…You can’t learn in that respect. [Interview—Employee]
In a more positive light, managers’ behaviours could have healthy
impacts on employees (such as through developing their resilience):
Oh it [my manager’s behaviour] makes me want to turn up. Just want to
get stuck in which is what it’s about. [Interview—Employee]
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Our interviews found that growth-oriented leadership reduced
demands on employees and stress, and promoted employee commitment,
confidence, job motivation and feelings of being valued. These psycho-
logical states in turn helped employees be resilient. Employees engaged
in adaptive behaviours, sought development opportunities and elicited
continuous learning processes.
…he’s [manager] always open to anything you want to suggest like if you
bring a development opportunity and its relevant then you can be confident
that you’ll be able to do it within reason… to even have that brought to me
as an opportunities kind of made me feel quite good because I wouldn’t have
thought I’d even be considered for this. [Interview—Employee]
Supporting Personal Goals
Growth-oriented managers supported employees’ subjective career
successes, defined as the ‘person’s own preferences for development in
an occupation, that is his/her individual perception of career experi-
ence’ (Gattiker & Larwood, 1986, p. 80). Subjective success is important
because objective success, such as promotion and pay increases, are some-
times limited in public sectors (Frank & Lewis, 2004; Lyons et al., 2006).
A public manager who values employee growth and potential is subse-
quently developing committed and effective public servants (Ng et al.,
2005). It likely also partly compensates for the low pay that characterizes
some public sector jobs:
I’ve been told ‘I can offer you at least 10,000 more than what you’re on
now’—it’s not a more complicated job … but the money isn’t enough to make
me want to change. [Interview—Manager]
Growth-oriented leadership is relational. Consistent with other leader-
ship constructs such as transformational, servant, organizing and paradox-
ical, resilience enhancing leaders respond to, care, and are seen to care,
about those they are responsible for (Dong et al., 2017; Franken, 2019;
Miao et al., 2014; Plimmer & Blumenfeld, 2012).
The best managers are people managers, they care about their staff, they put
them into training, they develop them to become the best people they can. And
then they know how to manage up. They’re the best managers. Quite often
you’ll get managers that just manage up. So all they care about is looking
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good to the person above them and they don’t care about the people below
them. [Interview—Employee]
Some research has found that these ‘developmental’ managers are not
easy to come by in the public sector (Plimmer et al., 2017a), where layers
of mixed ideologies such as new public management, market models and
bureaucracies have led to strong management control, but weak manage-
ment development and accountability. Our findings supported the idea
that some managers are better at managing up than down, and are moti-
vated to advance their own career but not that of their staff (Feldman &
Weitz, 1991).
You’ve still got a lot of the same people in those leadership positions that have
been there for 10 or 15 years and they got there through hanging around
and being quite senior and knowledgeable about their jobs rather than being
leaders per-se. So in that situation you don’t have people who necessarily have
the right sort of set of skills to lead or manage people. [Interview—Manager]
Growth-oriented leadership is also about encouraging employees to
make mistakes and then grow as a result. An employee explains this below:
If you let people make a few mistakes in a really low…you know, like there’s
a…the potential negative is really quite minor, but you let them kind of
fail, or also encourage them to deal with difficult situations that as a fresh
new person, they’re pretty stressful, but they’re actually not, you know what
I mean, in hindsight you go ‘yeah that wasn’t really that bad’. I think that
helps you to then develop up and be able to deal with more and more difficult
situations. [Interview—Employee]
Related to growth and development is learning (Hameed & Waheed,
2011), and managers can foster this through a learning orientation:
I say ‘so, what have you learnt from this?’ I’d say there’s always some learning.
So ‘what DID you learn and what do you think you could do better next
time?’ So you just went ahead and did it off the back of your hand? And
just made a decision? Or did you go and check that perhaps you should have
done this, you know? [Interview—Manager]
As can be expected, managers who do not foster growth in employees
were found to have a negative impact on employee morale and motivation
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(Moynihan, 2009; Pandey, 2010) limiting the possibilities for resilience
development:
[Having a manager who is not growth oriented] is like doing a degree that
never ends and it’s like you can’t get to a certain level and then you know,
you get promoted, or you know, you just keep going forever trying to get a
degree. [Interview—Employee]
Managers may also lack the time (and prioritization skills) to work
with employees to discuss and plan their growth and development
opportunities:
I’m an investment advisor, so my next career step would be a senior invest-
ment advisor and for me in the last year I’ve struggled to understand what
that progression looks like and I have asked a lot of questions about it but
[my manager] doesn’t have the time to really sit down and explain that.
[Interview—Employee]
Without growth-oriented managers, employees are left to navigate
their opportunities. This is good for certain employees, mainly as it repre-
sents some capacity for resilience and self-management. However, not
being supported in this way can place unnecessary stress and burden on
employees:
And previously any kind of secondments or movements I’ve done I’ve made
those myself, I’ve made those enquiries on my own, I haven’t had anyone or
a manager come to me and say you know, this would be a good idea for you
or anything like that. [Interview—Employee]
Providing Both Challenging Tasks and Safe Failures
A trusting relationship between employees and managers is important for
resilience (Franken, 2019; Walker et al., 2020). With this trust comes
the managers’ belief in employee competence, which enables autonomy
and self-management. Such independence is an essential part of employee
resilience (Näswall et al., 2019).
I guess that’s why I try to do, just assume that they are capable of doing their
job and let them get on with it. Um, expect them to hold up their hand if
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they need help. And if need be, kind of get alongside them to help them with
what they need. [Interview—Manager]
The quotes above and below establish that a balance of support is
required for trust—a certain degree of autonomy with adequate help and
guidance when required:
[My manager] has a lot of faith in me to manage myself to some extent.
So he’s, in saying that, he’s very supportive and you know that if some-
thing happens and you need help, he’ll be there and he’ll do whatever needs
to be done to make that happen. But yeah, doesn’t micromanage, which is
appealing. [Interview—Employee]
Trust, belief in competence and allowance of autonomy are often inter-
woven with learning. A resilience-enabling manager balances growth (and
learning), trust and collaboration in the approach to leadership:
So what I say is ‘you’re a manager in your own right’ When I see you’re not
managing yourself or you can’t manage, that’s where I step in. So that gives
them some autonomy to make decisions for themselves. They can be right or
wrong, I don’t care. As long as there’s that learning if it comes back to me.
[Interview—Manager]
The balance between providing support and allowing autonomy can
also come down to the different stages of trust development between
managers and employees (Whitener et al., 1998):
What happens is you grow a trust with the individual you’re working with
and it might start off with direction but it ends up with suggestion. And that
suggestion, once the trust is grown delivers what it was you want. Because you
don’t need somebody telling you to do it your way, you just need to make sure
that the aim is achieved and you can’t achieve the aim until you’ve built the
trust. [Interview—Manager]
Trusting behaviours by managers are often reciprocated by employees,
through a process of social exchange. There is a reciprocal trust that
can emerge from the employee, whereby they feel that they trust their
manager to value them and support them in their extra efforts. This
is good for employee resilience (learning, development, extension of
capabilities) and organizations:
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[When] they’ve given me that respect…it’s my responsibility to make sure that
I get my work done. [Interview—Employee]
Another employee experienced a sense of motivation to work and
freedom when he feels trusted.
…I actually enjoy coming to work because you have the freedom to do stuff .
[Interview—Employee]
Extra discretionary effort can also result from a trusting employee–
manager relationship (Burke et al., 2007):
If there is a big drama, all hands to the pump, I’ll work extra or I’ll call
into meetings from home and all that kind of stuff and I think that’s kind
of a key to having a good, having a workforce that’s kind of prepared to go
that extra mile when there is a big issue on. [Interview—Employee]
Positive leader–follower exchanges, underpinned by trust, matter
in public contexts, and predict motivation among public sector
employees (Gould-Williams & Davies, 2005). This is especially so when
employees lack confidence in political leaders and ministers (Miao et al.,
2014). Managers trusting their employees’ capabilities and giving them
autonomy likely provides employees confidence to address, experiment
with and learn from the challenges of governance. Positive interactions
with leaders promote trust in the leader–follower dynamic, even if trust
is lacking elsewhere. This makes sense since ‘direct leaders (e.g. super-
visors) appear to be a particularly important referent of trust’ (Dirks &
Ferrin, 2002, p. 611). Trust-based experiences with a leader may also
foster organizational commitment among public servants (Miao et al.,
2014).
Both employees and (some) managers emphasized the importance of
not micromanaging employees, but also providing support:
If they’re given a task and a time to be completed by, one follow up three-
quarters of the way through saying, “How you going? Need any help?” And
then wait for them to come back with it. Not be on their back every couple
of hours saying, “How you going?” [It] can give people confidence that they
are trusted. [I help them] out when they need [it] but don’t micromanage.
[Interview—Manager]
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Micromanagement was thus identified as harmful for employee
resilience. This likely stems from the pressure on managers to achieve
short term political deliverables at the expense of working proactively
towards long-term goals (Pandey, 2010).
Micromanaging behaviour sometimes caused a lack of trust. When
managers do not believe in the competence and growth potential of
employees, they tend to control processes in ways that damage the dyadic
relationship and resilience itself (Weibel & Six, 2013). While in some cases
lack of belief in employee competence might be warranted (for example,
with new employees), at times it seemed more a matter of managerial style
than employee competence. This is harmful for resilience development.
It’s the micromanagement that is a disguise for performance management…
And it’s just like setting impossible goals, saying OK, well there’s a problem
with your performance. [Interview—Employee]
Excessive control or micromanagement led one employee to feel as
though she was being treated like a child.
Micromanaging is therefore damaging and can turn the exchange
process negative, thwarting individual autonomy and leaving employees
unfulfilled and lacking ownership of their work (Hackman & Oldham,
1980). Social exchange can work in a negative and harmful way, whereby
‘employees will respond negatively to unfair treatment’ (Boddy, 2014,
p. 116). In our research, we found that some employees who experienced
micromanagement, for instance, would reciprocate with more counter-
productive behaviours. One employee spoke on behalf of his team when
he said:
We really didn’t want to do anything else, we didn’t want to do any more
than our job. [Interview—Employee]
Another employee noted that:
[Micromanagement] can allow people to get a bit complacent. Because you
think if no one is going to talk to me about this or if everything I’m doing is
just going to be acceptable … you sort of get a bit complacent and think I’ll
just keep doing it the way I’m doing it because no one’s telling me otherwise
and you don’t learn to evolve or change. [Interview—Employee]
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All in all, the ability to balance support with autonomy and lack
of micromanagement characterize growth-oriented leaders, creating
trusting, positive interactions between leaders and team members,
enabling employee resilience. Importantly, employee-centric culture,
including trusting relationships, has been suggested to be the founda-
tion of an adaptive, resilient, organization, a base on which a culture of
collaboration and learning can be built (Walker et al., 2020).
Managing the Whole Team
Managers who foster collaboration are important for resilience because
they help to build behavioural norms for network leveraging and allow
individuals to experience the benefits that come from sharing knowledge
and learning from each other (Malik & Garg, 2020). When employees
recognize and utilize others’ skills and resources they are better equipped
to face challenges and perform resiliently. Managers can create a culture of
collaboration in various ways, through fostering norms for collaboration,
involving themselves in collaboration with the team and setting collective
tasks for employees:
I always ask for a collaborative approach. And you know, bring them in as
part of the situation. And work together on the result or an outcome, however
we need to get there. [interview—Manager]
[My manager will] put me on a project and tell me the people who need
to be brought in on that project and he’s also open to me bringing in more
people if I think it’s suitable. [Interview—Employee]
Such a collaborative‘ approach helps employees build valuable
networks between each other.
Leadership that encourages employees to work ‘with groups inside and
outside of the organisation’ (Hsieh & Liou, 2016, p. 84) builds resilience,
and meets the demands for effective public service operations inclusive of
intra- and inter-agency collaboration and networked governance (Camp-
bell, 2016; Silvia & McGuire, 2010; Stoker, 2006). Effective collabora-
tion is not just a product of network leveraging ability. It also relates to
increased learning, problem solving and adaptability in employees, all of
which tie directly into employee resilience (Getha-Taylor, 2008; Kuntz
et al., 2017; Lengnick-Hall et al., 2011).
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Some managers understand the importance of collaboration, and have
the intention to promote it, but may struggle with executing it in
reality. This may be a product of the layering of various reform models,
where public servants and their managers must work within multiple,
contradictory logics (Fossestøl et al., 2015):
You get mixed messages, like I say, do it at whatever cost, and then you did
that and the cost was too high. So it’s the same with collaboration it’s like, you
know, you all have to work together as a team, there’s too much talking. You
know, you guys are wasting too much time because you’re working together,
I’m gonna get you to work on stuff individually. But make sure you ask the
senior people before you do anything, but don’t talk to each other. Um so I
guess that’s the best way I can answer that is, you always think you’re doing
the wrong thing, you spend the whole day worried that you’re gonna get told
you did something wrong. [Interview—Employee]
The impact of this can be that employees learn to accept that not
speaking up, or withholding ideas from each other, is actually safer than
showing vulnerabilities through experimenting and sharing ideas with
others:
I’ve probably switched off and I think that’s fair to say with a lot of public
servants who have been there for 10 years, you get taught that doing nothing
and wasting time and keeping your head down and keeping out of the way,
is better than actually working with anyone. [Interview—Employee]
Concluding Remarks
This chapter extends conceptual and empirical understandings of
resilience in public sector workplaces, with specific regard to the nature of
employee resilience and how managers can facilitate it. Four key takeaways
are: resilient responses are core to continual adaptation and flourishing
at work; employee resilience is developable; resilience enabling leader-
ship focuses on supporting growth and development and micromanaging
behaviours can be harmful to employee resilience.
The public sector context increasingly requires resilient employees,
organizations and institutions. This is exemplified by the collaboration
and learning required for addressing ‘wicked problems’ (Stoker, 2006),
and the adaptiveness demanded by uncertain environments (Karp &
Helg, 2008). This research shows more specifically how factors in the
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public sector context can influence resilience. Employee-level resilience
possibly works at organizational levels too, as the behaviours likely help
the integration of both exploration and exploitation (March, 1991).
Learning, network leveraging and adaptability have clear correspondences
to exploration, but also probably provide a foundation for efficiency
and use of existing resources too. Other research has found that aggre-
gated individual-level employee experiences help integrate exploitation
and exploration (Plimmer et al., 2017a). Reciprocally, environments that
integrate exploration and exploitation likely support employee resilience.
We expect employee resilience may also help public organizations in
their ongoing struggle to live up to the values the public hold them
to. Organizations vary in the degree to which they are public, but most
are public in some way. Participants in this study worked for organiza-
tions that were high in publicness, and so characterized by complex tasks,
professional orientation, diverse stakeholders, ‘conflicting environmental
demands, and low managerial autonomy’ (Antonsen & Jørgensen, 1997,
p. 1467). Employee resilience, and accompanying supportive manage-
ment behaviours, are likely needed to deal with this context, but the same
context may not always encourage these right behaviours. For instance,
low managerial autonomy likely limits the scope of support that can
be offered. Complex tasks, diverse stakeholders and conflicting demands
would make micromanagement tempting as a way to ‘get things right’.
Despite these pressures both managers and employees in public orga-
nizations are expected to demonstrate ‘public values’, which concern
the values (and expectations) attached to public organizations and
delivery of public services particularly those value sets concerning intra-
organizational life. Such relevant and identified public values include
robustness (which includes adaptability, reliability etc.), innovation
(which includes enthusiasm, risk readiness, etc.), productivity (which
includes effectiveness, business-like approach, etc.) and self-development
of employees (which includes good working environment) (Jørgensen &
Bozeman, 2007). Employee resilience matches several of these public
values. Adaptability likely supports robustness; network leveraging and
learning would support self-development of employees and learning
would enable innovation.
Employee resilience may also support the accountability of public
sector employees (another set of public values that include professionalism
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and integrity). Its capability development would encourage profession-
alism, and the associated self- and other-awareness would work to enhance
integrity.
Resilient behaviours—network-leveraging, learning and adaptability—
help employees deal with complex public sector realities. Such behaviours
are pertinent at the individual and team level, but they also model
effective behaviours at higher levels in the public system. Implications
for organizations are to develop, select, support and hold accountable
managers capable of enabling growth and resilience in their teams.
When addressing the potential solutions for coping with the future
of work, leadership matters. Resilient employees are well equipped to
confront the increasingly uncertain and dynamic nature of workplaces,
but they need to be supported and developed. The managerial behaviours
identified here represent useful competencies for growth-oriented leaders.
Additionally, this will require a view of the workplace as a learning envi-
ronment, supportive of adaptability and those who facilitate it. Such an
orientation may require not only investment in managerial and employee
development opportunities, but also review of reward and signaling prac-
tices in organizations which may discount resilience-enabling behaviours
and/or prioritize behaviours inimical to resilience.
For organizations, our findings provide an alternative to the top
down command and control management that sometimes characterize
government organizations (Plimmer et al., 2017a). Executive actions can
facilitate line leadership behaviours that develop employee resilience, and
build over time organizational capability to better deal with ambiguity,
tension and the competing demand of public service life (Jørgensen &
Bozeman, 2007). The resilience conceptualized in this paper was at the
employee level, but we expect it would aggregate to organizational levels.
It would be hard to imagine an organization as resilient if its employees
were not. However, this is an empirical question for future research.
We hope the ideas in this chapter will inform more positive and adap-
tive behavioural norms at individual, group and organizational levels,
contributing to the resilience of the wider public sector system.
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PART III
Resilience in Organizational Fields
and Societies
CHAPTER 7
The Post-entrepreneurial University: The
Case for Resilience in Higher Education
Mitchell Young and Rómulo Pinheiro
Introduction
Historically speaking, universities have been found to be highly resilient
organizational forms. Since their inception in Europe in the middle ages,
they have been able to adopt new functions, structures and values while
retaining their essence and identity (Scott, 2006). The most important
transformative turn occurred in the mid-nineteenth century, with the so-
called Humboldtian revolutions, when research emerged as a core mission
alongside academic autonomy as a cherished value (Nybom, 2003). In
many European countries, the post-WWII period assisted in the rise of
different types of higher education institutions (HEIs) with an explicit
mandate to promote national and regional economic development, which
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provide the backbone for the establishment of binary higher education
(HE) systems. More recently (last two decades or so), and as a result of
an increasingly competitive environment (for students, staff, funding and
prestige), both domestic and global, entrepreneurialism, and its emphasis
on the ‘market’, has emerged as a feature of modern HEIs and systems
alike (Alajoutsijärvi et al., 2021). As a means of responding to these (and
other) external imperatives, universities and other types of HEIs are nowa-
days characterized by a multitude of missions, some of which are at odds
or in tension with one another (Castells, 2001), leading some to suggest
that such tasks are impossible to accomplish (Enders & Boer, 2009).
Few studies to date have taken stock of the distinct and incompatible
ways in which the notion of the entrepreneurial university has developed,
and how that affects its ability to incorporate other concepts into its
model. Specifically, we are interested in the way the concept of resilience,
broadly defined as the ability to adapt to changing circumstances while
retaining its core attributes or essence (Walker & Salt, 2006), can be artic-
ulated to that of the entrepreneurial university. We ask in this chapter:
to what extent are entrepreneurial universities likely to be resilient? In
order to address this question, we first provide conceptual clarity by revis-
iting the seminal works of two scholars who have underpinned scholarly
and policy debates in the last two decades, resulting in what we argue
are two distinct schools of thought on the entrepreneurial university as
an organizational archetype. In doing so, we investigate how the rise of
New Public Management (NPM) in Europe in the late 1990s and early
2000s co-opted and reframed the concept of the entrepreneurial univer-
sity in ways that make it incompatible with resilience thinking. We do
this by, in the second part, laying out three tensions (or paradoxes) that
emerge from this NPM-inflected version of the entrepreneurial univer-
sity. We show how these are rooted in an ideational interpretation of the
concepts of efficiency, competition, and diversity. Finally, by tying back
into ‘lost’ elements of sociological conceptions of entrepreneurialism in
HE, we demonstrate how resilience can potentially resolve the tensions
identified in what we term a post-entrepreneurial model of the university.
The Entrepreneurial University: Tracing
the Origins of a (Misunderstood) Idea
The existing literature on the topic points to two relatively distinct
conceptions of entrepreneurialism in HE. These conceptions are aligned
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with two diverging schools of thought with disciplinary and normative
undertones, one sociological stressing the importance of adaptation and
change for the public good and the unique features of universities as
fiduciary institutions, and the other economic, centred on the idea that
competition and markets are the most efficient and sustainable ways to
organize activities and the notion of universities as quasi-firms. Having
presented the two schools, we go on to show how the entrepreneurial
university concept has been extrinsically aligned with a NPM policy
regime that emphasizes efficiency and competition and has been used to
underpin a bold reform agenda aimed at the modernization of European
HE systems and institutions.
The Sociological School
Since its inception in the 1970s, the sociological perspective’s point of
departure has been a recognition of the importance of HE as a public
good and the effects accrued from the massification of HE systems after
WWII. Inspired by the work of Israeli sociologist Joseph Ben David, it
paid attention to comparative issues pertaining to structural differences
among national HE systems, with an emphasis on flexibility, innovation
and change (Clark, 1973, p. 6). Following the seminal work of Jencks
and Riesman (1968), the sociological perspective interpreted broader
system-wide developments in the 1970s as reflecting the rising power
and influence of (North American) scholars and scientists as the funda-
mental ‘academic revolution’ of the time (Clark, 1973, p. 5). Further,
the sociological perspective identified the meso level of the HE orga-
nizations (themselves rooted in national systems of HE) as the primary
unit of analysis (p. 7). Burton Clark, as a principle voice in this tradition,
was immensely concerned with the risk of co-optation by non-educational
interests and agendas, particularly managerial and public policy ones.
Clark’s (1983) seminal work The higher education system: academic
organization in cross-national perspective sheds light on the building
blocks that characterize HE as organizations by pointing to three key
elements: (a) the fragmented nature (‘loose web’) of academic organiza-
tions substantiated around loose coupling among their various units and
knowledge domains [what might also be termed the ‘ambiguity of struc-
ture’ (Pinheiro, 2012)]; (b) the role of academic and disciplinary norms
and values (‘beliefs’) as mediating systems between societal demands and
university responses; and (c) the balkanized system of authority from the
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lowest level of the departmental unit up to the national government with
the ‘middle-structure’ of the central administration caught in between.
Finally, Clark’s work pointed to the process of adaptation and change
within HE systems by referring to natural systems’ evolution:
[T]he fundamental adaptive mechanism of universities and larger academic
systems is the capacity to add and subtract fields of knowledge and related
units without disturbing all the others […] Adaptability, in short, lies first
in the internal variety of amalgamated, conglomerated organization. (Clark,
1983, pp. 186–187)
In the 1990s, the emergence of the first studies focusing on university
crisis and change in Europe and the importance attributed to strategic
planning (Maassen & Potman, 1990) propelled Clark to pay close atten-
tion to the processes of change and adaptation within the context of an
entrepreneurial framework (Clark, 1998, 2004). Underpinning Clark’s
notion of entrepreneurialism in HE are three critical elements: autonomy,
differentiation and the active role played by the academic heartland.
A growing number of entrepreneurial universities now embody a new
option for institutional self-reliance. In their more active autonomy, they
marry collegiality to change as well as to the status quo… They know the
difference between a university and a business firm. They also know that
a complex university has many ‘souls’, some righteous others unrighteous.
(Clark, 2004, p. 7)
For Clark, the quest for self-reliance starts with the search for oppor-
tunities to foster institutional differentiation (niche seeking) in the larger
HE ecosystem. ‘Greater differentiation, rather than simple imitation,
becomes a virtual requirement. And standing still becomes a means
of falling behind’ (p. 161). Finally, Clark’s case studies revealed the
importance of the change processes initiated by or supported across
departmental units while acknowledging different postures across disci-
plinary fields when it comes to embracing ‘the market’ and/or change
more generally: ‘Science and technology departments commonly become
entrepreneurial first. Social sciences departments, aside from economics
and business, find the shift more difficult and lag behind… Uneven adop-
tion of new ways should be expected’ (p. 88). In short, the sociological
perspective on entrepreneurialism in HE stresses the importance of the
public good, approaches HE institutions as complex systems, and focuses
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on evolutionary processes of renewal and change with the aim of fostering
adaptation and differentiation.
The Innovation School
The second dominant perspective in the literature on the entrepreneurial
university emerged in the early 1980s through the work of Henry
Etzkowitz, a sociologist by training, but a scholar of innovation studies
then based at a UK business school. Etzkowitz’s focus was centred on the
rise of ‘entrepreneurial science’ and its direct contribution to economic
growth and innovation, which he termed the ‘second academic revolu-
tion,’ following the institutionalization of research as a core university
activity in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Etzkowitz &
Webster, 1998, 2001). According to this perspective, change is initiated
not from the inside of the organization but from the outside, with inner
dynamics centred on the protection of the status quo:
Change in academia has always been notoriously slow when driven from
within. As a conservative institution of medieval origins the university is
always fearful of change, especially of revisions of academic norms that
appear to be initiated by forces outside of the academy. (Etzkowitz &
Webster, 1998, p. 21)
For Etzkowitz, this external pressure is an opportunity for change,
and the author portrayed a more instrumentalist view of the univer-
sity that pays almost exclusive attention to the research function and
its interface with the outside world, most notably firms in the context
of innovation and technology transfers. It conceives of research groups
as ‘quasi-firms’ (Etzkowitz, 1983, 2003) that seek and secure funding
that enables them to be globally competitive and thus thrive in a market
economy. In short, the innovation perspective on entrepreneurialism in
HE stresses the importance of external dynamics and events and the need
to foster competitiveness through the infusion or institutionalization of a
market-like ethos across the inner fabric of universities.
The entrepreneurial university thus has interface capabilities such as liaison
and transfer offices and incubator facilities to manage and market knowl-
edge produced in the university at several levels, from specific pieces of
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protected intellectual property to technology embodied in a firm and
propelled by an entrepreneur. (Etzkowitz, 2003, p. 113)
As far as governmental policy is concerned, the innovation perspective
has been rather salient in providing a template for science and innova-
tion policy throughout the world, most notably in Europe in light of
the Lisbon Agenda (Pinheiro, 2015), but also elsewhere (Slaughter &
Cantwell, 2012). It has done so through the concept of the ‘triple helix’,
where university, industry and government articulate strategic actions for
promoting innovation and economic growth at the national, regional
and local levels (Etzkowitz, 2008; Etzkowitz & Leydesdorff, 2000). It
has also melded with NPM ideas and discourses which began gaining
prominence in the mid-1990.
Reframing the Entrepreneurial
University Through the Prism of NPM
In this section, we show how the ideas of NPM align with those of
the entrepreneurial university. Given that both concepts (NPM and the
entrepreneurial university) were developing hegemonic positions in their
relative fields at roughly the same time in the mid- to late 1990s and
that influential international actors, such as the OECD, were engaged in
championing both, some degree of mutual influence can be expected.
OECD became the key player in popularizing NPM through its Public
Management Committee (PUMA), and the 1995 report Governance
in Transition (OECD, 1995), which was followed by several policy
briefs and another report in 2005, Modernizing Governance: The way
forward (Pal, 2012). The OECD likewise was quick to pick up on the
entrepreneurial university concept and in the fall of 2000, through its
Programme on Institutional Management in Higher Education, orga-
nized a major conference (Clark, 2004) followed by a journal volume
on the topic (OECD, 2005). The OECD’s interest is thus not merely
coincidental but based on many overlapping and intersecting ideas in the
discourses that surround those two concepts.
NPM is a notoriously difficult concept to precisely pin down (Barzelay,
2001; Gruening, 2001); however, there are some agreed upon ideational
underpinnings that are common to most understandings. These trace
back to Christopher Hood’s (1991) seminal paper that identifies the
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freedom to independently manage and the use of markets as core prin-
ciples for allowing public administration to become more ‘business-like’.
Further research specifies more concretely three concepts: disaggregation
(distinct actors with a capacity to act), competition (a market-based land-
scape) and incentivization (a reason to act or change) (Dunleavy et al.,
2006, see also Diefenbach, 2009; Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). In short,
NPM entails a distinction between actors (with autonomy) and landscapes
(with market-based competition) that is critical for further discussion.
Across Europe, there are many ways in which NPM has entered
national and supranational policymaking that vary by intensity (Seeber
et al., 2015) and aspect (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011). In HE policy, we
have seen a move towards NPM-dominated policies in ways that often
maintain the strong historical path dependencies of the national context
(Bleiklie et al., 2011; de Boer et al., 2007; Paradeise et al., 2009; Young,
2015). Our argument here is more general, while the concept of an
entrepreneurial university and the idea of HE systems as quasi-markets
(Teixeira et al., 2004) appears to mesh well with the emphasis on business-
like, market-oriented public management, upon closer inspection, we
find that it embodies several inherent problems and contradictions when
attempting to unite management and markets.
If the ideal NPM actor is a business competing on a free market, then
to apply it to public administration requires the replication of two key
elements: a) an entity that behaves like a business and b) a landscape
that functions like a market. Attempts to apply these characteristics in
the realm of HE raises two critical issues. First, while universities may
be characterized as institutions (Meyer et al., 2006) and organizations
(Krücken & Meier, 2006; Seeber et al., 2015), they have tradition-
ally not been characterized as unified ones (Maassen & Olsen, 2007;
Musselin, 2007); rather, the university has been seen as loosely coupled
or an organized anarchy (March & Olsen, 1979; Weick, 1976). To
compete in the way that NPM envisions, the university needs to become
a unified actor; specifically, it should be a ‘complete organization’ (Brun-
sson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000). Hence, disaggregation in the university
sector involves aggrandizing the authority of the units which already have
distinct identities. Disaggregation can be understood as the process of
creating complete organizations and providing them the autonomy with
which to make strategic decisions. This paradigm contrasts with the view
that loosely coupled structures (individual academics and research groups)
can behave in entrepreneurial ways (i.e. swiftly adapting to emerging
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situations), as defended by proponents of systems thinking (Pinheiro &
Young, 2017).
The environment, in Europe specifically and across much of the world,
in which universities operate is not the free market per se—though univer-
sities may enter that arena with some of their activities, particularly ones
that are often associated with the entrepreneurial university (i.e. spinoffs,
technology transfer, etc.). In an attempt to bring market forces (and
their presumed benefits) to teaching and research activities in the univer-
sity sector, there has been an expansion of quasi-markets, which are
commonly depicted as a tool of NPM reforms (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011;
Salamon, 2002). Quasi-markets are socially constructed by the govern-
ment to foster competition but have several distinctive differences from
regular markets in terms of both supply and demand: while suppliers in
quasi-markets compete as independent entities, they don’t necessarily aim
to maximize profits; on the demand side, money is not necessarily the only
mechanism of purchasing power (others include prestige, reputation, or
bibliometric counts), finally, the user is not necessarily the consumer, i.e.
councils that fund research are not the users of that research (LeGrand &
Bartlett, 1993) (Table 7.1).
The entrepreneurial model follows the inspiration of Newtonian
physics, which is based on reductionist and rationalistic principles and
linear causality. It has much in common with what we have termed the
innovation model of the entrepreneurial university (see also Pinheiro,
2016). This model hopes to reduce or at least make manageable the
complexity of the university system and the context in which it is
embedded. The post-entrepreneurial or resilient university model, on the
other hand, embraces that complexity. It is rooted in complex systems
Table 7.1 Alternative university models
Entrepreneurial Post-entrepreneurial
Dominant logic Efficiency Resilience





Internal governance Unified, top-down control Loosely coupled




Source Authors’ own, following Pinheiro and Young (2017)
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thinking, in which causality is often non-linear; i.e. emergent entities co-
evolve with each other and their landscape and show the capacity to
self-organize (Meadows, 2008). The inspiration for this model comes
from evolutionary biology rather than Newtonian physics, and the overall
positional objective for an organization is to thrive within a niche rather
than to win a global competition.
Tensions and Their Resolution
in a Resilience Model
As we have seen, the concept of the entrepreneurial university grew out
of the idea of adaptivity and the perceived need for flexibility to adapt
to changing societal demands and circumstances. Clark (1998) intended
to showcase universities that were dynamic and changing. The word
‘entrepreneurial’ struck a chord, as it fits well with several discourses
of that time, particularly those of economic competitiveness, regional
development, globalization and NPM. In his own words, ‘The use of
“entrepreneurial” as the key term in the organizing framework, in place
of the softer “proactive” and “innovative”, was also provocative’ (Clark,
2004, p. 3). The relative ambiguity of the concept allowed it to become
imbued with unintended meanings that at times ran counter to Clark’s
aims of adaptability, diversity and dynamicism. There are three impor-
tant areas of tension that occur with the NPM inspired push towards
unified actorness, efficiency and isomorphism. In this section, we discuss
those tensions and demonstrate how the post-entrepreneurial university
model centred on a resilience paradigm (see Pinheiro & Young, 2017 for
a more detailed description) addresses them in a way that cleaves to the
sociological understanding of the entrepreneurial university.
The first tension, a push towards unified actorhood, assumes that the
university can be treated as a single unit, specifically that the uppermost
level of the university has authority similar to that of the uppermost level
of a business. This reinforces the idea that inter-institutional university
competition is the most important type of competition in the sector, thus
legitimizing the importance of global rankings (Ramirez et al., 2016).
However, as we have seen earlier, this was not part of Clark’s vision for a
balance of authority at all levels of the university:
Balancing influence across multiple levels is an almost constant problem
in entrepreneurial universities […] Effective entrepreneurial universities are
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neither extremely centralized nor decentralized; they are administratively
strong at the top, the middle and the bottom. (Clark, 2004, p. 175)
The post-entrepreneurial university is not a unified actor but rather
a loosely coupled one. The term ‘loose coupling‘ was coined to deal
with inherent contradictions that could not be captured in the language
of organizational scholars, particularly the demand for simultaneous
connectedness and autonomy (Orton & Weick, 1990). For Orton and
Weick, and similarly to modern conceptions on resilience systems (see
Frigotto et al., 2022), to be loosely coupled, an organization needed to
simultaneously exhibit both distinctiveness (being stable and closed to
outside forces) and responsiveness (being flexible and open to outside
forces). Loose coupling addressed both of these dimensions; however, in
their review article, Orton and Weick (1990) found that much of the
scholarship following Weick’s seminal 1976 article simplified this dialec-
tical dynamic and treated loose coupling as one end of a continuum in
which it was opposed to tight coupling. Treating loose coupling as the
authors originally intended allows us to avoid the binary sort of thinking
that leads to overvaluing complete organizations and accepting that orga-
nizations have both connected and independent elements that are not
reducible or rationalizable. In other words, a university can have the
strengthened steering core that Clark (1998) called for without being a
complete organization. The key is reaching a balance as described in the
quote above.
Orton and Weick (1990, p. 219) also raised an issue with how binary
rather than dialectical thinking is problematic: ‘The last way in which
researchers drift away from the dialectical interpretation of loose coupling
is to describe it as managerial failure […] These forms [universities,
hospitals, etc.] are not failed bureaucracies, but distinct organizational
forms’. However, it is precisely the sentiment, or even accusation, of
managerial failure that lies behind the NPM reforms and buttresses their
aim of enabling stronger management within public institutions. It is
argued that fixing these management failures should allow the university
to better respond to external pressures for efficiency, effectiveness and
accountability (Pinheiro & Stensaker, 2014a).
Loose coupling treats strategy as an emergent pattern rather than a
centrally planned activity. The network of units and actors that comprise
the university system create a unique constellation of responses to their
environment (societal, disciplinary and organizational). The identity of
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the university is formed not only by its culture but also by the ongoing
decisions of the actors at the heartland level as well as the departments,
faculties and central administration. This supports the idea of ‘structure
as something that organizations do, rather than merely as something they
have’ (Orton & Weick, 1990, p. 218). Structure in this way becomes a
dynamic emergent property, not a planned or pre-determined reification.
The second tension, the push towards efficiency, assumes that stream-
lining processes and reducing waste will result in a more effective
organization and thus a better use of public funds. Again, this is not
essentially part of Clark’s intention:
The legitimacy of the portfolio [of income sources] depends on educational
values guiding monetary decisions. There must be things that the university
will not do no matter how much money is offered. Conversely, there must
be ‘useless’ things it insists upon doing. (Clark, 2004, p. 174)
The post-entrepreneurial university maintains an appropriate level of
slack. We conceive of slack as pertaining to repositories of redundant
resources, human or otherwise, at the disposal of organizational actors.
Organizational scholars have depicted slack as a buffer (Selznick, 1966)
that protects the organization from external influences (Thompson,
2008). Taking this a step further, Sharfman et al. (1988) argued that
slack can even be linked to efficiency; in other words, there is an
optimal level of slack which, if absent, reduces organizational perfor-
mance. Within the university sector, slack can be understood in a variety
of ways: as having multiple research projects seeking the same knowl-
edge, maintaining different disciplines and departments that cover the
same topics, allowing researchers ample time to explore and take risks,
maintaining a full array of disciplines to allow for the possibility of inter-
actions between them and the creation of interdisciplinary knowledge,
etc. Slack allows ‘productive waste,’ whose tolerance is a prime virtue
that is necessary for creative destruction in the broader terms of the
innovation economy (Janeway, 2012). Resilience scholars have identified
‘redundancies’ (another term for slack) as a critical antecedent of adap-
tive resilient systems, including their key role in fostering organizational
learning (Giustiniano et al., 2018, pp. 91–92).
The third tension arises from the assumption that competition will lead
to diversity. In this case, Clark’s hope was to see universities diversify, and
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he envisioned that this could happen in his version of the entrepreneurial
university:
The mantra for reform becomes: complex universities operating in complex
environments require complex differentiated solutions. One hundred
universities require 100 solutions. (Clark, 2004, p. 183)
However, the idea of global competition that has found favour in many
policy interpretations of the entrepreneurial university is more likely to
produce homogenization than differentiation. To understand why, we
turn to recent research on evolutionary competition. Kenneth Stanley
and Joel Lehman asked why, if evolution is correct, we don’t ‘converge
on a single optimal creature?’ (2015, p. 115). Evolution, they argue,
when understood as a universal theory of competition, does not logi-
cally include a mechanism to promote and sustain diversity, but rather
‘drives towards everything converging to the best. And the best is only
one thing’ (p. 108). This quest to be the ‘best’ is one of the driving
forces in both university ranking systems and policy initiatives (Young,
2015). The emergence of global university rankings (Hazelkorn, 2015)
and discourses on the global organizational archetypes (Pinheiro & Sten-
saker, 2014b), such as world-class universities (Ramirez et al., 2016),
demonstrate how the global context has taken a central role in shaping
the context of the modern university. This has resulted in a convergence—
a so-called ‘emerging global model’ for the university (Mohrman et al.,
2008)—to which an ever-greater number of universities aspire.
A resilient approach to diversity would try to model itself more on
natural evolution, which as Stanley and Lehman explain: ‘But natural
evolution isn’t like these kinds of competitions because it drives towards
divergence, towards a multitude of varying solutions to life’s problems’
(p. 109). It does this by creating local rather than global competition:
Unlike global competition, local competition encourages the founding of
new niches to escape competition. In discovering a new way to live that’s
free from previous competitors, competition is reduced—by running away
from it. But in global competition there is no escape: No matter what
an organism does it will always be judged against all others. That’s why
global competition naturally leads to convergence while local competi-
tion naturally enhances diversity and creativity. (Stanley & Lehman, 2015,
p. 115)
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There is a distinct lack of an alternative model or niche to which
universities can escape and thrive, and thus under the current condi-
tions, we would expect more homogenization than differentiation. This
is not to say that some differentiation does not occur in the context of
global competititon, but that the convergence forces are stronger in the
context of hegemonic templates or archetypes like the research-intensive
university (for a discussion see Hüther & Krücken, 2016).
The concept of requisite variety helps us reframe this dilemma in a way
that allows resilience to be used to foster diversity. The concept comes
from cybernetics (Ashby & Goldstein, 2011) and is based on the idea
that ‘the diversity of potential responses must be sufficient to handle the
diversity of disturbances’ (Page, 2011, p. 211). Applied to organizational
studies, this means the internal variety in an organization—be it struc-
tures, skills, people or knowledge—must match the variety of the external
environment if the organization is to thrive. That external environment
is both local and global. In the case of universities, this is particularly
challenging, as the number of missions that have been assigned to it has
grown dramatically over the past few decades, making it ‘a rather vulner-
able institution that tends to be overloaded with multiple expectations
and growing demands. The mission impossible of the modern univer-
sity is that it means too many things to too many and too diversified
stakeholders’ (Enders & Boer, 2009, p. 166). Fulfilling the demands
of requisite variety under these conditions is nearly impossible from
a centralized perspective. The central steering core cannot understand,
much less strategize about, all the disturbances and responses faced by
the hundreds or thousands of people in the academic heartland. This is a
classic situation of bounded rationality (Simon, 1991). Requisite variety
thus requires autonomy at the lower levels of the organization and a
strategy that emerges from them rather than being produced from the
top. It also requires the establishment of new units that correspond to
the new pressures and initiatives, as Clark described:
Just as each new source of funding requires a university office, so do the
new units of the developmental periphery require specialized offices to
develop and process their activities, the office of continuing education,
for example. Numerous administrative units paralleling the many research
and teaching units of outreach are part of what makes the entrepreneurial
university a proactive place [...] New assemblies of subjects – cogni-
tive territories varying in content, time and place – require supporting
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tribes in both operating units and the administration, resulting in greater
organizational density. (Clark, 2004, p. 176)
Diversity is in this view not only about finding unique things to
do but about finding different ways of doing them. This aligns with
university missions on their broadest level: seeking knowledge through
different disciplines and methodologies and interacting with society and
business in a plethora of ways. However, the global archetypes described
above challenge diversity by standardizing the measurement of univer-
sity achievement or excellence in a set of key indicators (Sørensen et al.,
2016). Through standardized archetypes and indicators, the complexity
of both the organization and the environment is simplified as a result of
our attempt to rationalize it, as discussed by Ramirez et al. (2016).
Conclusion
Our core argument, rooted in concepts from complex systems litera-
ture, is that the successful fulfillment of the multiple missions of the
modern university requires characteristics of loose coupling, slack and
requisite variety which can be found in the idea of a post-entrepreneurial
or resilience university based on some of the original elements in Clark’s
sociological model of the entrepreneurial university. Universities and
political and economic systems are both related and nested (Pekkola et al.,
2021), and while exerting pressures on one another, they also retain the
ability to shield themselves from pressures (Young et al., 2017) that could
take them over thresholds. Based on this perspective, it is a mistake to
consider resilience as essentially just resistance to change. Resilient enti-
ties and systems are dynamic in the sense that they can and do change and
adapt but also retain their identities by not crossing essential thresholds
or identity boundaries. The university’s continued existence is evidence
of its remarkable resilience and adaptability since its origins in the Middle
Ages.
While NPM has remained an important concept in understanding
public policy changes since the 1990s, there have recently been calls in
both public policy and HE studies to move beyond discussions of NPM
(Broucker et al., 2017; Christensen & Laegreid, 2007). We argue that,
correspondingly, university discourses need a concept less infused with
NPM values and ideas than the entrepreneurial university archetype (as
an ideal model), whose meaning, as we have shown, has shifted away
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from its sociological origins and whose hegemonic use leans towards
the innovation perspective. Thus, the concept of a post-‘entrepreneurial’:
or resilience university builds on the sociological foundations of the
entrepreneurial university and the idea of complex and co-evolutionary
systems that change in accordance to external stimulus yet retain their
essential function and identity, i.e. it is resilient.
In fact, what we show in the section on tensions is maybe better
described as a paradox. Policy initiatives that aim for diversity and effec-
tiveness are in fact likely to do the opposite. The incentives for organiza-
tional behaviour promoted within these policies, push towards increasing
homogeneity, despite policymakers’ interest in a diversified system in
which universities ‘smartly’ specialize and find niches. An overemphasis
on efficiency drains away the slack which would have allowed for more
exploration (March, 1991) and an ability to react to and address emerging
scientific puzzles. And consolidation of centralized governance moves the
locus of resource allocation further away from those with the expertise to
effectively allocate it.
The resilient post-entrepreneurial university is entrepreneurial in that it
captures many advantages of the entrepreneurial model, though not as a
unified actor but intrinsically through and within the academic heartland.
It is not static but dynamic, diversifying, looking for niches, and doing
new things while retaining the core values and norms of what makes it
a unique institutional type. Most importantly, the post-entrepreneurial
university model respects the complexity inherent to both the university
itself and the landscape in which it operates. Further research is needed,
both empirical to flesh out the model and theoretical to build these
connections more substantially, to demonstrate how complex systems
theories can solve some of the many puzzles of university organiza-
tion and action that are not properly conceivable within the rationalized
entrepreneurial model that has gripped public policy debates in recent
decades. It is by turning away from the efficiency/innovation unified
model and refocusing on those post-entrepreneurial aspects that make it
resilient, that the university will position itself to drive economic growth
and social change while simultaneously remaining truthful to its cher-
ished values and traditions, including an insurmountable commitment to
safeguarding the public good.
188 M. YOUNG AND R. PINHEIRO
References
Alajoutsijärvi, K., Alon, I., & Pinheiro, R. (2021). The marketisation of higher
education: Antecedents, processes, and outcomes. In J. D. Branch & B. Chris-
tiansen (Eds.), The marketisation of higher education: Concepts, cases, and
criticisms (pp. 17–45). Springer.
Ashby, R. W., & Goldstein, J. (2011). Variety, constraint, and the law of requisite
variety. Emergence: Complexity and Organization, 13(1/2), 190.
Barzelay, M. (2001). The new public management: Improving research and policy
dialogue. University of California Press.
Bleiklie, I., Enders, J., Lepori, B., & Musselin, C. (2011). New public manage-
ment, network governance and the university as a changing professional
organization. In P. Lægreid & T. Christensen (Eds.), Ashgate research
companion to new public management (pp. 161–176). Ashgate.
de Boer, H., Enders, J., & Schimank, U. (2007). On the way towards new public
management? The governance of university systems in England, the Nether-
lands, Austria, and Germany. In D. Jansen (Ed.), New Forms of governance
in research organizations: disciplinary approaches, interfaces and integration
(pp. 137–152). Springer.
Broucker, B., De Wit, K., & Verhoeven, J. (2017). Higher education research:
Looking beyond new public management. In J. Huisman & M. Tight
(Eds.), Theory and method in higher education research (pp. 21–38). Emerald
Publishing.
Brunsson, N., & Sahlin-Andersson, K. (2000). Constructing organizations: The
example of public sector reform. Organization Studies, 21(4), 721–746.
Castells, M. (2001). Universities as dynamic systems of contradictory func-
tions. In J. Muller, N. Cloete, & S. Badat (Eds.), Challenges of globalisation.
South African debates with Manuel Castells, (pp. 206–233). Maskew Miller
Longman.
Christensen, T., & Laegreid, P. (2007). Transcending new public management.
Ashgate.
Clark, B. (1973). Development of the sociology of higher education. Sociology of
Education, 46(1), 2–14.
Clark, B. R. (1983). The higher education system: Academic organization in cross-
national perspective. University of California Press.
Clark, B. R. (1998). Creating entrepreneurial universities: Organizational path-
ways of transformation. Pergamon.
Clark, B. R. (2004). Sustaining change in universities: Continuities in case studies
and concepts. Society for Research into Higher Education & Open University
Press.
Diefenbach, T. (2009). New public management in public sector organizations:
The dark sides of managerialistic ‘Enlightenment.’ Public Administration,
87 (4), 892–909.
7 THE POST-ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY … 189
Dunleavy, P., Margetts, H., Bastow, S., & Tinkler, J. (2006). New public
management is dead—Long live digital-era governance. Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, 16(3), 467–494.
Enders, J., & Boer, H. (2009). The mission impossible of the European univer-
sity: Institutional confusion and institutional diversity. In A. Amaral, G. Neave,
C. Musselin & P. Maassen (Eds.), European integration and the governance
of higher education and research (pp. 159–178). Higher Education Dynamics
Series. Springer.
Etzkowitz, H. (1983). Entrepreneurial scientists and entrepreneurial universities
in American academic science. Minerva, 21(2), 198–233.
Etzkowitz, H. (2001). The second academic revolution and the rise of
entrepreneurial science. Technology and Society Magazine, 20(2), 18–29.
Etzkowitz, H. (2003). Research groups as ‘quasi-firms’: The invention of the
entrepreneurial university. Research Policy, 32(1), 109–121.
Etzkowitz, H. (2008). The triple helix: University-industry-government innovation
in action. Taylor & Francis.
Etzkowitz, H., & Leydesdorff, L. (2000). The dynamics of innovation: From
National Systems and “Mode 2” to a Triple Helix of university-industry-
government relations. Research Policy, 29(2), 109–123.
Etzkowitz, H., & Webster, A. (1998). Entrepreneurial science: The second
academic revolution. In H. Etzkowitz, A. Webster, & P. Healey (Eds.), Capi-
talizing knowledge: New intersections of industry and academia (pp. 21–46).
SUNY Press.
Frigotto, L., Young, M., & Pinheiro, R. (2022). Resilience in organizations and
societies: The state of the art and three organizing principles for moving
forward. In R. Pinheiro, L. Frigotto & M. Young (Eds.), Towards resilient
organizations and societies: A cross-sectoral and multi-disciplinary perspective.
Palgrave.
Giustiniano, L., Clegg, S. R., Cunha, M., & Rego, A. (2018). Elgar introduction
to theories of organizational resilience. Edward Elgar Publishing.
Gruening, G. (2001). Origin and theoretical basis of new public management.
International Public Management Journal, 4(1), 1–25.
Hazelkorn, E. (2015). Rankings and the reshaping of higher education: The battle
for world-class excellence. Springer.
Hood, C. (1991). A public management for all seasons? Public Administration,
69(1), 3–19.
Hüther, O., & Krücken, G. (2016). Nested organizational fields: Isomorphism
and differentiation among European universities. In E. Berman & C. Paradeise
(Eds.), The university under pressure (pp. 53–83). Emerald Group Publishing
Limited.
Janeway, W. H. (2012). Doing capitalism in the innovation economy: Markets,
speculation and the state. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
190 M. YOUNG AND R. PINHEIRO
Jencks, C., & Riesman, D. (2002). The academic revolution. Transaction
Publishers.
Krücken, G., & Meier, F. (2006). Turning the university into an organizational
actor. In G. Drori, J. W. Meyer, & H. Hwang (Eds.), Globalization and
organization: World society and organizational change (pp. 241–257). Oxford
University Press.
LeGrand, J., & Bartlett, W. (1993). Quasi-markets and public policy. MacMillan.
Maassen, P., & Olsen, J. (2007). University dynamics and European integration.
Springer.
Maassen, P., & Potman, H. (1990). Strategic decision making in higher
education. Higher Education, 20(4), 393–410.
March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and exploitation in organizational learning.
Organization science, 2(1), 71–87.
March, J., & Olsen, J. (1979). Ambiguity and choice in organizations. Univer-
sitetsforlaget.
Meadows, D. H. (2008). Thinking in systems: A primer. Chelsea green
publishing.
Meyer, J. W., Ramirez, F. O., Frank, D. J., & Schofer, E. (2006). Higher educa-
tion as an institution (CDDRL Working Papers, 57). Stanford University.
Mohrman, K., Ma, W., & Baker, D. (2008). The research university in transition:
The emerging global model. Higher Education Policy, 21(1), 5–27.
Musselin, C. (2007). Are universities specific organisations? In G. Krücken, A.
Kosmützky, & M. Torka (Eds.), Towards a multiversity? Universities between
global trends and national traditions (pp. 63–84). Transaction Publishers.
Nybom, T. (2003). The humboldt legacy: Reflections on the past, present, and
future of the European University. Higher Education Policy, 16(2), 141–159.
OECD. (1995). Governance in transition. Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development.
OECD. (2005). Higher education management and policy. Special Issue:
Entrepreneurship, 17 (3), 1–147.
Orton, D. J., & Weick, K. (1990). Loosely coupled systems: A reconceptualiza-
tion. Academy of Management Review, 15(2), 203–223.
Page, S. (2011). Diversity and complexity. Princeton University Press.
Pal, L. (2012). Frontiers of governance: The OECD and global public management
reform. Palgrave MacMillan.
Paradeise, C., Bleiklie, I., Enders, J., Goastellec, G., Michelsen, S., Reale, E., &
Westerheijden, D. F. (2009). Reform policies and change processes in Europe.
In J. Huisman (Ed.), International perspectives on the governance of higher
education: Alternative frameworks for coordination (pp. 88–106). Routledge.
Pekkola, E., Pinheiro, R., Geschwind, L., Siekkinen, T., Carvalho, T., &
Pulkkinen, K. (2021). Nested hybridity and value definition in public higher
7 THE POST-ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY … 191
education. In J. Vakkuri & J.-E. Johanson (Eds.), Hybrid governance,
organisations and society: Value creation perspectives (pp. 59–80). Routledge.
Pinheiro, R. (2012). University ambiguity and institutionalization: A tale of three
regions. In R. Pinheiro, P. Benneworth, & G. A. Jones (Eds.), Universities
and regional development: A critical assessment of tensions and contradictions
(pp. 35–55). Routledge.
Pinheiro, R. (2015). Citius, Altius, Fortius: Mobilising the university for the
‘Europe of Knowledge’. In B. Culum, F. Ribeiro, & Y. Politis (Eds.), New
voices in higher education research and scholarship (pp. 1–17). IGI-Global.
Pinheiro, R. (2016). Humboldt meets Schumpeter? Interpreting the
‘Entrepreneurial Turn’ in European higher education. In S. Slaughter & B. J.
Taylor (Eds.), Competitive advantage: Stratification, privatization and voca-
tionalization of Higher Education in the US, EU, and Canada (pp. 291–310).
Springer.
Pinheiro, R., & Stensaker, B. (2014a). Designing the entrepreneurial university:
The Interpretation of a global idea. Public Organization Review, 14(4), 497–
516.
Pinheiro, R., & Stensaker, B. (2014b). Strategic actor-hood and internal trans-
formation: The rise of the quadruple-helix university? In J. Brankovik, M.
Klemencik, P. Lazetic, & P. Zgaga (Eds.), Global challenges, local responses
in higher education. The contemporary issues in national and comparative
perspective (pp. 171–189). Sense.
Pinheiro, R., & Young, M. (2017). The university as an adaptive resilient
organization: A complex systems perspective. In J. Huisman & M. Tight
(Eds.), Theory and method in higher education research (Vol. 3, pp. 119–136).
Emerald Publishing.
Pollitt, C., & Bouckaert, G. (2011). Public management reform. Oxford
University Press.
Ramirez, F., Byrkjeflot, H., & Pinheiro, R. (2016). Higher education and health
organizational fields in the age of “world class” and “best practices”. In
R. Pinheiro, L. Geschwind, F. Ramirez, & K. Vrangbæk (Eds.), Towards a
comparative institutionalism: Forms, dynamics and logics across health care and
higher education fields (pp. 35–57). Emerald.
Salamon, L. (2002). The new governance and the tools of public action. In
L. Salamon, (Ed.). The tools of government: A guide to the new governance
(pp. 1–47). Oxford University Press.
Scott, J. (2006). The mission of the university: Medieval to postmodern
transformations. The Journal of Higher Education, 77 (1), 1–39.
Seeber, M., Lepori, B., Montauti, M., Enders, J., De Boer, H., Weyer, E.,
Bleiklie, I., et al. (2015). European universities as complete organizations?
Understanding identity, hierarchy and rationality in public organizations.
Public Management Review, 17 (10), 1444–1474.
192 M. YOUNG AND R. PINHEIRO
Selznick, P. (1966). TVA and the grass roots: A study in the sociology of formal
organization. Harper & Row.
Sharfman, M. P., Wolf, G., Chase, R., & Tansik, D. A. (1988). Antecedents of
organizational slack. Academy of Management Review, 13(4), 601–614.
Simon, H. (1991). Bounded rationality and organizational learning. Organiza-
tion Science, 2(1), 125–134.
Slaughter, S., & Cantwell, B. (2012). Chapter Three: Academic Capitalism:
Reflections on Higher Education in the united States and European Union.
In R. Barnett & M. Peters (Eds.), The Idea of the University: Contemporary
Perspectives (pp.55-77). Peter Lang,
Sørensen, M., Bloch, C., & Young, M. (2016). Excellence in the knowledge-
based economy: From scientific to research excellence. European Journal of
Higher Education, 6(3), 217–236.
Stanley, K., & Lehman, J. (2015). Why greatness cannot be planned: The myth of
the objective. Springer.
Teixeira, P., Jongbloed, B. B., Dill, D. D., & Amaral, A. (Eds.). (2004). Markets
in higher education: Rhetoric or reality? Springer.
Thompson, J. D. (2008). Organizations in action: Social science bases of
administrative theory. Transaction Publishers.
Walker, B., & Salt, D. (2006). Resilience thinking: Sustaining ecosystems and
people in a changing world. Island Press.
Weick, K. E. (1976). Educational organizations as loosely coupled systems.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 21(1), 1–19.
Young, M. (2015). Shifting policy narratives in Horizon 2020. Journal of
Contemporary European Research, 11(1), 16–30.
Young, M., Sørensen, M., Bloch, C., & Degn, L. (2017). Systemic rejection:
Political pressures seen from the science system. Higher Education, 74(3),
491–505.
7 THE POST-ENTREPRENEURIAL UNIVERSITY … 193
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the
chapter’s Creative Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to
the material. If material is not included in the book’s Creative Commons license
and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds the
permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright
holder.
CHAPTER 8
Organizational Persistence in Highly
Institutionalized Environments: Unpacking
the Relation Between Identity and Resilience
Lars Geschwind, Rómulo Pinheiro, and Bjørn Stensaker
Introduction
Universities rank among the most enduring organizational forms. Over
time, they have adapted to changing circumstances while retaining a sense
of stability in their inner core, i.e. the values, norms and traditions guiding
L. Geschwind (B)








Department of Education, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
e-mail: bjorn.stensaker@iped.uio.no
© The Author(s) 2022




196 L. GESCHWIND ET AL.
academic behaviour. At their essence, universities are value-laden institu-
tions, and thus highly cultural in nature (Dill, 1982). Resilient systems
and organizations are characterized by their ability to adapt to changing
circumstances while remaining within thresholds, i.e. while retaining their
core function and identity (Walker & Salt, 2006; see also Chapter 1
of this volume). Despite growing academic interest in understanding
the conditions under which resilient organizations adapt to challenging
circumstances (Bhamra, 2015; Pirotti & Venzin, 2016), little attention to
date has been paid to culture as a meditating factor, i.e. as an enabler
or property of resilient behaviour. This is particularly salient when it
comes to organizational fields or sectors characterized by a multiplicity of
formal and informal rules emanating from a variety of carriers or sources;
what organizational scholars term as ‘highly institutionalized’ environ-
ments (Scott, 2014). Such rules both constrain and enable social agents’
attempts to respond to environmental imperatives, thus being of interest
to students of resilient behaviour within complex organizational forms.
Given this backdrop, the chapter investigates how organizational iden-
tities are formed within the organizational field of higher education (HE)
in the context of conflicting and even hostile environments. Moreover,
taking a resilience prism, we shed empirical light on how identities evolve
over time, in the light of specific configurations of the external envi-
ronment, and how this process affects (either enables or constrains) key
resilient attributes. Hence, the chapter bridges separate streams of the
organizational literature to unpack change and adaptation processes in
the context of resilient behaviour in a specific field. The research question
being addressed is:
What is the relationship between organizational identity and
resilience, and does it manifest itself empirically in the organizational
field of higher education?
We test our framework by undertaking an investigation of a case higher
education institution (HEI) located in the Nordic region. The case in
point—Örebro University—has undergone considerable identity changes
during the last four decades, driven by both regulatory and cultural
factors. Empirically, the paper investigates identity evolution, formation
and legitimation by illuminating critical events associated with historical
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turning points or ‘critical junctures’, especially those affecting key external
legitimacy issues.
In the next sections, we review the existing literature and outline our
analytical framework, focusing, first, on the relationship between identity
formation and adaptation or change, and second, on the antecedents asso-
ciated with key attributes of organizational resilience within the context
of HEIs. Our research quest is, thus, associated with empirically demon-
strating the extent to which the aforementioned resilience attributes are
affected by shifts in organizational identity over time. The closing part of
the chapter discusses the main findings and reflects on their implications
for future research.
Organizational Identity---An Elusive Construct
Seminal studies on organizational identity have identified several factors
driving identity formation and change, including the circumstances
surrounding the birth of the organization (Stinchcombe, 1965), strategic
leadership (Gioia & Thomas, 1996), organizational recruitment and
demographics (Selznick, 1957). Despite the continuing interest in the
concept of organizational identity, it nonetheless remains an elusive
construct, not least insofar how organizational identities are formed and
evolve (Gioia et al., 2013). As is often the case with complex social
phenomena, there is no universal definition of identity (‘who we are as
an organization’), but there is a consensus that organizational identity
provides a guide for what an organization’s members should do (Gioia
et al., 2013). Recent studies have shed light on organizational identity
as a mechanism for responding to institutional complexity (Kodeih &
Greenwood, 2014), including adapting to shifting and/or multiple insti-
tutional logics (Raynard & Greenwood, 2014; Thornton et al., 2012),
living with hybridity (Boers & Nordqvist, 2012), and while handling
cross-level dynamics (Ashforth et al., 2011). As part of this interest, there
is also a noticeable shift towards investigating process-related dimensions,
i.e. the notion of identity ‘as becoming’ and as a more dynamic concept
(Elsbach, 2013). Attention has also been paid to the gamut of method-
ologies used for measuring or assessing identity (Foreman & Whetten,
2014). Despite considerable progress, the field is still characterized by
somewhat idiosyncratic descriptions of how identity formation takes place
and the factors that are salient in this process.
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Much research on organizational identity can be classified as belonging
to either an essentialist or a strategic perspective (Glynn, 2008). The
essentialist perspective is concentrated around the key properties of orga-
nizational identity as suggested by Albert and Whetten (1985)—the
central character, the enduring nature and the distinctiveness of a given
organization—and, as such, points back to the notion that identity and
culture are intimately linked, as postulated in the old institutionalism
tradition (Selznick, 1957). The strategic perspective is more associated
with the link between identity and image, with identity seen as an asset for
profiling and positioning the organization in more competitive environ-
ments (Gioia et al., 2010). That said, the weight given to the historical
legacies and the path-dependencies of organizations as well as environ-
mental adaptability suggests that both the essentialist and the strategic
perspective may have several links with central institutional assumptions
about organizational persistence and change (Glynn, 2008; Stensaker,
2004), aspects intrinsically linked to resilience both as a system’s property
as well as outcome (Ruth & Goessling-Reisemann, 2019).
The split between the various camps within research on organizational
identity is unfortunate in several ways, not least with respect to the lack
of cross-fertilization (He & Brown, 2013, p. 11). In line with Glynn
(2008), we take the position that institutions (i.e. formal and informal
rules) may both enable and constrain organizational identities and that the
relationship between the focal organization and its environment is vital
for understanding both change and continuity, affecting resilience—while
also questioning its stability. Foreman and Whetten (2012) touch upon
this issue while referring to the ‘identity paradox’—the fact that identi-
ties are constructed through comparisons with others to find a balance
between being distinctive and similar within a larger population.
From an institutional perspective, organizational identity is framed and
embedded within the larger organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983) providing the focal organization with the material used in the iden-
tity formation process. Dominate institutional templates (derived from the
field) help set the limits for the forming and acceptance of possible iden-
tities (Kraatz & Zajak, 1996). In other words, an institutional perspective
builds a bridge between essentialist and strategic perspectives on identity
by opening up for the possibilities that identities may stem from both
micro- and macro-level factors, thus turning critical attention towards
identity formation as an ongoing process (Glynn, 2008; Gioia et al., 2013;
Stensaker, 2004).
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However, this way of interpreting organizational identity—as an
ongoing process—also makes it possible to link identity closer to
resilience. If resilient organizations are characterized by their ability to
adapt to changing circumstances while maintaining their core function
(Walker & Salt, 2006)—identity and resilience become two concepts that
are highly intertwined—and perhaps sharing key properties—as explained
in the next section.
Identity and Resilience
The key elements of organizational identity—centrality, endurance and
distinctiveness (Albert & Whetten, 1985)—which normally are perceived
as stable elements of a coherent identity change character when assessed
in a process perspective. The notion of resilience allows for a more flex-
ible and adaptable identity to occur where the internal and external
ingredients of the identity enable but also constrain possible actions.
For example, by adding resilience to existing research on organizational
identity, we may provide answers to fundamental questions within organi-
zational identity research—for example which element of a given identity
that is central (Corley et al., 2006, p. 90)? Here, resilient organizations
would most likely opt for what some label as ‘optimal distinctiveness’
(Brewer, 1991; see also Phillips et al., 2016)—suggesting that centrality is
actually shaped by what is perceived as distinctive features of the organiza-
tion. Of course, when facing expectations from their environments which
are difficult to ignore or reject, resilient organizations might be forced to
develop multiple (Pratt & Kraatz, 2009) or even hybrid identities (Batti-
lana & Lee, 2014). The latter options could, of course, be imagined
as an interesting alternative for younger and more recently established
organizations having weak or at least less distinct identities where possi-
bilities and boundaries are tested and pushed. As such, resilience could
be argued to be something that is installed quite early in the organiza-
tional life-span, and not necessarily developed with increasing age. This is
consistent with key findings from organizational theory (Drori & Honig,
2013; Stinchcombe, 1965).
However, opting for multiple or even hybrid identities might also
suggest that resilience is not as enduring as one might imagine. However,
allowing for some fluidity in the organizational identity is consistent with
more recent claims that identity formation processes have no end-points
(Alvesson & Robertson, 2016). The enduring character of the identity
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concept is then perhaps more related to the ‘identity struggle’ itself than
to specific features of the identity. The consequence for resilience is that it
is not necessarily linked to a ‘real’ identity but to perceptions of an identity
suggesting that the idea of resilience is embedded in processes of transla-
tion, interest negotiation and social construction (Gioia & Chittipeddi,
1991; Gioia et al., 2000; Stensaker, 2015; Washington & Ventresca,
2004).
Based on the above discussion, we can outline some expectations as to
how organizational identities develop from a process perspective.
Our first expectation is that organizational identity—and resilience—
is installed quite early in the organizational life-span.
Our second expectation is that organizational identity—and
resilience—is more dynamic and less enduring than imagined.
The Dynamics of Legitimacy in Forming Organizational Identities
While centrality, the enduring character, and distinctiveness originally
were seen as key characteristics of organizational identity (Albert &
Whetten, 1985), later contributions have suggested that, in addition to
these dimensions, one should also add legitimacy and adaptability as
central elements (Foreman & Whetten, 2012). The latter dimensions
are more associated with an institutionalist perspective on organizational
identity i.e. the relationship between a given organization and its external
environment, and how this might lead to changes in the identity over
time (Phillips et al., 2016). The adaptability element brings to the fore
the notion that organizational identity formation can be embedded in
more deliberate design attempts (Parent & Foreman, 2007), while the
underlining of legitimacy suggests that identities are highly dependent on
some sort of external support and acceptance (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996;
Deephouse & Suchman, 2008), a central assumption within institutional
theory (Phillips et al., 2016). By adding legitimacy and adaptability to
the original elements constituting organizational identity, a better balance
between the intrinsic and the extrinsic dimensions of identity forma-
tion is achieved. Furthermore, although it also opens for new questions
regarding the specific conditions affecting the development of organiza-
tional identity and how intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions are balanced in
the process.
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Deephouse and Suchman (2008, p. 60) have suggested that legiti-
macy is a dichotomous construct—you either have it, or you do not.
This is in line with earlier research defining legitimacy as a generalized
perception that the ‘actions of an entity is desirable, proper, or appro-
priate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs,
and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). This definition of legitimacy
suggests that fields are characterized by coherence and a collective under-
standing with respect to what the dominant norms, values and standards
are. However, this definition may be questioned in fields that are more
heterogeneous, and where different actors are carriers of contrasting
assumptions about the key criteria determining legitimation. The institu-
tional assumption that organizations need to conform to the environment
for legitimacy (Scott, 2014) may thus be a challenge given the exis-
tence of different ‘moral’, ‘cognitive’ and ‘pragmatic’ forms of legitimacy
(Suchman, 1995), especially if these are held by different actors and
groups in the environment (Bitektine & Haack, 2015). However, as
demonstrated by resource-dependency theorists, organizational survival
may not need to be conferred by a large segment of the society for a
given organization to prosper (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978, p. 194).
Conflicting and contended forms of legitimacy add an important
dimension to both institutional theory and organizational identity studies,
allowing researchers to investigate how identify formation processes are
embedded in power struggles and interest articulation within a given
field (Alvesson & Robertson, 2016), between insiders and outsiders alike
(Drori & Honig, 2013; Gioia et al., 2010), and more specifically among
different external stakeholders (Bitektine & Haack, 2015). While we
agree that legitimacy is an important dimension in the forming of organi-
zational identities, we see legitimacy as an intimate part of the centrality,
the endurance and the distinctiveness of the organizational identity, and
hence as the key mediator conditioning identity change or adaptability.
Identity Formation and Resilience in Contested Fields—Key
Assumptions
If legitimacy is important when organizational identities and resilience
are formed, the question arises as to how focal organizations obtain (and
maintain) such legitimacy in highly contested or even hostile fields in the
first place (Greenwood et al., 2011). The existence of specific configura-
tions of identities can be expected to be dependent on the characteristics
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and the dynamics of the organizational field (Weerts et al., 2014). We
suggest that the different elements of organizational identity—centrality,
endurance and distinctiveness—which normally are perceived as unified
and inseparable elements of a coherent identity emerging from within the
organization (Albert & Whetten, 1985), may be affected in different ways
in contested fields thus, conditioning the degree of resilience.
Hence, our take is that external legitimacy, first and foremost, condi-
tions and shapes the central element of an organization’s identity in
contested fields. As different external stakeholders may be linked to
and advocating for specific forms of legitimacy—being moral/normative,
cognitive/cultural or pragmatic/regulative—(Scott, 2014; Suchman,
1995), emerging organizations will have to adapt to, and emphasize
those forms of, legitimacy that are linked to supportive stakeholders,
being constrained from adapting to others. Hence, our answer to one of
the fundamental questions within organizational identity research—which
element of the identity is central? (Corley et al., 2006, p. 90)—is that this
is conditioned through the process of obtaining external legitimacy.
The question which arises is, of course, what happens when an orga-
nization has few or even none powerful external supporters and where it
is not obvious how external legitimacy can be translated into a central
element of the identity. On this issue, institutional theory may have
different answers. Our hypothesis is that, when exposed to more hostile
external stakeholders while still striving for legitimacy, organizations may
downplay their distinctiveness as a way to position themselves as attrac-
tive and relevant for the highest possible number of external stakeholders.
While the notion of ‘optimal distinctiveness’ (Brewer, 1991) is important
in understanding how established and legitimate organizations may want
to position themselves in a larger and more unified field, we argue that a
search for ‘optimal legitimacy’ may be a viable option for new organiza-
tions entering conflicting fields. This may result in the forming of multiple
(Pratt & Kraatz, 2009) and hybrid identities (Battilana & Lee, 2014).
However, in such contested fields, another option may also be to search
for what might be labelled as ‘non-threatening distinctiveness’—identities
that may push and explore existing perceptions of what possible iden-
tities might look like (Czarniawska, 1997) while still forced to search
for distinctiveness within the broader acceptable boundaries of the field
(Phillips et al., 2016). Here, we suggest that the identity formation
process may be more or less innovative partly dependent on whether the
focal organization may be said to already carry a less distinct or a more
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distinct identity. While one could imagine that organizations with a less
distinct identity may be more likely to explore such possibilities, research
has actually found that it is organizations having more distinctive percep-
tions of their identity that engage in such processes (Stensaker, 2004,
p. 210; Tapper & Palfreyman, 2011). It is possible that this might be
explained by the strong internal legitimacy of the organizational identity
established in the emergent stage (Drori & Honig, 2013).
Organizational identity formation processes can be seen as ongoing
with no formal start- and end-points (Alvesson & Robertson, 2016).
This argument can be said to be somewhat in conflict with a key assump-
tion within the organizational identity literature—the enduring character
of organizational identity (Albert & Whetten, 1985). We suggest that
the degree of endurance in organizational identity is highly dependent
on the dynamic configuration of legitimating stakeholders in the envi-
ronment over time. If contestation about key legitimacy issues among
stakeholders is reduced over time, we assume that this will allow for an
expansion of the central element of the focal organizations to build a
broader base for its legitimacy. This may, at the same time, increase the
need to develop its distinctive element in line with the optimal distinc-
tiveness argument by Brewer (1991). In this case, endurance implies
an adding-on of central elements very much in line with the assumed
isomorphic processes as suggested in institutional theory (Scott, 2014),
through processes of translation, interest negotiation and social construc-
tion (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Gioia et al., 2000; Stensaker, 2015;
Washington & Ventresca, 2004).
However, if, over time, external stakeholders continue to be engaged
in contestations over what valid legitimacy might imply in the field, and
where the focal organization has a central character linked to specific legit-
imacy forms, we contend that the room for manoeuvre is reduced. This is
in line with earlier evidence on how powerful external stakeholders might
narrow down the options of available central elements of organizational
identities (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996; Stensaker et al., 2016). In this case,
the environment constrains available options and the central element of
the organizational identity persists. In line with our earlier assumptions,
we suggest that this will also reduce the possibilities for developing the
distinctiveness of the organization as it might endanger the support from
supportive external stakeholders.
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Empirical Context:
Scandinavian Higher Education
As a field, HE is relevant for testing out the role of external legiti-
macy in identity formation processes. First, it has been found rather
suitable for studying both organizational identity (Clark, 1992; Sten-
saker, 2015; Weerts et al., 2014) and for testing central tenants from
institutional theory (Maassen & Olsen, 2007; Ramirez & Christensen,
2013; Scott, 2014). Second, the field is characterized by conflicting
expectations and values (Pinheiro et al., 2016a, 2016b), thus being
highly relevant for analysing the role of complex and conflicting envi-
ronments (Clark, 2004; Maassen & Olsen, 2007). Third, while the field
has been criticized by some as an empirical testing ground for institu-
tional theory due to its ‘strong institutional/weak technical’ character
(Kraatz & Zajak, 1996), the Scandinavian countries are an exception
to this rule due to the quite powerful role played by public authorities
affecting the funding, the regulation of, and personnel policies in the
sector (Huisman et al., 2002; Kyvik, 2009). Hence, in Scandinavia both
the institutional and the technical environment can be characterized as
strong, creating a field containing contested legitimacy forms. To illus-
trate this, we base our presentation of the empirical context on the three
forms of legitimacy outlined by Suchman (1995) and Scott (2014), i.e.
the pragmatic/regulative, moral/normative and cultural-cognitive forms
of legitimacy.
Governmental influence (regulative/pragmatic legitimacy) in Scandi-
navian HE has always been strong (Kyvik, 2009), not least with respect
to the role the field is intended to play in the economy (Pinheiro et al.,
2012). The dominant role of the state is substantiated through its key
influence as a funder and regulator, e.g. in the form of accreditation
and evaluation (Hansen et al., 2019; Pinheiro et al., 2014). Hence, the
political steering of the sector should, in a comparative perspective, be
characterized as quite strong (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2007), although one
can witness several changes in the role of the state in the region over the
latter decades, moving towards providing HEIs with greater autonomy
(Maassen & Stensaker, 2003). Still, the responsibility for deciding upon
the domestic HE landscape is a task that has continued to be central to
national governments in the region (Meek et al., 1996; Maassen & Sten-
saker, 2011), as illustrated by the many merger processes that the state has
initiated during the last decade (Geschwind et al., 2016). As such, issues
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addressing diversity and differentiation rank high on the policy agenda in
the region.
However, the Scandinavian region can also be said to be embedded
in and an integrated part of the broader and more global field of HE,
being exposed to various signals and expectations linked to cultural-
cognitive forms of legitimacy . Of particular relevance here is the increasing
prevalence of global organizational archetypes (Greenwood & Hinings,
1993), such as the ‘entrepreneurial university’ (Pinheiro & Stensaker,
2014) or the ‘research university’ (Kyvik, 2009), aimed at making HEIs
more responsive and resilient to increasingly volatile technical and institu-
tional environments (Karlsen & Pritchard, 2013). These ideals and ways
to accomplish legitimacy have been supported by a range of stakeholders
within the region that see adaptation to the market as vital (Kyvik, 2009;
Salerno, 2007), pushing HEIs to become more professional and adaptive
in their functioning (Christensen et al., 2019; Ramirez & Christensen,
2013).
Finally, in the Scandinavian countries, it is also possible to identify
strong demands, aspirations and ideals that are linked to normative/moral
forms of legitimacy . The region hosts several universities that were estab-
lished in pre-modern times and that have acted both as producers and
gatekeepers of the values, norms and ideals that dominate the field
(Maassen & Olsen, 2007). These values and norms have often been
linked to more global ideas related to the Humboldtian university and the
more critical role HE should play in society in developing and stimulating
truth and democracy (de Boer & Stensaker, 2007). For new institutions
entering the field, established and powerful older universities may thus
create an important frame of reference, both enabling but potentially
also restricting the identity formation of the ‘newcomers’. Studies have
shown that established universities in the region both protested and were
quite hostile towards the establishment of new HEIs, a critique that has
continued although in different forms and through different arguments
over the decades (Huisman et al., 2002; Kyvik, 2009).
The ‘legitimacy landscape’ identified above has two important impli-
cations for empirical studies. First, the Scandinavian region creates a
complex environment for the ways in which identity construction as a
process takes place. The regulative, cultural-cognitive and the normative
forms of legitimacy can, in essence, be said to represent competing and
conflicting arguments for the forming of an organizational identity, and
mapping the different positions key stakeholders have had over time is
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therefore essential to understand their potential influence on the focal
organizations. Second, the different forms of legitimacy may also repre-
sent important building blocks for understanding how identity is shaped
in that they include both more abstract (desired images from the environ-
ment) and more concrete (past experiences about how the organization
functions) dimensions. By tracing arguments, discourses and beliefs over
time, the three forms of legitimacy assist us in unpacking the institutional
processes involved since their relative impact in the identity formation
process can be studied more analytically. Thus, by theoretically exploring
the significance of regulative, normative and cultural-cognitive legitimacy
on how the central and distinctive elements of the organizational iden-
tities develop over time (endurance), we build a bridge between studies
on organizational identity, institutional theory and resilience on the one
hand, and studies on organizations and historical reasoning within the
social sciences on the other.
Identity formation is a complex process requiring the analysis of
multiple data sources and levels of analysis over an extended time period.
This is challenging due to the traditional nature of undertaking scientific
inquiries, where longitudinal perspectives are rare and more in-depth anal-
yses are both time and resource consuming, and hence often avoided. Our
analysis relies on the officially communicated and/or ‘narrated’ (Czarni-
awska, 1997) organizational identity and we have limited our study to
the official identity as expressed in sources from top managers and litera-
ture during three critical junctures (Capoccia & Kelemen, 2007). Hence,
we do not claim that this represents a shared identity by all or even a
majority. Furthermore, due to space limitations, rather than an extensive
case study, the empirical section of this chapter should rather be consid-
ered an empirical ‘vignette’ based on a few written sources and literature
with the aim to illustrate and test the theoretical framework. As such, it
is far from comprehensive, but sufficient for our purposes (Benneworth,
2019). Quotations have been translated by the authors from Swedish.
Empirical Vignette: Örebro University
Critical Juncture 1: Aspirations to Become a New Kind of University
The history of higher education in Örebro can be traced back to the
1960s when professional education was established in the city (Sports,
Engineering and Social Work, respectively). A new institution started out
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as a university college in 1977 (Högskolan I Örebro), as a standalone seat
of learning but with close relations to one of the country’s older, research
universities as a ‘satellite’. The decision to develop towards full univer-
sity status was made early. Although education was first priority for the
university college, research increasingly became part of the core business,
e.g. through staff mobility and joint professorships with the neighbouring
research university (Andrén, 2013). Already in the late 1980s, plans to
become a university were developed and when a new Vice-chancellor was
appointed in 1990; this future goal was even specified in the job advertise-
ment: ‘target university status, increased internationalization, educational
development’ (Lind, 2009, p. 30).
In his inaugural speech, the newly appointed Vice-chancellor also iden-
tified a number of features of the existing organization that he found
beneficial for the aspiration to become a full university: ‘At our disposal
we also have the comparative advantages of the new university college:
simplicity, transparency, affinity. Could it be any better? We can do what-
ever we want. If we want to’ (Lind, 2004, p. 31). Being a new seat of
learning, the Vice-chancellor argued, was also a possibility to develop a
distinct identity, different from the existing flagship universities in the
country. However, the Vice-chancellor also made specific reference to
the hostile national environment when he compared the new university
colleges’ academic journey with the beginning of an Odyssey, navigating
between Scylla and Charybdis, illustrating the open resistance from the
older universities and a, so far, reluctant state (Lind, 2004, p. 33).
Increasingly during the 1990s, the university college developed its
international profile, described as the ‘educational center of the region
with an international outlook’ (Lind, 2004, p. 49). It was still considered
important to stress the regional embeddedness, but the internationaliza-
tion activities were considered a key feature of becoming a stronger, more
recognized institution. However, the national HE and research policy
in the early 90s stipulated a strict division of labour between research-
oriented universities and teaching-oriented university colleges and there
was no national scheme in place for university colleges to become full
universities. This created a dead end for university colleges with aspira-
tions. As the then, frustrated, vice-chancellor described it: ‘We bang our
heads in the research policy Berlin wall’ (Lind, 2004, p. 63).
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Critical Juncture 2: Vision 2005
Another critical juncture for the HEI was the initiation of a new forward-
looking project titled ‘Vision 2005’, which included and engaged many
people and took almost a year to complete (1995–1996). The task to
develop a shared long-term vision was described as pioneer work, new to
universities in the country, but in line with the new ‘Freedom reform’
then recently launched by the Government in 1993 following the logics
of New Public Management. The main goal of the strategy was to become
‘a respected university of good European standard’ with researching
teachers, learning students, a rich collaboration with society and an
environment for encounters. The difference between being a university
college focusing on undergraduate education and being a university with
a more even balance between teaching and research was described by the
Vice-chancellor in a 1997 speech: ‘It will be noticed in the daily work,
I assure you! One will discuss, inform and question at all levels’ (Lind,
2004, p. 151). Not only was the internal life of the university expected to
change, but also the relations to the surrounding society were expected
to reach higher levels.
The formation of the institution is also a changed relation to our envi-
ronment. And by this, I mean not only the regional but also the national
and the international. To avoid all misunderstandings, I want to strongly
emphasize that this, or rather these, relations have always been there, at
times very rich. What is now happening is a forceful development also in
new fields. (Lind, 2004, p. 152)
The new Vice-chancellor decided that the university should be driven
‘not by tradition but rather by vision’ (Gidlund, 2009, p. 91). The new
vision would cover the coming 10 years and was developed during one
and half years. The key concept ‘European research university’ indicated
two things as far as organizational identity was concerned: European
rather than national ambitions and, in addition, that operations should
be research-led. Another key identity marker was the task to renew the
academic landscape and our society. The Ministry of Education encour-
aged Örebro to find its own profiled way: ‘Don’t copy, create your own
profile’ as referred to by the Board chairman at the time (Larsson, 2009,
p. 48). Again, the ambition is to acquire a distinct identity in relation to
the ‘traditional’ universities. The focus was also on the future and not
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on the past, neither the legacy of older Swedish universities nor its own
historical path.
Critical Juncture 3: University Status Awarded
The goal of achieving university status was reached in 1999 due to a
major shift in HE policy during the late 1990s, making it possible to
transition from university college to university. Örebro University College
was one of the institutions that in 1997 applied for and subsequently was
assessed by a peer review panel commissioned by the national accred-
itation body. The panel was chaired by former Gothenburg University
Vice-chancellor Jan S. Nilsson and in addition membered by five promi-
nent scholars from the Nordic countries. In doing so, the university
needed to comply with the assessment criteria established by the accredi-
tation agency Högskoleverket, which were general for all HEIs (Andrén,
2013).
Based on the peer review report the national accreditation agency
declined the application, which was also the case for two of the other
applying university colleges. Only the university college in Karlstad was
considered qualified to become a full university. However, the Govern-
ment overruled its agency and approved the application anyway which
spurred a debate on the relation between the government and Högskolev-
erket (Sjölund, 2002) but also earlier showed the fierce resistance from
the existing universities (Andrén, 2013). Against this background, the first
years were characterized by the hard work to gain legitimacy in the sector
in the eyes of multiple and influential stakeholders (Lind, 2009). The
promotion of three new universities had to be defended until the end.
(Lind, 2004, p. 176) This created on the one hand a sense of ‘under-
dog’ mentality, cultivating the image of the brave innovative newcomer
fighting against the old, established universities and the national accredi-
tation agency (Larsson, 2009). However, the identity as being innovative
and new was, during this early university period also complemented with
links to the past and the university traditions. As an illustration, the
new university decided to unveil a plaque with inscriptions in Latin with
explicit references to the history of universities and Latin as the former
lingua franca. Also in the inauguration speech, the Vice-chancellor made
use of Latin phrases which had not been done before (Lind, 2004,
pp. 199–202).
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Hence, both continuity and change can be identified in the sources
from this time. The then chairman of the board reflected a decade later
upon the transition from university college to university:
When the university college was transformed into a university, it meant an
important change for the future but in many senses things remained as they
were. […] Obviously, it was symbolically important – not least for the self-
esteem among management and staff – that [the university] was considered
meeting the requirements that could be imposed on a university: it was no
longer a species difference with respect to [two established universities]
but rather a difference of degree. (Larsson, 2009, p. 59)
The then vice-chancellor illustrated the new situation: ‘at the time
of the foundation, the new university made a number of strategically
important decisions. Perhaps the most important was what role the
university should have in the academic field and in the surrounding
society’ (Gidlund, 2009, p. 90). Both internally and from external stake-
holders, various expectations were expressed. Several new academic staff
had been recruited to meet the new demands. Since 1999, the univer-
sity has grown, both in terms of size but also regarding scope (faculties,
programmes) and services (doctoral education, research). The scientific
portfolio now also comprises a medical faculty and engineering education,
to which the right to award degrees had to be applied for several times
before the Swedish accreditation agency Högskoleverket finally awarded
the examination rights. In the case of the medical doctor programme,
the role of the other universities as well as the medicine professional
association (Läkarförbundet) were important. In the words of the Vice-
chancellor at the time: ‘A complicating factor was the negative attitude
among the six universities already providing medical doctor programmes,
who were unwilling to welcome another player on the pitch’ (Gidlund,
2009, p. 65).
As of the time of writing (Summer, 2020), Örebro University hosts
about 17,000 students, almost doubled compared to when university
status was reached, and close to 1300 total staff. It has become a full-
fledged, comprehensive university with a growing research proportion.
It is now a multi-faculty university with one of the broadest missions in
the country, ranked among the best 400 universities in the world (THE,
2020).
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Discussion
Identity Formation Over Time:
Centrality, Endurance and Distinctiveness
Our empirical vignette shows an interesting trajectory over time. Higher
education in Örebro was established as a teaching-only university college
providing vocational programmes, e.g. social work. It was closely linked
to one of the older universities in the country, serving as ‘satellite’ insti-
tution during the wave of HE expansion in the 1960s. Early on, plans to
become a university emerged internally at the university. It appears that
becoming a full-fledged university was important, not like the other ‘tra-
ditional’ universities but rather in a new, modern, novel way, in order to
create a distinct identity. This vision met a hostile environment where
the state was reluctant for a long time to enable university colleges to
develop into universities, and the other, existing universities put up open
resistance to newcomers like Örebro. The crucial policy change during
the late 1990s opened the opportunity for university colleges to apply for
university status. This process affected the institution’s central identity
formation fundamentally, and made it less distinct but rather more stream-
lined with other comprehensive European research universities. Örebro’s
identity has thus changed rather than been enduring through an expan-
sion both in scientific scope and missions (more research) underlining the
transformative potential of organizational identities (Parent & Foreman,
2007).
Identity, Legitimacy and the Regulative Pillar:
The State
The vignette also shows that identity formation and change are strongly
linked to external legitimacy. In order to gain legitimacy from the author-
ities and the organizational field, HEIs need to adjust and adapt to
external shifts and dynamics which in turn sets in motion the need for
identity reformation, challenging the notion of an enduring identity char-
acter (Gioia et al., 2013). One way of shedding light on this process is to
investigate the role played by Scott’s (2014) institutional pillars. Starting
with the regulative pillar, the data shows that the state has played a vital
role, both as enabler and constrainer. Shifting HE policies have either
created major obstacles for the institutions in their quest for university
status and permanent research funding or, instead, acted as an enabler
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and promoter by pushing universities to develop a distinct institutional
profile. In the case of Örebro, the state in the 1980s and early 1990s
upheld a division of labour among HEIs across the country, but in the late
1990s, HE policy changed. Not only was research funding allocated to
university colleges, more importantly, but it also became possible to apply
for university status (Andrén, 2013). However, the evaluation process
meant that Örebro was becoming less distinct and more similar to already
existing research universities, following the template provided both by
the state agency’s evaluation criteria and by the interpretation of them
by the peer review panel. After the decision to ‘promote’ the university
college to full-fledged university in 1999, increased financial support for
research followed, which again decreased after only a couple of years due
to yet another policy change focusing more on the older, well-established
universities rather than the newcomers (Geschwind & Pinheiro, 2017).
Identity, Legitimacy and the Normative Pillar:
The Organizational Field
The empirical vignette also attests to the importance of approaching
identity construction from a broader perspective encompassing dynamics
within a given organizational field (c.f. Pinheiro et al., 2016a, 2016b).
Universities are not only affected by the actions of other universities, but
they also use these to re-inforce their unique identities. Yet, at the same
time, they also copy features of those they are trying to avoid becoming,
largely as a result of the role attributed to socialization (e.g. hiring from
other organizations), resource-dependencies (copying successful features
from leading universities) and the strategic management of legitimacy
imperatives emanating both inside and outside organizational boundaries
(e.g. the quest to become world class, globally oriented, etc.). Stated
differently, they have adopted a hybrid (Boers & Nordqvist, 2012) profile
and identity, for example being locally engaged and globally oriented
(Marginson & Rhoades, 2002). The case of Örebro is compelling in
this sense, balancing regional embeddedness with internationalization
ambitions. The early emphasis on not being ‘traditional’ was gradually
replaced by many traditional features of universities, as shown here by the
ceremonial use of Latin when becoming a full university.
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Identity, Legitimacy, and the Cultural-Cognitive Pillar:
The Role of Institutionalization
As HEIs grow and develop, their organizational identities become
increasingly diverse, complex and hybrid in nature, reflecting not only
internal dynamics but also, as this case has shed light on, external pres-
sures within the organizational field and changing policy agendas over
time. This hybridity, in turn, creates challenges both for the central
administration and for the different units, as the academic heartland pulls
and pushes in different directions challenging the strategic orientation set
out by those at the top of the hierarchy, including leadership efforts to
use identity as a strategic asset (Fumasoli et al., 2015). For the case HEI
in this study, launching identity projects embedded in long-term visions
and strategies has functioned as an important institutionalization process
(Cooper et al., 2008), recognizing the past and present while finding
out about the future for education, research and other academic tasks
regionally, nationally and globally.
Identity and Resilience
As hypothesized at the onset, it turns out that as far as the case univer-
sity is concerned, identity and resilience are rather dynamic attributes,
taking into account critical shifts and legitimacy claims emanating from
the environment, as postulated by institutional theorists (Greenwood
et al., 2011). From the point of view of the notion of ‘remaining within
a threshold’, the empirical case demonstrates that in spite of the adop-
tion of new structural features and outlooks associated with dominant
(hegemonic) archetypes in the field, domestic and internationally, the case
university was, nonetheless, able to establish meaningful links with its past
and cherished traditions. The result was increasing hybridity as a strategic
means of bridging the multiple, and sometimes contradictory demands
from the environment, with its enduring character or past identity. This
dynamic process suggests that, as indicated in the existing literature
(Pirotti & Venzin, 2016, Pinheiro & Young, 2017 see also Chapter 7 in
this volume), resilient organizations operating in dynamic environments
are capable of adapting to new environmental demands while ensuring
that their core essence remains relatively stable over time. Contrary
to earlier accounts suggesting that vulnerable organizations, character-
ized by weak legitimacy claims and restricted room for manoeuvre, are
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more constrained in their adaptive responses to environmental shifts
(Clark, 1956) and/or subject to co-optation by external actors (Selznick,
1957), our empirical case suggests that less central organizations are also
capable of mobilizing resources to ensure that environmental (legitimacy)
demands are met without jeopardizing enduring features seemed to be
central to their modus operandi, such as key identity-related attributes.
In this way, resilient organizations, universities included, are characterized
by the co-existence of enduring (‘old’) and emerging (‘new’) attributes,
being able to bridge past trajectories with future aspirations.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have discussed how an organizational identity can
evolve in a resilient way over time in hostile environments where external
legitimacy plays a key role. The aim has mainly been conceptual, with
the ambition to combine theories and concepts to be further empirically
tested in future studies. However, as a first test of our approach, we have
in this chapter employed the Scandinavian HE sector as our empirical
case. Our analysis, based on primary and secondary sources shows how
the organizational identity at a Swedish university over a period spanning
40 years has evolved, becoming more complex and hybrid (Kodeih &
Greenwood, 2014).
However, the uniqueness of our study is rooted in the fact that
this development has taken place in environments that have been quite
conflicting and even at times hostile. As such, our approach to resilience
is somewhat different: while many studies of resilience focus on how orga-
nizations resist change, our case has illustrated resilience towards change,
aligned with what the editors of this volume term as pertaining to ‘adap-
tive resilience’ (see chapter 1). We have shown—in line with Foreman
and Whetten’s (2012) arguments—that external legitimacy provides the
boundaries for how identity and resilience can play out over time, but
we have extended this idea by demonstrating how different forms of
legitimacy can be used deliberately as tools to construct new identities
also in situations where conflicting and hostile environments exist. We
have identified three critical junctures in the recent history of the HEI
that have enabled this outcome. These include necessary policy change
at the state level (regulative pillar), changing dynamics in the organi-
zational field (normative pillar) and institutionalization processes within
the universities (cultural-cognitive pillar). Albeit recognizing the past and
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the institutional legacy, reflected in a layered, hybrid identity, the HEI
is primarily forward looking rather than building on tradition. Further-
more, well-anchored visions and strategies have been important identity
formation tools (Ramirez & Christensen, 2013). Conflicting and hostile
environments have been tackled by emphasizing that the identity is ‘spe-
cial’, ‘novel’, ‘innovative’ and even ‘underdog’ in the organizational field
(cf. Huisman et al., 2002). In other words, our study rejects the idea
of legitimacy as fundamentally dichotomous (either you have it, or not)
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008, p. 60), although our findings are very
supportive of the notion of legitimacy as something fundamentally polit-
ical (Deephouse & Suchman, 2008, p. 61). We would argue that it is
exactly the latter characteristics that enable the quest for a distinct orga-
nizational character and identity—allowing for resilience to develop. As
such, by establishing a clear empirical link between identity and adapta-
tion or degrees of change, the chapter provides critical insights to scholars
interested in unpacking the complex dynamics underpinning the emer-
gence and evolution of resilient organizations operating in highly dynamic
and complex organizational fields.
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CHAPTER 9
Resilience and Change in Opera Theatres:
Travelling the Edge of Tradition
and Contemporaneity
Maria Laura Frigotto and Francesca Frigotto
Introduction
Resilience has recently become of great interest in various areas of social
science (Fisher et al., 2018; Linnenluecke, 2017; Williams et al., 2017).
Resilience refers to the ability of an individual, an organization or a
system to bounce back, respond and recover when facing disturbances
(Linnenluecke, 2017). According to Bartezzaghi (2013), the popularity
of resilience across academic disciplines and domains of life relates to the
historical moment we are facing that is characterized by the perception of
a general crisis, such as psychological resilience against increasing stress,
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business resilience against the financial crisis, social resilience against waves
of migration.
Given the ambiguity and ignorance of the state of the environment in
many realms (Frigotto & Rossi, 2015), the hook offered by the concept
of resilience is that it moves the focus from the ability to interpret the
environment to the ability to resist it, ideally, independent of the source,
form and manifestation of the disturbances. Resilience also reflects a trust
in human abilities that is typical of contemporary, narcissistic society
(Sennett, 1998). At the individual and organizational level of analysis,
resilience lies in the so-called ‘agency’ of actors (Ruef & Aldrich, 2006).
Nevertheless, at the system level of analysis (e.g. regional systems, indus-
tries, societies, etc.), the issue of ‘the agency of resilience’ (i.e. who has the
ability to be resilience and how much effect and intention does that actor
have on the outcome) is not easily addressed (Frigotto, 2018). Thus, this
chapter performs a system-level analysis of resilience to add to the debate
on the agency of resilience.
The other open issue in the resilience literature concerns the role
of stability and change. Resilience both enhances and emphasizes the
ability of systems to resist adversities: in other words, to survive. This
skill has been represented by the stability of a system’s outcome (Fisher
et al., 2018) or, in some cases, with the achievement of a higher level
of outcome that reflects ‘the ability to thrive’. However, little attention
has been given to the actual change that systems experience in order to
achieve stability or an increased outcome level. Resilience is related to
stability as much as it is related to the change (Frigotto et al., 2022, in
Chapter 1, this volume). A closer look at the relationship between stability
and change provides theoretical elaboration on the resilience concept that
several scholars call for (Britt et al., 2016; Duchek, 2019; Fisher et al.,
2018; Kossek & Perrigino, 2016; Linnenluecke, 2017; Vanhove et al.,
2016). It also raises an important question: to what extent can an entity
change in order to be considered a persisting entity and not a different
entity? This is called the ‘continuity of essence’ in Chapter 1 and relates
to the philosophical debate on essence and change originally referred to
by the Greek Heraclitus (535–475 B.C.) who claimed that stability is an
apparent and artificial state: given that everything is becoming, change is
the only natural state.
The analysis in this chapter considers the opera as an organizational
archetype (Greenwood & Hinings, 1993, p. 1052), defined as the holistic
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system of meaning (ideas, values and beliefs) that build an interpre-
tive scheme and the organizations that adopt and embody it. Thus, an
organization archetype includes i) a system of meaning,1 ii) organisa-
tional structures (Opera Theatres or Houses (OHs)2) and iii) artistic and
working systems and practices that mirror professions and their practical
knowledge (Muzio et al., 2013). We depict the evolution of the system
in regard to the three dimensions mentioned above from origin to now
and explore their interconnections in line with studies on the emergence,
change and evolution of organizations provided by Padgett and Powell
(2012) and those on organizational archetypes (Cooper et al., 1996;
Greenwood & Hinings, 1996).
This longitudinal perspective across centuries in the birth country of
opera, Italy, provides the ideal empirical environment to study resilience
at the system level over time. This perspective shows the connection
between the agency of individuals and institutions to shed light on lower-
level action and its nestedness into higher levels (and vice versa) for the
production of the general outcome. This is relevant given that resilience
can appear different according to the time, space and social scale consid-
ered (Carpenter et al., 2001; Walker et al., 2004; see also Frigotto et al.,
2022, in Chapter 1, this volume), and it is necessary to assume a holistic
perspective across levels to account for resilience as a whole. This case
also allows discussion on how resilience looks over a long time span.
The longitudinal view allows consideration of how much continuity is
necessary to recognize resilience in the same entity. This issue links to
the ‘continuity of essence’ as a core principle of resilience identified in
Chapter 1 of this volume. The chapter is organized as follows: The
next section briefly describes the debate growing in the literature around
the concept of resilience and introduces the distinction between three
different resilience types: absorptive, adaptive and transformative. Section
three gives an overview of the literature on institutional change and orga-
nizational archetypes, providing categories and concepts that inform the
understanding of the continuity of essence in resilience. Section four
pertains to the research design. Section five illustrates the evolution of
the opera in Italy as an organizational archetype with structure and artistic
1 In this sense we will also refer to the opera as a genre of classical music consisting of
a dramatic work in one or more acts set to music for singers and instrumentalists.
2 The organizations that set on stage and promote operas that typically have their
headquarters in theatres designed for the performance of opera.
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Resilience can be divided into three types that imply different changing
dynamics and that vary across stability and change: absorptive resilience,
adaptive resilience and transformative resilience (Frigotto, 2020; Frigotto
et al., 2022, in Chapter 1, this volume).
Absorptive resilience is a form of stability of the system where change is
controlled by limiting it. Here, the resilient outcome is such that change
has nearly zero impact on the system (Linnenluecke, 2017). Absorptive
resilience is measured in terms of return time and efficiency, where the
possibility to return to the initial state is taken for granted. In this perspec-
tive, disturbances are temporary and involve ‘a rather narrow range of
predictable external conditions’ (Holling, 1973, p. 1).
Adaptive resilience responds to unanticipated triggers that can be
understood using the available knowledge. The resilience outcome reflects
the achievement of a new, typically higher, performance level.
Transformative resilience responds to triggers that challenge ‘sharp
shifts’, ‘regime shifts’ or ‘critical transitions’ and concern a variety of
adversities that are typically unpredictable, unexpected or novel (Folke
et al., 2010; Frigotto, 2018). Thus, resilience is measured by the effec-
tive ‘persistence or probability of extinction’ (Holling, 1973, p. 17)
rather than the return to the former equilibrium. Transformative resilience
requires a deep change of the present state while a continuity of essence
is still recognizable. Despite being uncertain, it is typically associated with
a higher level of performance, although it has also been linked to lower
levels of performance and to high-risk survival.
As Carpenter et al. (2001) contend, resilience depends on the
temporal, spatial and social scale of the observation. The latter is further
divided into micro, meso and macro levels concerning, respectively, indi-
vidual actors, organizations and systems. They also stress that these levels
do not imply consistency with one another, and, if considered one-by-
one, they might render a contrasting picture of resilience at some levels.
An analysis of resilience concerning these levels can only assume a holistic
approach that accounts for the nestedness of smaller elements into larger
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ones and for the complexity of the micro–macro interaction (Walker et al.,
2004).
Archetype Change
Organizations belonging to an archetype are subject to the same envi-
ronmental demands, i.e. ‘distinctive prescriptions […] (Greenwood &
Hinings, 1996) – of the way that collective purposes should be defined
and of how those collective purposes should be organized and accom-
plished’ (Greenwood et al., 2014, p. 1214). Powell and DiMaggio (1991)
outlined three pressures that induce organizations towards change:
coercive (often conveyed through laws, regulations and accreditation
processes), normative (grounded in the pressure to adopt shared and
accepted values, standards and techniques) and mimetic (related to the
need to imitate role models). These pressures refer to disturbances or
adversities emerging at the level of laws, norms and behaviours, respec-
tively. In the literature on resilience, disturbances are the triggers that
require the social entity to change and show resilience (Linnenluecke,
2017).
The institutional literature has widely addressed how change occurs in
institutions when pressures operate and, conversely, how change does not
occur despite them. Through decoupling (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), orga-
nizations separate the source of their legitimacy from the source of their
survival, showing conformity in their windows that is not in their oper-
ations (Boxenbaum & Johnsson, 2008, p. 80). Oliver (1991) elaborated
on strategies of resistance that organizations put in place to respond to
institutional processes of change, and that range from passive conformity
to proactive manipulation. While the initial debate was framed in terms
of transformational and incremental change (e.g. Powell & DiMaggio,
1991; Oliver, 1991), according to Cooper et al. (1996), later, more atten-
tion was given to the variety of possibilities, between total change and
total stability or inertia, by accounting for intermediate modes of change
as well as for their ‘evolutionary or revolutionary pacing’ (Greenwood &
Hinings, 1996, p. 1023).
Cooper et al. (1996) use ‘archetype transformation’ and ‘sedimenta-
tion’ to track how organizations change from one archetype to another.
Transformation refers to the case ‘in which one archetype sweeps away
the residues of the other’ (Cooper et al., 1996, p. 625) as a reaction to
dramatic change; sedimentation is when the new archetype is piled on the
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old one, and both are competing. While the first case stresses complete
change, the second stresses persistence that occurs ‘even when the formal
structures and processes seem to change, and even when there may be
incoherence’ (Cooper et al., 1996, p. 624). In some sense, sedimentation
describes change through the ‘extension’ of the archetype (Cooper et al.,
1996, p. 644), meaning that change is important, but also ‘unresolved’
and not stabilized into a new state (Cooper et al., 1996, p. 625).
This discourse found new interest with institutional logics identifying
patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs and rules that
organizations take as reference for their action and cognition (e.g. the
market logic or the religion logic) (Thornton & Ocasio, 1999, p. 804;
Thornton, 2004). Building on the latter, scholars considered how orga-
nizations change by adhering to more than one logic, making ‘hybrid
organizations’ (e.g. Pache & Santos, 2010) or by combining logics
into ‘hybridised logics’ (Greenwood et al., 2014, p. 1217). McNulty
and Ferlie (2002, p. 362) showed that even when conflicting logics
trigger change, when they are too different, change does not reach
completion: ‘there were some pockets of change, but no organizational
transformation’.
Intending to define change across the individual, organizational and
system levels through networks, Padgett and Powell (2012) identified
several mechanisms by which new organizational archetypes emerge as
a result of ‘genuine novelty’ (p. 1) that, as a new ingredient at the begin-
ning of the process, ignite new archetypes as new sprouts, as a result of
adoption and diffusion or as a result of renovation. They stress the role
of individual agents that, intentionally or otherwise, assume positions in
networks that were previously non-connected or that benefit from their
multiple roles, producing a convergence with the literature on institu-
tional entrepreneurs (Hardy & Maguire, 2008) and the role of agency
in change. Groups of individuals with their own professional institutions
also play a role in spreading change (Muzio et al., 2013).
This literature provides the language and concepts describing how
change occurs and needed to discuss if that change displays resilience and
of what kind.
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Research Design
This paper builds on a case study analysis used for exploratory purposes
(Yin, 2009) for further development of the theory on resilience in relation
to change (Siggelkow, 2007).
The case selected is the change in the opera since its foundation. Our
study is longitudinal and depicts the evolution of opera as a cultural
archetype, as an organizational form and as the professions of music
workers, over time. For the historical evolution of opera as a cultural
archetype, we relied on specialized literature in musicology. In terms of
organizational form, our data include economic and financial reports,
legislative debate, and the laws that were passed, as well as specific
managerial literature and media reports discussing the changes in OHs.
For information on artistic professions in the opera and the opera as an
employer, the collection of the 30 years’ experience by one of the authors,
interviews with experts in the field and the contracts of musicians in
opera houses over the last 50 years serve as a rich source of data. The
latter reflects the need for more grounded approaches to organizational
understanding (Reason & Bradbury, 2008).
The evolution of the opera provides a good case for studying resilience
at the system level because OHs’ survival has been challenged several
times. By the middle of the nineteenth century, there were about 200
OHs in Italy, and today there are 13 OHs that belong to Lyric-
Symphonic Foundations (LSFs) with national recognition and continuous
in-house production and 29 that have local relevance as Theatres of Tradi-
tion (ToT) with very few of their own productions, mainly acting as
seasonal outlets or peripheral halls for LSFs. Over the 400 years during
which this drop took place, several initiatives have failed that had been
previously successful. Society has changed greatly in political, economic
and cultural terms, and the opera has become less interesting and less
relevant to the resulting society. Since their legislative recognition, the
29 ToT have often lacked the resources for activity, while the 13 LSFs
granted ‘some’ national funding have all gone through default procedures
several times. In 2020 (time of writing), 9 of the 13 LSFs are operating
under remediation procedures following an assessed default situation,
paired with burning debates on the opportunity and necessity of public
interventions to save them. Some of the 13 LSFs were forced to close
temporarily, and their workforce were laid off and redirected to other
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professions. Eventually, the government, encouraged by public opinion,
chose to intervene, saving some of the Italian OHs.
This chapter does not concern itself with resilience displayed by one or
by a set of OHs, like when resilience is analysed in companies that have
survived several crises over the years (such as Nokia; Duchek, 2018). In
those cases, the level of analysis is the organization; in this chapter, it
is the system, or ‘organisational field’ from an institutionalist perspective
(Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). On this matter, an analysis focusing on one
organization would be limited. In fact, both legitimacy and the funding
necessary to survival comes from outside the ability of an OH to produce
income. While each OH is funded dependent on its choice of titles and
marketing, and each OH will have a higher or lower level of box-office
success, these elements of competition are too limited to lead to an actual
differentiation or to a survival, à la Schumpeter (1934), that implies the
death of some and the continuity of others because of their decisions and
actions. For these reasons, we also do not draw attention to the many
OHs that closed along the way. The question remains whether the system
has changed too much to display a continuity over resilience, or, in other
terms, whether it has denatured its essence such that today it has nothing
to do with the Italian tradition of opera.
In terms of archetype, the opera provides a good case for studying
resilience. An archetype within the neo-institutional literature is ‘a set
of structures and systems that reflects a single interpretive scheme and
mirrors a holistic perspective that reconciles ‘narrowly drawn organiza-
tional properties’ under overall patterns towards which all organizations
tend to converge (Greenwood & Hinings, 1993, p. 1052). Following
Cooper et al. (1996, p. 625), the opera allows the study of archetypes
that are ‘institutionally specific’. We stress the cultural grounds of the
archetype by drawing attention to the fact that the opera is a system
derived from a cultural type of communication and expression that is
also a form of art or entertainment, with stylistic, aesthetic, rhetorical
and communicative rules. The communicative rules are also codified and
studied within musicology, and their change over time contributes to the
analysis of the resilience of the system.
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The Opera as an Archetype
Operatic Essence and Meaning
The opera has survived 400 years, enduring transformations of society,
taste, mores, government systems, laws and economies. In this first
subsection, we address the evolution of systems of meanings that
contribute to organizational archetypes in the periods of emergence and
diffusion, of struggling, and of renovation and renewal.
Sprouting and Spreading
The opera was born in royal theatres as a combination of words and music
called recitar cantando in the form of the serious melodrama and on minor
stages in the form of comic operas and burlesque. The first public theatre
was opened in Venice in 1637 for the merchant bourgeoisie, and the
business model spread across the Italian peninsula. These theatres mainly
performed operas during carnival time and for about one month within a
series of festivals (Della Seta, 1993). Towards the end of the eighteenth
century, there were about 100 theatres, which expanded to 200 by the
mid-nineteenth century; basically, each city had one or more theatres that
represented, even through the buildings’ architecture, the social relevance
of the melodrama.
The opera became the expression of the romantic period in Italy.
During the Independence Wars (1848–1866), it was used to commu-
nicate and spread nationalist sentiment against the foreign sovereigns
ruling the Italian territory. In particular, composer Giuseppe Verdi wrote
operas such as ‘The Battle of Legnano’ and ‘Nabucco’ that represented
a similar struggle and fighting attitude. As it was forbidden to propagan-
dize nationalist thoughts, nationalists used the opera like a secret code
to communicate: singing ‘Va pensiero’ from Nabucco became like hailing
insurrection, and writing ‘VIVA VERDI’ on the walls of the streets was
often changed into ‘VIVA V.E.R.D.I’, meaning long life to the king of
Piedmont that should be King of Italy (Vittorio Emanuele Re D’Italia).
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, opera composers found
inspiration in the novels of their contemporaries that described everyday
life in the countryside (e.g. the Novels by Giovanni Verga and the Rustical
Chivalry by Pietro Mascagni), real facts that occurred in the chronicles in
Italy (e.g. Pagliacci by Ruggiero Leoncavallo) or fascinating new texts
that were appearing in other countries, such as the discovery of West
America or the colonialist relationship between the USA and Japan that
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were turned into operas by Puccini (respectively, The Girl of the Golden
West and Madame Butterfly).
Operas were popular performances as they were able to speak to
different levels of society, namely the new aristocrats, the bourgeois and
the masses, meeting their tastes and expectations. OHs were initially
funded by aristocrats and royals, then impresarios turned them into
a business, renting theatres from the municipality, commissioning new
operas and organising production. Such business was rarely profitable;
many went bankrupt. Often the economic success of theatres was due to
bundling strategies, for example, with gambling (Ernani & Iovino, 1993).
Struggling
The opera started having trouble when it stopped being a popular expres-
sion of culture and entertainment. Two elements grounded the debate
then and still ground it today: the need for financial support beyond the
box-office flow and the societal value of operas. This might be indepen-
dent or might progressively rely less and less on the choice of opera as
entertainment.
In 1867, the Italian Parliament cancelled all support to the opera
theatres and transferred the responsibility of any intervention from the
state to the municipality level because of the lack of resources (Balestra &
Malaguti, 2003, p. 38). The operation of OHs depended on ‘the mood
of the councilmen’ when the issue was discussed in the House (Ruggieri,
2004).
In 1885, the music publisher Ricordi, who had commissioned many
operas from famous composers, gave a speech in front of the Milan city
council on the critical economic situation of the Theatre La Scala, asking
for public support and arguing that the opera, as ‘an Italian excellence of
glorious tradition’, should be publicly funded (Ernani & Iovino, 1993,
p. 7). Nevertheless, the OH in Genoa was closed from 1879 to 1883, as
was Bologna in 1891 and La Scala in 1897–1898 because of lack of funds.
The opera was considered ‘a good for an elite’, especially if compared to
the need to publicly fund the construction of streets, aqueducts, hospitals
and schools (Balestra & Malaguti, 2003, p. 39). In Italy, and in Milan
in particular, socialist ideas spread, such as those concerning the social
role of the theatre, the public utility of the arts and the public support of
opera. In 1901, a referendum took place asking whether the municipality
should support the costs of the La Scala. The turnout was low among the
very few voters of the time, and the result was ‘no’ (Barigazzi, 2014).
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In terms of cultural production systems, according to musicologists,
starting from the mid-1800s, OHs began evolving from ‘laboratories of
novelty’ to museums of ‘magnificent performances’ of previously released
operas (Rosselli, 1985). In the early days of opera, novel productions were
funded by the wealthy nobles or bourgeois first, and then by the mecenate;
in the last century, new operas were rare, and the opera transformed into
great and magnificent reproductions, or sometimes reinterpretations, of
operas, where the excellence of the performance comes from the quality
of the artists and producers involved.
The framework on performance defined by Toscanini at La Scala
(1920s) represents a milestone in the operatic management system and
represented a model for other theatres at that time. The performance was
becoming an ‘event’, not because of a novel opera, but because great
interpreters were involved. Toscanini brought this concept to comple-
tion by adding the perfection of performance. La Scala became the
apotheosis of a repertoire system where preparation was well-structured
and performers were linked to the theatre, so that the previous year’s
productions could be reassembled with very few rehearsals. For example,
over one week in 1927, the first performances of three repertoire produc-
tions and of one new production, on top of rehearsals, were staged with
no lapses in the extremely high artistic standards (Sachs, 1987). Toscanini
is well-known for his ‘new way of working’ and his ‘tyrannical method’
that produced a holistic performance that encompassed the aesthetic
and even the moral facets of the opera. Toscanini’s method incorpo-
rated the trend towards educating the public to ‘consider the theatre
not as something for amusement, but as something with a moral and
aesthetic function that becomes part of the life of a society, part of the
life of a culture’ (Sachs, 1987, p. 9, quoting the words of conductor and
musicologist Gianandrea Gavazzeni).
The opera is no longer the status symbol it was until probably the
1990s when, for instance, the première at La Scala was in the news for
several days and fed magazines with in-depth reports on dames’ expensive
and excessive outfits. Opera also stopped being related to the élites, and,
consequently, stopped being interesting to those who wanted to enter
their circle. The amateurs also thinned out, given that the new cultural
archetypes had become the popular expression in music (e.g. rock, pop,
etc.). The public attended OHs less frequently also because new technolo-
gies allowed them to reproduce music at home. In general, knowledge of
the opera became less widespread, in contrast with the beginning of the
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twentieth century in which every radio station broadcasted operas and
everybody still knew the repertoire and the interprets.
In the last few decades, the musical critique has also changed dramat-
ically. By writing in the newspapers about operas and new productions
being performed in OHs, music critics informed non-experts about forth-
coming productions providing context, background and the meaning of
operas and production choices. For instance, during the direction of the
conductor Riccardo Muti at La Scala (1986–2005), very remote operas
from the past by composers such as Spontini or Cherubini were newly
performed. However, they were under-appreciated by the general public,
who were less and less knowledgeable on the opera and had fewer good
critics to guide them. This repertoire also brought the public further in
feeling the opera as something elitist and ancient that challenged the resis-
tance even of those that had bought an expensive dress to go to the prima
(in fact, in several cases, the media reported disheartened people that left
the theatre after 3 or even 5 or 6 hours of opera).
Re-novelling
More recently, the opera has tried to reposition itself towards a new target,
in particular, young people and tourists. The OH in Florence engages
schools in the production of the performances, building a strong link with
the local territory, or through joint-production with pop stars. A different
way was explored by Fenice in Venice that addresses the tourist market
with a repertoire of classics such as Traviata. This performance is repeated
many times all over during the year and critics claim this endless repetition
has transformed the OH into an ‘operatic Disneyland’ (The Economist,
2015) and transformed the opera production system (Trevisan, 2015). As
a result, all 13 OHs doubled, or even more, the number of performances
per year and kept the budget nearly stable.
OHs are also attempting to renew themselves within the reproduction
of the tradition. Since operas can also be enjoyed by watching a perfor-
mance on a screen, some OHs have pushed the renovation of the classics
and on the ‘feeling of the opera’ that can only be appreciated live (as
a representation of this feeling, think of the Julia Roberts in the movie
‘Pretty woman’, that is moved by compassion for Traviata and cries at
her first-time performance at the opera). A recent production of Carmen
in Florence in 2018, surprised the public with a totally different ending
of this traditional opera. In the original libretto, Carmen is killed by her
partner when she wants to break up with him but, in this new version,
9 RESILIENCE AND CHANGE IN OPERA THEATRES … 235
Carmen kills him for self-defence instead. The intent was to contribute
to the modern discussion of violence against women. Though this new
ending, the OH revived its previous role as a reflection on hot topics,
combining the need to perform traditional, well-known operas and the
need to remain relevant for society.
An interesting example of this occurred at the Arena in Verona in 2019.
The American soprano, interpreting the Ethiopian princess in Verdi’s
Aida, refused to put on the theatrical blackface to ‘appear Ethiopian’, as
tradition says, claiming ‘I will not have my face made up in black, and it
will be the first time in 106 years. It is institutionalized racism’ (Manca,
2019). While this is not a debate triggered by the OH, as in the case
of Carmen, it shows that the opera is dialoguing with the present times
and its debates. Finally, the opera is also picking up new themes in newly
written operas. For instance, the new ‘Noi due, quattro’ by Elisa Fuksas
shows the alienation of people that communicate mainly through medi-
ating technologies such as mobiles and social networks and is unable to
build real and face to face relationships.
Operatic Organizational Structures
The second building block of the archetype is the organizational struc-
ture. On this topic, in 1921, the La Scala Opera House was re-founded
as an organization called an Autonomous Entity (AE), a legal personality
under public law that owned the theatre (the building) and was in charge
of organizing the activity. Resources were guaranteed by public funding,
including grants from the city and the central government, as well as
private funding, including individual and corporate contributions (Sachs,
1987). The attribution of regular subsidies was related to the recognition
of special public interest in the opera as a form of culture and national
heritage (Sicca, 1997).
Between 1929 and 1938, 11 other OHs formed AEs and were
supported by municipalities and taxes on other forms of entertainment,
such as radio and television subscription fees (Trezzini, 1994). In the
later years, the situation of OHs became critical several times when what
they did were not in public taste and they spent more than the funding
covered; the government struggled to finance OHs that were increasingly
draining resources and displaying a ‘persistent emergency state’ (Ruggieri,
2004).
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In 1967, the Corona Act reformed the system by recognizing 11 OHs
and two concert institutions for a total of 13 (this set was increased in
2003 with the Opera House in Bari). This law changed the performing
arts sector from ‘ad hoc funding’ to the regular subsidies (Sicca, 1997,
p. 205) justified by the recognition of the ‘relevant general interest’ of the
State in the OHs as ‘they enable the musical, cultural and social education
of the national collectivity’ (Law 800/67).
In 1985, law #163 introduced a new ad hoc fund for the performing
arts granted within the Yearly Budget Act of the State; this fund was called
the ‘Unified Fund for Performing Arts’ and was meant to give stability to
the performing arts organizations by securing yearly resources (Trezzini,
1994; 2006). However, funds were distributed every year among the
various organizations that produced arts; given that the plethora of appli-
cants was variable and the resources available were unstable, the goal of
this reform was limited.
A further important element defined through the AE form and the
Corona Act concerned the governance of OHs. The mayor of the city
in which an OH was located nominated the president of the OH while
the superintendent was nominated by the Ministry of Tourism and of the
Performing Arts. The superintendent was in charge of the OH activities,
supported by the Artistic Director on the matter of artistic program-
ming and performance responsibility. The duality in the leading roles
produced ambiguity (Cori, 2004) on i) the distinctive competencies they
had to have, as both sat in the board of directors, and were respon-
sible for the artistic productions and other activities of the OH and ii)
the responsibility and merit (or blame) that could be claimed for the
OH performance. The result was, respectively, that i) both figures were
recruited more for their political networks than their competencies and ii)
each claimed for himself or attributed responsibility to the other according
to the context and the advantage that could be derived with the result that
no clear responsibility was identifiable (Sicca, 1997).
In 1996, the Veltroni Act ‘Privatization and Managerialization’ of AEs
was passed after a period in which politicians contended that the state
could not afford to keep funding the increasing economic and financial
‘urgencies’ of OHs given strong budgetary constraints deriving from the
‘Maastricht parameters’ to join the Euro.
This act ruled the mandatory transformation of AEs into organizations
of private law defined as LSFs. This transformation implied two main
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changes. First, it allowed private funders to benefit from a tax deduc-
tion of 30% if they committed to give funds for at least six years. Private
funders were also entitled to sit on the Board of Directors with the State,
the Region and the Municipality if they contributed with a fund that
was no less than 12% of the total funds for at least six years. Second,
it introduced an accounting and reporting system akin to that of private
organizations that was more oriented to result and performance.
The act took until 2000 to become operational because the Consti-
tutional Court had to rule on its constitutionality, putting OHs in three
years of limbo. The Bassanini Act (2001) overcame this impasse by trans-
forming by law the OHs into LSFs and by stating the public nature of
OH despite the private legal form.
The objectives of the Veltroni Act were, essentially, not achieved, and
OHs faced increasing continuous crises. Between 2005 and 2010, five
of the 14 LSFs almost defaulted, and the Ministry took charge through
‘special commissioners’ (Ferri, 2016). Private contributions never reached
the hoped-for percentages, and later amendments to the Act reduced the
private participation quota to 5% of state funding for at least 2 years
(instead of 3).
Towards the end of 2013, the Bray Act was passed. It was meant
to respond to the needs of the many LSFs facing deep financial and
economic crises and to the reducing resources and the OHs’ inability
to manage them. It established a strict minimum performance standard,
identified in both the economic and financial structural equilibrium, to be
reached within three years and to be met by all OHs in default conditions
that wanted to access the ‘special fund’ that represented the only way to
avoid closure. The standard was intended to delineate between survival
and closure. The request to benefit from the ‘special fund’ implied the
willingness of the LSF to revise scheduled artistic programmes and imple-
ment downsizing and salary reduction if necessary. LSFs that did not meet
the standards were at first said to be destined to compulsory administra-
tive winding up and later (Act # 175/2017) to lose the status of LSF and
exit its public funding and control system to become Lyric Symphonic
Theatres with a lower level of public support. Lay-offs and salary decreases
occurred, and later laws moved the deadline from December 2016 to
December 2018 (Act # 160/2016) and then to December 2019 (Act #
205/2017) and reduced the requirements, asking for a yearly economic
equilibrium and a tangential rather than structural equilibrium of assets
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and liabilities. The actual implementation of the Bray Act by the estab-
lished deadlines would have required implementing decrees that should
have occurred at least six months before the deadline, but this never came
to fruition. This communicated to LSFs that the cut-off promised by law
was not going to be pursued as it was written.
During these changes, the opera as an organization experienced adver-
sities from different sides that challenged the idea that they should receive
public funding. The ambiguity in the public nature of the opera and the
uncertainty in the actual provision of yearly funding were at the heart
of these continuous adversities. Respectively, the 13 OHs risked default.
They faced complete shut down a few times, the last in 2014, but remain
to this day.
The objectives behind the transformation into LSFs were not achieved,
and the LSFs found themselves facing a growing crisis; between 2005
and 2010, five foundations defaulted, though they did not close. After
the reform, which led to overcoming the old lyrical institution based on
public interest, private contributions should have been the norm, but
they rarely reached the percentage necessary for achieving balance. The
numerous changes to the legislative decree n. 367/1996 that occurred
between 1998 and 2010, such as a further lowering of the partici-
pation rate of private individuals to 8% of state funding for at least
2 years (instead of 3), are only ‘buffering measures’ to solve specific
and contingent problems, and did not substantially and incisively affect
the institutional set-up, the production structure or the financing mecha-
nisms. They did, however, change the OHs dramatically, as they oriented
more to their sustainability than to their excellence, making a musician
more akin to an assembly line worker than an artist.
Operatic Professionalism: From Amateurs to Professional Artists
The third building block of the archetype analysed here concerns rules,
practices and behaviours. These often converge into professions that are
involved in archetypes (Muzio et al., 2013). The generation of AE stabi-
lized the production of operas over the years. While the laws addressed
all the institutions that organized an operatic season of more than one
month, in those theatres that were more active for longer periods, the
operatic season was extended throughout the year. Moreover, artistic
work was pushed from dilettantism to professionalism, as it could be
performed during the whole year, producing a significant increase in
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quality. In the AE, the superintendent had authority over hiring artists
or workers and the president had the power to refuse. The president, as
already said, was also the mayor and the main contributor to the OH. In
this legislative framework, the OHs in Rome, Florence and Milan worked
for the financial stabilization of their artists.
Between 1934 and 1938, two kinds of institutions related to OHs
were founded: governmental institutions that controlled the decisions and
operations of OH under the Ministry of Popular Culture and govern-
mental institutions that protected workers in theatres through unions
(Balestra & Malaguti, 2003, p. 42). The union of performing arts workers
provided general improvement of the working conditions and salary, but
it also transformed the approach of performing arts workers towards the
public, government and the OH itself. According to Pestalozza (1981)
during fascism, musicians developed a strong parasitic and patronizing
approach towards the state, exploiting the fact that the state wanted to
secure their intellectual support and offered corporate-union assistance
and an organization that allowed them to benefit from the welfare state.
The influence of this framework continued after this period. For example,
Nicola De Pirro played a primary role in the definition and leadership
of the OHs, remaining in the governmental General Management of
Performing Arts until 1963 (Balestra & Malaguti, 2003).
In the 1920s, Toscanini was the first to conceive of the orchestra musi-
cian as a professional as we understand it today. As mentioned earlier, his
pursuit of performance excellence implied the professionalism of artists as
natural (Sachs, 1987). However, the fact that many OHs worked through
‘seasons’ of half a year or shorter, with interruptions between them (Della
Seta, 1993), led to the need for many artists to have jobs for the ‘quieter
periods’. Well-known anecdotes are shared by artists and musicologists on
the matter. In the 1920s, Maestro Gui, hunting for orchestra musicians,
was told that in a nearby city there was a good trombone player in the café
by the sea in Viareggio (interview with Music Critic and Artistic Director,
Daniele Spini, Firenze, 26/09/2019). Similarly, in the choir in the Arena
di Verona in 1950, one of the tenors was the local barber that used to sing
arias out loud while doing his ‘other job’, and altos were school teachers
and hairdressers (interviews with experts in Verona, 2015–2016).
When the artist of the opera was allowed to focus on a single profes-
sion, the quality of performances greatly increased. The technical level
required to qualify for a short-list today was not even considered possible
30 years ago. For the trumpet, for instance, the mastery of the ‘double
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staccato’ is a basic technical element for a professional player today,
but was considered nearly impossible in 1960. Higher education for
artists was done in conservatories for musicians, singers and composers
and, since 1971, in universities for other aspects of the performing
arts (DAMS at Bologna University). Until the Mascagni Act in the
mid-1980s, instructors in the conservatories also worked in OHs, so
competencies for performing in OHs were acquired in regular education.
After the Mascagni Act, instructors had to opt for either the conservator
or the OH, leading to a lack of orchestral competencies and practical
knowledge of new artists. The effect was fewer young artists qualifying
for operatic jobs. Instead, they were given temporary positions with little
pay that did not include rest days over a production and began a few days
after the start of the rehearsals scheduled for a production. Indeed, this
also impacted the quality of the performance.
In social terms, the profession of the artist in the OH was respected,
at least until the 1990s. It provided prestige, recognition and paid well.
Later, a growing discussion on the budget for performing arts and culture
puts OHs in a bad light, framing OH workers as parasitic, living on
others’ ability to produce wealth. In addition, especially in technical
professions, OHs, like other fields in the cultural sector, were often used
politically as a social buffer to unemployment, with positions in excess
of what was required. For the same political reason, OH workers have
typically shown a rigid attitude towards change and negotiation and have
always claimed their contractual rights. For instance, they obtained some
integrative ‘allowances for humidity’ or ‘for black tie’, acknowledging
the special conditions of their work. In addition, strikes in OHs were
not unusual. Since 2014, with the Bray Act, salaries have dropped and
many allowances have been cancelled. Altogether, the social perception of
the OH profession has changed dramatically (interviews with Orchestra
professionals, 2016–2018).
Discussion
In this chapter, the literature on resilience was related to the litera-
ture on change in institutions, and, more precisely, in organizational
archetypes. This provides the first contribution to both streams of litera-
ture, as it establishes a link that supports cross-fertilization. Resilience was
analysed through the evolution of the opera and, as a further contribu-
tion to resilience analysis, presented a picture of resilience that accounts
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for the main components of an archetype: symbolic meanings, organi-
zational structures, professional knowledge and behaviours building a
social system that includes aesthetic, economic, legislative and sociological
aspects (Greenwood & Hinings, 1993).
From a longitudinal perspective, we showed that the opera experienced
coercive, normative and mimetic pressures in relation to disturbances that
triggered change. Laws during the nineteenth century that directed the
opera towards educational or cultural aims, and later to managerializa-
tion, introduced coercive disturbances. The role of first-in-class played
by La Scala functioned both as a source of normative and mimetic pres-
sure. Over time, the opera evolved from being a popular expression, to
elitist, to entertaining and to an educational form of culture, and from
a public system to a managerialized one where efficiency is the target.
This evolution shows the contours of a plurality of institutional logics
(Kraatz & Block, 2008; Thornton, 2004) pertaining to the opera. In the
early days, the opera reflected the logic of amusement and entertainment
that supported a market or business logic when it was a popular form of
divertissement. Then, it responded to a logic of exhibitionism related to
the need for nobles to show off their status and power when it became the
main expression of nobles and their courts. Recently, it has included the
logic of business that assumes there is a market for opera, especially for
opera reproductions of ancient cultural expressions; the logic of culture,
conceiving opera as a system of meaning that can still speak to contempo-
rary society and the logic of opera professions, supporting the idea that
the opera contains artistic excellence and performance can be cultivated
by artists.
This chapter also addresses the extent to which we can talk of resilience
when deep change occurs (Frigotto et al., 2022, in Chapter 1, this
volume) and when a long time scale is considered (Carpenter et al.,
2001). Our analysis showed that the opera went through transformative
resilience, as it was challenged in its survival and identity several times
since its birth. The opera has changed dramatically since its early days,
so much that we hardly understand the operatic works of the early days
when they are performed (e.g. Muti’s choices of openings at La Scala).
Several directions of transformation are visible, ranging from the disneyfi-
cation (fitting with a box-office/business logic) to the componentization
of opera’s pieces, including the change of ending and of performing tradi-
tions (fitting with a logic of contemporary cultural relevance). Moreover,
intense transformation was introduced by legislation towards determined
242 M. L. FRIGOTTO AND F. FRIGOTTO
managerialization and strict attention to costs and revenues in line with
the broader introduction of new public management in all areas of public
organizations since the 1990s and that triggered the opera to lean towards
the private organization model. To the resilience discourse, the most
important question concerns the continuity of essence in this evolution,
or, in other terms, if these pressures and conflicting institutional logics
have transformed the nature and identity of opera or if it is possible to
recognize a red thread across these changes.
Political assessments of the need for change in the opera have typi-
cally resulted in new laws and new nominations to the top roles in OHs.
However, our analysis showed that, despite the intent of the legisla-
tion, and compared to the intent and determination of specific actors
(e.g. impresarios or Toscanini) that acted as institutional entrepreneurs
producing and spreading change (Battilana et al., 2009; Hardy &
Maguire, 2008) or organizations within the system (e.g. La Scala) or
other institutions (e.g. fascism and its political propaganda), agency
played a limited role in the evolution of the opera and, therefore, on
resilience. For example, the objective pursued with the transformation to
LSFs was not achieved, nor was the 2013 Bray Act able to push OHs
towards efficiency and business logic. This is witnessed by the fact that
the deadlines in the Bray Act that foresaw the closing down of OHs had
to be postponed several times. Similarly, the traditional operatic repertoire
was not abandoned nor exclusively and slavishly reproduced for box-office
logic.
In our interpretation, this means two things. First, that a holistic
perspective on change is necessary, one that considers the various actors
and logics involved and puts them in perspective for an integrated
understanding of the overall outcome that might not reflect the actors’
intentions nor their design. This requires rich data and different compe-
tencies for a multifaceted understanding of actors and logics. In this
case, organization studies, musicology and music practice were neces-
sary, which are the areas of expertise of the authors. This also implies
that change derives from the interplay between the micro, meso and
macro levels and that one level considered in isolation cannot account
for change, similar to the relevance of the social scale in the observation
of resilience (Carpenter et al., 2001).
Second, the opera as an archetype has gone through a transforma-
tive kind of resilience and is still transforming but has not abandoned
its original nature of cultural and entertaining artistic expression that
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combines reflection with amusement. The latter has been ‘reproduced as
in chemistry’ (Padgett & Powell, 2012) through the staging of traditional
operas with renewed interpretations, endings and social reflections. In the
eyes of some, the latter is the essence of opera that should be treated
as the line of continuity that is preserved and along which resilience is
observed. Others instead think that the opera can only survive through
new cultural tastes and little funding by becoming keener to adapt to
contemporary entertainment. Several music critics have envisioned the
denaturing of opera in the future, given that, in several aspects, it has been
heading towards a business-driven factory rather than a cultural organi-
zation. The co-existence of these different logics may make the opera a
hybrid organization (Pache & Santos, 2010). Further, the opera maps
onto different organizational archetypes that also co-occur and whose
competition has not been solved; this situation configures archetype sedi-
mentation (Cooper et al., 1996). The transformation itself, described as
‘sweeping away’ the residues of previous archetypes (Cooper et al., 1996,
p. 625), has not taken place, given that the tension between logics and
the decoupling of OHs and the various pressures are still taking place.
change is still ongoing and only future studies will be able to analyse the
whole evolution when opera reaches its final destination.
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CHAPTER 10
Being Resilient Between the Region
and the Higher Education System? Views
on Regional Higher Education Institutions
in Estonia and Finland
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and Garri Raagmaa
Introduction
The chapter explores the resilience of regional higher education insti-
tutions (RHEIs), which must be resilient because they are exposed to
changes in the higher education system (HES), such as with policies of
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‘picking winners’ that emphasize excellence, efficiency and centralizing
resources (Pinheiro & Young, 2017; Sørensen et al., 2016). RHEIs are
also impacted by the development trajectories of their regions. However,
the literature on education system resiliency in the context of economic
development (shocks) is limited (e.g. Moran, 2016; Pinheiro & Young,
2017; Postiglione, 2011), neglecting RHEIs’ role in regional resilience.
There is a relatively wide consensus that the presence of universi-
ties stimulates economic development and improves the resilience of
regions. HEIs have a significant impact on the businesses and orga-
nizations of their region (Vaessen & Velde, 2003), opening it up to
the wider world. HEIs may serve as the global pipelines bridging
social capital, contributing to regional development (Bathelt et al.,
2004) and interpreting new ideas, knowledge and technologies. HEIs
may also assume the role of experts in local decision-making bodies
(Arbo & Benneworth, 2007), act as strategic partners and institutional
entrepreneurs (Raagmaa & Keerberg, 2017) and contribute to rural
innovation (Charles, 2016).
Typically, resilience (Chapter 1, in this volume) is divided into two
main types: (1) bouncing back to a state of normalcy after a crisis and
(2) the flexibility to adjust without crossing the thresholds of identity. For
regions, adaptive resilience, a third type of resilience, is possible (Martin &
Sunley, 2015). Hence, we are interested in the conditions that motivate
or even force RHEIs to choose their resilience strategy. A RHEI may
contribute proactively to the development of its own operational envi-
ronment, that is, the surrounding region, by acting as an institutional
entrepreneur (cf. Benneworth et al., 2017; Cai & Liu, 2020). Insti-
tutional entrepreneurs are actors that challenge existing institutions or
create new ones (DiMaggio, 1988). However, having the role of a local
opinion leader would theoretically lead RHEIs to lock in, assuming a
defensive position and losing the strategic vision of the future. Therefore,
we attempt to examine whether and under what circumstances RHEIs are
sustainable in the long run. We address the following questions:
G. Raagmaa
Tartu University, Tartu, Estonia
e-mail: garri.raagmaa@ut.ee
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• How resilient are RHEIs, and what kind of organizational strategies
do they use?
• What is the relationship between RHEIs, their locational regions and
the HE system from the perspective of resilience?
The answers to these questions are sought by conducting a qual-
itatively case study on two small RHEIs in the peripheral regions of
Kuressaare, Estonia and Seinäjoki, Finland. The case studies are a result
of a long-lasting research process in which versatile case study method-
ologies and data sets have been applied: (1) desk research of policy
documents and statistics; (2) data provided by the representatives of
RHEIs (e.g. memos, planning documents); (3) semistructured interviews
and (4) action research directly involved in the activities of the RHEIs’
directors, board members and employees.
The earliest data sets were gathered for both case studies in 2013
as a part of two projects: the TIPS programme1 in Estonia and ITU
research programme2 in Finland. These data include eight interviews for
the Kuressaare case and 11 interviews for Seinäjoki. The interviewees were
mainly local HEI leaders, representatives of local and regional authorities
and business representatives. Since then, the data have been updated and
augmented with a large number of interviews and other written and elec-
tronic material up to the year 2019. Some interviews were conducted
repeatedly, giving a longitudinal character to the case studies. In the very
end of this research process, the manuscript was commented on by two
representatives of the case RHEIs to verify and validate our theoretical
approach and empirical findings.
1 Teadus- ja innovatsioonipoliitika seire programm (TIPS) [Research and Innovation
Policy Monitoring Program], funded by Estonian Ministry of Science and Education.
2 Innovaatioympäristöjen tutkimus- ja kehittämishanke (ITU) [Research Programme
on Local and Regional Innovation Environments], funded by University of Tampere,
Regional Council of South Ostrobothnia, City of Seinäjoki, Into Seinäjoki Ltd, University
Consortium of Seinäjoki and Higher Education Fund of South Ostrobothnia.
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Theoretical Backdrop
Organizational Resilience and Coevolution in Different Contexts
Here, we construct a theoretical framework to understand how the
resilience of RHEIs may be shaped. We begin by outlining organizational
resilience, continue with the interaction of RHEI and regions and study
the role of the HES. Organizational resilience (OR) is usually defined as
the organizations’ capability to recover from external shocks. However,
this is a narrow view of resilience. More detailed and enriched definitions
exist:
Resilience is the emergent property of organisational systems that relates to
the inherent and adaptive qualities and capabilities that enable an organ-
isations adaptive capacity during turbulent periods. The mechanisms of
organisational resilience thereby strive to improve an organisation’ situ-
ational awareness, reduce organisational vulnerabilities to systemic risk
environments and restore efficacy following the events of a disruption.
(Burnard & Bhamra, 2011, p. 5587)
Here, the emphasis is not only on the individual and sudden shocks
in terms of resilience, but attention is paid to incremental changes.
Following this reasoning, OR can be understood as organizations’ capa-
bility to cope with their own operational environment over time. Coping
does not only refer to surviving or pure adaptation: it also involves the
idea of strong agency. Indeed, RHEIs are organizations capable of antic-
ipating the future, preparing themselves for it and shaping their own
operational environment. RHEIs may not only interact with other institu-
tions (formal and informal practices), but also proactively create new and
modify existing ones (see, e.g. DiMaggio, 1988) because they play an
important role in transforming social values and shaping society (Cai &
Liu, 2020).
Denyer (2017) created the ‘tension quadrant’ model on OR based on
an extensive literature review (181 academic articles). The model splits
OR into behaviours that are defensive (maintaining the status quo) or
progressive (innovating and taking risks) and those that are consistent
or flexible. These four viewpoints form an integral part of the OR ‘ten-
sion quadrant’ (Fig. 10.1). Consistent and flexible behaviours relate to
March’s (1991) organizational learning, where an exploitative type of
learning refers to efforts aimed at incremental change and continuity,
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Fig. 10.1 Dimensions of organizational resilience. Source Denyer (2017, p. 10)
whereas explorative learning is about seeking new paths aiming at more
radical changes and innovations.
Denyer (2017) identified four strategic ways of thinking about OR:
preventative control (defensive consistency), mindful action (defensive
flexibility), performance optimization (progressive consistency) and adap-
tive innovation (progressive flexibility). A resilient organization utilizes all
ways of thinking depending on the situation. Sometimes, it is crucial to
defend the integrity of an organization against external interests (Selznick,
1984), and in some situations, a more progressive strategy is called for.
The concept of coevolution means that the relationship between agents
and their environment is bidirectional. If an agent is merely adapting
to changes, the relationship is not coevolutionary. From an evolutionary
perspective, coevolution is a matter of series of variation and retention
processes (Lewin & Volberda, 1999; Sotarauta & Kautonen, 2007; Sota-
rauta & Srinivas, 2006). Coevolution calls for agency, which is also an
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integral part of OR. As Sotarauta and Srinivas (2006, p. 319) stated, ‘The
co-evolutionary view suggests that both environment and agency are impor-
tant in the course of evolution’. Agency is the link between OR of RHEIs,
that is, their strategic ways to act, and the coevolution of the determinants
constructing both the resilience of RHEIs and their surrounding region
and the whole HES.
Regional Higher Education Institutions and Regional Resilience
Regional resilience is a complex phenomenon that determines how a
region responds to a shock or disturbance and under what circumstances
it will be able to develop further. Following the 2008–2010 global finan-
cial crisis, the resilience concept began to be used in regional studies.
According to Martin (2012), a region is resilient if it can resist reces-
sionary shocks, recover quickly from them, re-orientate and renew its
growth path towards a new growth trajectory. We define the resilience
of a region as equal its capability to adapt to the changes in its economic
environment.
This kind of adaptive resilience thinking is typical for evolutionary
economic geography, which sees regional economies as continuous
adapting processes and stable equilibrium states as nonexistent (Martin &
Sunley, 2015). This is why so-called bounce-back resilience (see Chapter 1
in this volume) is not easily applied to regions. Regions adjust to new
kinds of situations, for example, by creating, diversifying and upgrading
industrial paths (Grillitsch & Asheim, 2018). This can lead to changes
in regional economic structures like the industrial mix. Therefore, the
second type of resilience—an adjustment without crossing the threshold
of identity—does not suit regions as such because there is the question of
what the ‘thresholds’ of regional economy are.
A regional economy can go through major changes, and exactly
because of this, a region can be called ‘resilient’. This is what Mart-
in’s (2012) ‘re-orientation’ means. Thus, regional resilience would be
a region’s capacity to maintain economic performances despite shocks
by adapting regional structures and functions; this can also be seen as a
‘bounce forward’ (Martin & Sunley, 2015, p. 4). Pike et al. (2010, p. 62)
studied the mechanisms of regional resilience and found that ‘adaptability’
is the key issue, which here means the capacity of a region to break free
from old paths and ability to find new ones. This also resonates well with
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March’s (1991) study of organizational learning and its concept of explo-
ration, that is, seeking new avenues and breaking with the past. Bristow
and Healy (2014) emphasized that this process of regional reorientation
calls for agency.
The components of regional resilience can be divided into five cate-
gories: (1) industrial and business structure, (2)labour market conditions,
(3)financial arrangements, (4)agency/decision making and (5)governance
arrangements (Martin & Sunley, 2015). These factors explain much of a
region’s ability to resist and recover from shocks, but also its ability to
recognize and benefit from positive changes.
Peripheral regions have many disadvantages compared with core loca-
tions. The logic of economy is mostly based on the benefits of agglom-
erations and accessibility of core regions (Isaksen, 2015). In this respect,
the resilience of peripheries faces challenges. HEIs can play a crucial role
in shaping regional resilience. Karlsen et al. (2011) and Trippl et al.
(2016) pointed out that Nordic peripheries succeeded in compensating
for organizational thinness with the institutional thickness provided by
public policies. Here, thickness refers to the presence of dynamic clus-
ters and support organizations that can help in developing new industries
based on scientific knowledge, while thinness is about the absence of
this (Tödtling & Trippl, 2005). There was a policy boom of setting up
RHEIs to enrich regional knowledge capacity in many European regions
in the 2000s (Hedin, 2009; OECD, 2007). The evolution of RHEI
networks in the Nordic countries was the result of several decades of
lasting regional and education policy, the resilience of RHEIs and their
surrounding regions developing in a coevolutionary manner.
The role of RHEIs in facilitating learning and adaptation processes
(Gunasekara, 2006) can be considered particularly vital in peripheral
regions characterized by low densities and limited access. Smallness and
remoteness can be associated with closeness and kindness—generating
rich social capital might be an advantage: capable people with a high
knowledge level empowered by high social capital and trust may increase
the benefits of a small region. The potentially good and lively commu-
nity life is often a breeding ground for innovation. In such regions, the
quadruple helix model combining HE actors, public authorities, busi-
ness community and local social community groups may be at the very
heart of knowledge-based regional development (Kolehmainen et al.,
2016). Peripheries in general—save for one-company towns that might
be extremely vulnerable—are less influenced by global shocks that arrive
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with a delay and in an already modified form. RHEIs located in the
peripheries act not only as educators and technology transfer units, but
also as institutional entrepreneurs that create new institutions and modify
entrepreneurial ecosystem (Raagmaa & Keerberg, 2017; TIPS, 2015).
Peripheral regions are organizationally thin (Tödtling & Trippl, 2005),
giving more weight to RHEIs and allowing them to convince local deci-
sion makers more easily to implement institutional changes in a shorter
time. RHEIs located in small towns tend to be relatively more active
in contributing to regional development actions. In addition, regional
leadership in policy and business have a significant role in establishing
and supporting the development of the RHEI as an initiative maker
and funder (Sotarauta, 2014, 2015). However, institutional lock-in and
ceasing development are a possible threat because of limited human
resources and the pressure of local actors of RHEIs, meaning conse-
quently a much higher role of proactive leadership than institutionally
thick well-staffed urban cores.
Regional Higher Education Institutions and the Higher Education
System
RHEIs are regional actors, but they are also a part of the national and
global HES. Analysing the resilience of an entire HES by using explicitly
the concept of resilience appears to be scarce in the literature. Naturally,
there is a plethora of studies on the transformation, reforms, change and
adaptation of the HEIs and the whole HE system (Stensaker & Benner,
2013; Stensaker et al., 2012; Vukasovic et al., 2012). However, despite
different geographical and field-specific traditions and development paths,
the university has proven to be very persistent in retaining its basic ideals,
such as its knowledge-based nature and open and genuine discourse and
interaction (e.g. Rothblatt & Wittrock, 1993). Universities are institu-
tions, not instruments for reaching certain externally set agendas (Olsen,
2007), even if entrepreneurs and even governmental bodies occasionally
criticize universities about their rigidity and far less innovative action than
society would expect.
Still, as Pinheiro and Young (Chapter 7, this volume) pointed out,
in the European context, universities are seen as strategic actors of
the knowledge-based economy. These notions call forth the ‘Hesburgh
paradox’: how traditional and rigid institutions like universities produce
revolutionary change (see Clark, 1983, p. 182). In this light, HEIs could
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choose a defensive strategy to maintain the status quo. Still, all HEIs are
not alike; there are great variations depending on size, age, profile, loca-
tion strategies and so forth. For example, there is a growing number of
‘entrepreneurial universities’ (Benneworth & Nieth, 2018; Benneworth
et al., 2017; Clark, 1998) aiming to become more adaptive and engaged
with public institutions, businesses and civil society. Even the old conser-
vative universities are changing and adapting alongside the changing
governmental policy goals and funding conditions, reflecting the more
profound changes in economy and society (see, e.g. Tapper & Palfreyman,
2011).
The HES consists of different kinds of HEIs that coevolve together.
This holds true for the RHEIs, which are only a small but a particular part
of a national HES. Pinheiro and Young (2017, p. 122) defined an HES
as ‘an emergent, self-organizational, and dynamic complex system where
the relations among the actors or agents are characterized as nonlinear,
with the relations among system elements and with other systems being co-
evolutionary’. HESs are usually permanent, and thus, it is relevant to
interpret their resilience as their capability to adapt in a changing environ-
ment without compromising their core essence and values, such as social
justice, competence, liberty and national loyalty (Clark, 1983). These
basic values may be misaligned or manifest differently in different parts
of HESs.
It is also worth noting that there are many kinds of pulling and pushing
forces within and among HEIs and within HE systems and policies.
Those forces create tensions and result in the coexistence, even coevo-
lution, of multiple, sometimes contradictory, logics. Certain approaches
are more dominant than others in certain periods of time. As Pinheiro
and Young (this volume) argued, the prevailing European HE policies
and systems emphasize short-term efficiency, instrumentalist objectives,
rankings and other managerialist practices challenging the resilient nature
of universities based on requisite variety, loose-coupledness and slack (see
also Pinheiro & Young, 2017). This may not be a good orientation for
RHEIs because they do not usually fit into the tight, managerial university
moulds because of their distinctive characteristics.
There are few other specific issues in the relation between RHEIs
and the whole HES from the perspective of resilience. First, RHEIs
are strongly engaged with local and regional stakeholders and needs.
However, they are also a part of the whole HES and have ambitions
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to influence it. On the other hand, RHEIs are institutionally depen-
dent on their ‘mother universities’, that is, the central administrations of
those universities that are responsible for the operations of RHEIs or are
members of RHEIs that are network organizations. Therefore, RHEIs
have both direct and indirect relations with the ministries and other key
institutions within the HES. However, the strategic objectives of RHEIs
and their ‘mother universities’ may differ. Consequently, especially for
RHEIs, influencing the whole HES is a delicate balance between their
own objectives and their mother universities’ objectives.
The second notion relates to the size of RHEIs. Universities have to
operate in a rapidly globalizing competitive marketplace (Olsen, 2007),
and the recent trends include merging HEIs into larger entities (see, e.g.
Välimaa et al., 2014). Large organizations tend to have better resources
to face adversities, but small organizations can have other benefits, such as
low bureaucracy, effective internal communication, quick decision making
and rapid strategic adapting (Vossen, 1998). Hypothetically, choosing a
progressive or defensive strategy depends on the size and status of a HEI.
Fairly young and small RHEIs can hardly be defensive; instead, they need
to be progressive and ‘entrepreneurial’. Naturally, this is a simplistic view
because the actual lived strategies and strategic practices are context and
time specific. Still, it can be argued that when RHEIs are belonging and
steered by ever larger mother universities, this becomes a potential source
of tensions, and RHEIs should find a way to act within the universities
and the whole HES.
Empirical Section
Case 1. Kuressaare, Estonia
Regional HEIs in the Estonian Higher Education System
The Estonian HES is the third smallest among OECD countries.
Currently, there are 20 HEIs, including six public universities, one
private university, eight state professional HEIs and five private profes-
sional HEIs. The universities run six regional units. The number of
students reached its peak in 2010 and has been declining because of tight-
ened quality requirements and demographic development in recent years.
Estonia is undergoing a period of demographic transition; the domestic
HE enrolments are falling, but the number of international students is
growing (see, e.g. OECD, 2019).
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The development path of the Estonian HES has been eventful because
of a number of reforms. There were six national HEIs in Estonia in
1990. Then, demand for market economy professionals increased, and
several mainly private HEIs were established. By 2001, there were 49
HEIs that ran 30 regional units outside the old university cities Tallinn
and Tartu. There was no national legislation or policy regulating the
creation of RHEIs in Estonia; instead, they resulted from agreements
between local initiative-takers and the universities. Setting up RHEIs in
Estonia was the result of several market-led, societal, governance and
leadership-related factors. The process was strongly supported by regional
authorities, county governments and/or city governments that lobbied
ministries and university rectors (Raagmaa & Keerberg, 2017).
Saaremaa and Kuressaare College
Saaremaa is an island in the Baltic Sea, and with its surrounding islands,
it makes up about 7% of Estonian territory and 2% of the popula-
tion (33,000 inhabitants). The distance from the county seat Kuressaare
(13,000 inhabitants) to Tallinn is 217 km, a journey of 4.5 h, including
the seaway. Saaremaa’s economy is dominated by services, but the share
of manufacturing in regional GDP is increasing. The main industries
are food, machinery, electronics, rubber and plastics. More than 70% of
industrial output is exported. The Development Strategy of Saaremaa
County has identified health tourism and small craft building as new
growth areas. The latter forms advanced R&D-based industry micro
cluster accounting over 90% of the turnover and 80% of the employment
nationwide (Sääsk, 2018). Over the last three years, some 150 new highly
qualified jobs have been created in companies involved in shipbuilding
(Saare Development Centre, 2018).
Kuressaare College of the Tallinn University of Technology (KC), the
smallest based on its students numbers, was created in 1999. Saaremaa
entrepreneurs were active in the process because they realized that other-
wise, they could not employ the necessary specialists. Seven Estonian
university colleges started joint collaborative action since 2003, and inten-
sive lobby work with the Minister for Regional Affairs resulted in a
national university college programme in 2006. The rectors of six public
universities of Estonia signed an agreement in 2008 aiming to develop
a network of regional centres of competence (Ülikoolide, 2008). As
a result, the EU-financed regional competence centres programme was
launched in 2009.
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Kuressaare College and Regional Resilience
The regional competence network of Saaremaa, led by Kuressaare
College, was created in 2009. Small craft building was agreed to be the
most promising area for smart specialization, so the Small Craft Compe-
tence Centre (SCC) was initiated (see Reidolf et al., 2011). The purpose
was to accumulate and develop related knowhow and provide better facil-
ities to train marine engineers. In parallel, the development of small
craft building curriculum started and enrolled its first students in 2010.
The proposal for EU funding was approved, and the SCC was officially
established as a part of KC in 2011.
Universities were directly communicating with regional businesses
when their local staff was conveying knowledge demanded by the commu-
nity. In return, the (business) community provided feedback and input for
education and research activities. At the heart of realizing these mutual
benefits were place-based initiatives and intensive regional networking.
Making these things happen also called for capable leadership that
convinced the community to develop a certain sector with university
support. In addition, regional partners had to find additional resources
to finance the regional activities of the universities.
In 2014, the new Estonian Regional Development Strategy endorsed
cooperation with the universities. Ironically, at this point, regional coop-
eration was no longer an urgent priority for the universities because
they were facing increasing pressure for excellence and competition for
enrolling international students and EU research grants. This has been
a challenge for RHEIs. Despite this policy mismatch, the network of
Estonian regional colleges has had a significant role in increasing the
development capacity of different regions (TIPS, 2015). College towns
have been growth centres for future-oriented industries because of the
accumulation of competences and institutions able to support ongoing
industrial transition. KC progressively and flexibly promotes adaptive
innovation, and it has a coevolutionary relationship with the region.
Kuressaare College and the Evolving Higher Education System
In 2016, a new Tallinn University of Technology (TalTech) development
plan was adopted aiming to optimize its structure. Thus, TalTech merged
KC as its smallest unit with the TalTech Maritime Academy in January
2017. The merger was also a potential threat. However, KC and SCC
continued receiving support and investments from entrepreneurs and
from the local community leaders who convinced the TalTech rector to
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continue KC and SCC’s joint activities as the Centre for Blue Economy.
Today, the SCC’s main R&D area is marine engineering and vessel hydro-
dynamics. At the beginning of 2018, TalTech appointed a professor of
naval architecture to the Centre for Blue Economy; this was the first Esto-
nian RHEI to open a professorship. In addition, the centre is developing
a new specialization on marine bioresources valorization: a product devel-
opment lab for fish farms and seafood producers. Hence, KC received an
opportunity to bounce forward after a risky period.
In small, isolated peripheral regions, the scope of HEI curricula and
research activity is usually narrow. KC has focused on the region’s
potential growth sectors. KC has regional roots and strong links to
local businesses and the community but also a close connection with
the mother university when defining the regional focus sectors (Keer-
berg, 2018). This illustrates the creativity of the HEI organization when
improving universities’ regional contribution ‘at a distance’, for example,
in generating additional finances.
The key message here is that even small peripheral regions generate
specific synergy and creativity that help universities deliver useful services
to local industries. However, this synergy can be easily disrupted. The
KC case can be characterized as a constant fight for survival when
convincing local stakeholders, national ministry officials and university
headquarters of their future operations. In this coevolutionary process,
KC adopted both progressive and defensive strategies. The future perspec-
tive of Estonian RHEIs can be characterized as unclear because of the
declining number of students, fragmented local authorities and university
management reforms.
Case 2. Seinäjoki, Finland
Regional HEIs in the Finnish Higher Education System
The Finnish HES is based on two complementary sectors: 13 universi-
ties and 23 universities of applied sciences. Traditionally, the universities
represent a top-down approach because they were owned by the state
until 2010 when they became autonomous. Universities of applied
sciences are limited liability companies owned mainly by local authorities,
and they focus on a bachelor’s level of education, research, development
and innovation activities with regional stakeholders.
Additionally, there are six (regional) university consortia (UC)
mentioned in the Universities Act, which aims to strengthen universities’
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impact on regional development. Universities see UC as a part of their
regional and societal engagement. The central government provides sepa-
rate funding for them through the coordinating university. The UC were
established between 2001 and 2003 in regions with university activities
and where there was no university.
South Ostrobothnia and University Consortium of Seinäjoki
Seinäjoki has 62,500 inhabitants, which is one-third of the population of
the region. Seinäjoki has been growing, whereas the rest of the region has
seen a decrease in the population. The distance from Seinäjoki to Helsinki
is 360 km (three hours by train). South Ostrobothnia is a semirural region
known for its production of food, metal and wood products. The level of
education (tertiary degrees) is one of the lowest among the 18 Finnish
regions. The number of companies conducting professional innovation
activities and R&D expenditures per capita has been low but growing.
The University Consortium of Seinäjoki (UCS) is located in Seinäjoki,
the centre of South Ostrobothnia. UCS was established in 2004 to
strengthen the collaboration and provide common services to the univer-
sities located in the region; it is coordinated by Tampere University
(formerly University of Tampere) because it was the first university that
established its unit in Seinäjoki in 1981 (Jumppanen & Riukulehto, 2015;
Kolehmainen & Alarinta, 2009), focussing mainly on open university
education and some practical development projects. The University of
Tampere was initially established as the Civic College in Helsinki; it devel-
oped into the School of Social Sciences and was moved to Tampere in
1960 in a wave of regional expansion of HE. In Tampere, it grew quite
rapidly and was named the University of Tampere in 1966. In 2019,
University of Tampere and Tampere University of Technology (TUT)
merged and formed the current Tampere University. Currently, Tampere
University has operations in Tampere, Pori and Seinäjoki.
The dual nature of the Finnish HES prevails also in South
Ostrobothnia. Seinäjoki University of Applied Sciences (SUAS) has 4800
full-time students and 350 staff members, and it started its operations in
1992. The University Association of South Ostrobothnia was founded in
1960 to enhance HE in the region in the hopes of having its own univer-
sity. Since then, several universities set up their units in Seinäjoki. Still, in
the mid-1990s, there was a rising concern among the central local and
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regional authorities that the rural and low-educated region was unpre-
pared for the new knowledge economy and innovation policies that were
replacing the traditional, more cohesive regional policy.
At that time, the idea of a regional university network emerged. Local
and regional development organizations and young academics from the
University Association of South Ostrobothnia and university branch units
took leadership to carry these ideas forward (Sotarauta, 2015). The
strategic conclusion was that the actual problem was not a missing univer-
sity of their own but rather the lack of competent people and skilled and
plausible academic actors (Sotarauta, 2015). Strengthening the university
activities in South Ostrobothnia called for innovative actions: developing
a new kind of research culture and cooperation between universities,
research institutes, enterprises and local organizations. In 2001, the first
programme agreement on Epanet network was signed by five universities
and local stakeholders, creating a unique partnership between regional
authorities and national academic organizations.
The core of the Epanet network is composed of fixed-term research
professors who form externally funded research groups. The aim of the
network was to create attractive working conditions for talented scholars.
One strategic choice was to focus on research and concentrate profes-
sorships on nationally new, interdisciplinary and applied fields relevant
for both Finland and South Ostrobothnia (Sotarauta, 2015). The goal
to establish 12 professorships exceeded in two years. Here, the strong
regional cooperation culture was another key issue in the model because
the main financiers were local companies, municipalities and public devel-
opment organizations (see also Kolehmainen et al., 2016). Therefore, the
Epanet model is based on several coevolutionary components between
RHEI and its locational region.
Establishing UCS in 2004 was both a regional and national venture:
it was national legislation initiated and supported by regional actors.
University units located in South Ostrobothnia conducted mostly progres-
sive strategies (performance optimization and adaptive innovation) when
following Denyer’s (2017) typology. The Epanet network, the heart of
UCS, has been the major adaptive innovation. In addition, the aim was
to secure the existence of the university activities in the region, that is,
acting defensively. Currently, there are 24 research groups led by profes-
sors and research directors. More than 80 private partners and several
public bodies are financing the Epanet network. Combining different,
mainly regional resources is one of the ways to ensure its sustainability.
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As a whole, UCS is a multidisciplinary scientific community of about 90
academics.
UCS and Regional Resilience
It can be argued that Epanet, UCS and Seinäjoki University of
Applied Sciences have contributed to the recent development of South
Ostrobothnia and Seinäjoki. The relationships between UCS and the local
and regional governmental authorities have been close and their strategies
well aligned. The key documents here are from the region’s side: South
Ostrobothnia’s Future Path (2015), Tuoreita eväitä Etelä-Pohjanmaalle
(2018) and Smart and outstanding—South Ostrobothnia’s strategy of
smart specialization (2014). Correspondingly, UCS, SUAS and Univer-
sity Association of South Ostrobothnia have their joint collaboration
strategy (Vuorovaikutuksesta vaikuttavuutta, 2013).
Through these planning processes and documents, the selected HE
activities of the region have been profiled even more clearly than before
but still hold broad focus areas aligned with the region’s industrial and
business structure. These regional strategic choices have coevolved in
close collaboration between the regional authorities and HEIs. When
planning new Epanet professorships, future orientation and support for
the renewal of the region are important criteria (University Consortium
of Seinäjoki, 2019) from the viewpoint of adaptive resilience.
As analysed above, UCS and its surrounding region have coevolved
also in terms of resilience. However, there are also some challenges.
During the last years, there has been a debate on the regional demo-
graphics, labour market and human capital. UCS has made a strategic
choice to focus on research and adult education because SUAS has
taken care of the degree programmes. Still, the major problem is
the decreasing share of 25–34-year-old people holding tertiary degrees
(Regional Council of South Ostrobothnia 2017). This is partly a national
problem, but South Ostrobothnia is especially lacking behind, resulting
in labour shortages in some key fields of the regional economy. This is
not a sudden shock or adversity but a result of many factors; hence, focus
of UCS on research and development activities and adult education has
been challenged.
In this situation, UCS has taken both progressive and defensive actions
(Denyer, 2017) or explorative and exploitative actions (March, 1991).
On the one hand, it has actively sought new opportunities to expand
the educational possibilities, for example, new bachelor’s and master’s
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programmes and ways to organize internship periods in the region. These
new developments may not be radical as such, but they clearly represent
a new phase in the development path of UCS. On the other hand, UCS
has held to its core strategy based mainly on research and development
activities and strong engagement with the regional stakeholders. In terms
of OR as conceptualized by Denyer (2017), it is a matter of adaptive
innovation and mindful action but also consistency in terms of the core
strategies and activities to maintain their identity.
UCS and the Evolving Higher Education System
The prevailing Universities Act gave the scientific universities increased
autonomy in 2010 because they were not owned by the state anymore.
However, universities are still heavily dependent on the Ministry of
Education and Culture in terms of steering and funding. Finland was hit
hard by the global economic crisis in 2008, and the last decade (2010–
2020) has been the age of austerity for Finnish HEIs. It can also be
labelled the time of ‘structural development’. The Ministry of Educa-
tion and Culture has encouraged HEIs to become internationally more
competitive to ensure the quality and effectiveness of universities’ research
and teaching, to name few objectives (Välimaa et al., 2014, pp. 45–46).
It can be argued that the government funding model has played a crucial
role in this respect. Namely, the Finnish university funding model is one
of the most performance-oriented models in the world (de Boer et al.,
2015). On the other hand, Finnish universities are expected to develop
both a knowledge-based economy and societal and civic conditions, for
example, by reducing poverty, inequality and social exclusion (Kivistö
et al., 2019).
Considerable changes have taken place in the Finnish HES over the last
decade: some HEIs have merged, HEIs’ internal structures have been
regenerated and many universities and universities of applied sciences
have reduced or discontinued their regional operations and units. The
‘structural development’ of the Finnish HES continues. The next signif-
icant change in the short or medium term might be the convergence of
HE subsystems into a more integrated two-pillar model because there
are already new kinds of ‘university corporations’ in which a scientific
university owns a regional university of applied science (e.g. Tampere
University).
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UC have a fairly stable position in the Finnish HES, but they cannot
take their position for granted because they represent the most decen-
tralized part of the university system. Currently, the core value within
the development of the Finnish HES is efficiency, not resilience (cf.
Pinheiro & Young, 2017) albeit there are signs of more balanced ways of
thinking. However, for many years, it has been more about streamlining
the system than cherishing diversity. These ideas have been transferred
from the central government and funding bodies to the HEIs themselves.
This is natural because the HES is based on certain funding principles set
by the central government, and HEIs adjust their activities to optimize
funding.
Also, UCS units are constantly under pressure to prove their utility to
their mother universities. Therefore, UCS units have made their connec-
tions to their mother universities more aligned with their main objectives.
In this respect, the high quality of scientific outputs is a key issue. From
the point of view of OR, this calls for progressive- and consistency-driven
strategies: the practices of core academic work are developed to optimally
utilize resources. However, UCS and other university consortia try to stay
original, for example, by being more agile and regionally more engaged
as the ‘ordinary universities’. It is a matter of diversity and flexibility. In
this way, they can also contribute to the resilience of the whole Finnish
HES.
Discussion and Conclusion
Organizational Resilience of RHEIs
Estonian and Finnish RHEI schemes provide an interesting organizational
model. University colleges and UC differ from traditional research univer-
sities: they are smaller, deal largely with applied studies and have proxi-
mate relations to local and regional authorities and business communities;
still, they have quite directly subordinated to their mother universities. In
addition, Finnish UC have internally diverse network structures. RHEIs
are constantly under pressure to prove their relevance and quality to the
ministerial and university superiors: the rules and standards have been
set and are controlled from outside, even if RHEIs own their local and
regional funding and other resources.
In both countries, the intensity and scope of regional partnerships
depends mainly on local and regional expectations and opportunities
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because mother universities’ interest depends largely on national incen-
tives, steering mechanisms and policies. Local businesses form a specific
stakeholder group as the collaborative partners for RHEIs. This is empha-
sized especially in the Estonian case, even if firms are very important
funders and collaborative partners in the Finnish case as well. Support
from the local and regional public organizations is also valuable. Espe-
cially in Finland, the regional public organizations are strongly committed
to support and collaborate with the academic organizations in the region.
The Resilience of RHEIs is Rooted in Smallness
As Vossen (1998) pointed out, small organizations can be agile. The
smallest RHEI in Estonia, Kuressaare, has made the best postcrisis
progress. In the Estonian case, with a less advanced legislative framework
and higher societal dynamism, leadership has played a very vital role in the
performance of RHEIs. It has been a constant fight for survival. A small
unit can be effective if there is a reasonable labour division: this small unit
cannot rely on someone else and can work more intensively because they
feel the pressure of the community. Proximity and local buzz also matter
(Bathelt et al., 2004), allowing close collaboration and the fast transfer
and interpretation of new ideas and knowledge.
Following Denyer’s (2017) dimensions of OR, we identify that progres-
siveness and flexibility are the most important resiliency strategies for
RHEIs. Estonian and Finnish RHEIs and their partner networks have
existed for about 15 years, so they are still young institutions whose posi-
tion in the HES is not completely solid, especially in Estonia, where
the whole HES has been more volatile. Innovativeness is required to
stay on par with or even ahead of traditional HEIs. However, both
cases also show the importance of history: there were several previous
higher educational bodies that paved the way for the current HEIs.
Even though progressiveness and flexibility are the main characteristics
of the OR of RHEIs, there are behaviours that are naturally defensive
(e.g. counteracting budget cuts or other clearly negative decisions) or
consistency driven (preserving strategic emphasis). It is also notable that
both cases show an evolution closer to the traditional HE ideal of the
research-teaching nexus (cf. Tight, 2016); the research activities have
been strengthened in Kuressaare, and more students will be recruited in
Seinäjoki.
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RHEIs Being Resilient Between the Region and HES
RHEIs are located at the intersection between the region and the HES.
In this position, it is possible to recognize the different components
creating the conditions for resilience strategies. Next, our empirical obser-
vations about coevolutionary processes between RHEIs, regions and the
HE system are summed up. Table 10.1 presents the key components of
the relationship of a RHEI and the surrounding region and the RHEI
and the entire HE system. Table 10.1 introduces how resilience may
appear in these relationships in the fields of governance, resources, struc-
ture and diversity, agency and leadership and competence building. These
categories are at a very general level and are applied from Martin and
Sunley’s (2015) determinants of regional resilience and are interpreted in
the context of RHEIs.
In sum, to be resilient, to survive and thrive, RHEIs must search for
balance between the expectations of their region and the HE system,
including mother universities. In this respect, RHEIs are organizations
that are constantly facing pressures to adapt their operations. These expec-
tations can sometimes be contradictory to each other, like highly ranked
scientific research and applied research in cooperation with local business.
In their processes of coevolution, RHEIs also meet a tension between
progressiveness/defensiveness and flexibility/consistency. On the one
hand, they are expected to provide novelty, but on the other hand, they
must secure the continuation of existing functions and support regional
industrial structures. The resilience of young RHEIs has been mostly
based on progressive and flexible strategies because they have been small
and agile. Because they are stabilizing and institutionalizing, they also
have more accomplishments to defend.
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Table 10.1 The coevolutionary components shaping the resilience of the
RHEI, region and HES
Dimensions of coevolution Resilient coevolution between
RHEI and region
Resilient coevolution
between RHEI and HES
Governance Trusty and reciprocal
relationships between the
RHEI and the regional
public institutions are
important for both parties.
If the relationship is overly
dependent (see, e.g. Kurikka
et al., 2018), there is
danger of a lock-in situation
(Martin & Sunley, 2006)




reduces the flexibility of
RHEIs and the whole







funding for the RHEI
alongside university or state




research funding to the
region
The HES is based on
certain funding principles
and schemes set by the
central government (see,
e.g. de Boer et al., 2015).
It is quite typical that
different HEIs will adjust
their activities to maximize
their funding. Presumably,
this reduces the diversity
and resilience of the whole
HES. RHEIs need to align
their activities with the
national funding principles
and schemes
Competence building Building competences and
increasing human capital is
one of the key tasks of
HEIs (see, e.g. Vaessen &
Velde, 2003). If the
educational profile of
RHEIs is compatible with




RHEIs, to some extent,
depend on the region’s




competences are at the core
of the success and resilience
of RHEIs and the HES.
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Table 10.1 (continued)
Dimensions of coevolution Resilient coevolution between
RHEI and region
Resilient coevolution
between RHEI and HES
Structure and diversity The structure and
specialization of the regional
industry forms the basis for
economic development and
resilience (see, e.g. Martin
et al., 2016). Matching of
the industrial structure of
the region with the
competences of the RHEI
benefits them both. The
profile of the RHEI can
also contribute to the
renewal of the region’s
industrial and business
structure to prevent
lock-in situations (see, e.g.
Benneworth & Hospers,
2008)
From the perspective of
system resilience, diversity
is key because it helps the
system adapt to a changing
and complex environment
(Pinheiro & Young, 2017).
However, there is a natural
dilemma between diversity
and the efficient use of
resources. These notions
hold true both for the
whole HES and individual
RHEIs; indeed, the smaller
institutions have only
limited possibilities to be
diverse
Agency and leadership Regional actors’ attitudes
towards RHEIs and their
capabilities to lobby for




insightful people who can
generate institutional
change and provide their
global knowledge networks
(see, e.g. Sotarauta, 2015)
RHEIs have quite limited
possibilities to affect the
whole HES system.
Nonetheless, it is a matter
of agency and leadership
that can reach out from the
regional context (cf.
Benneworth et al., 2017;
Cai & Liu, 2020).
Representatives of RHEIs
can contribute to the
discussion on the regional
engagement of universities
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Agency, Institutions and Regional Resilience:
An Approach from the Basque Region
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Introduction
Resilience is a phenomenon that has been widely studied in the context of
organizations and, in this field, it is normally understood as the capacity to
return to a previous ‘status quo’ after a disturbance. However, in the last
decade resilience has been applied to regions as a means of understanding
economic development.
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In the evolutionary economic geography literature, unlike the meaning
of the concept in engineering, resilience does not imply a return to a
previous equilibrium point or regional path but the ability of a system
or a territory to resist, adapt, respond, recover and/or renew from a
shock (Martin, 2012; Evans & Karecha, 2014). Therefore, adaptation and
evolution underline the concept of resilience. While adaptation could be
seen as a process of change in regions due to unexpected shocks, resilience
is the ability of those territories to deal with these changes on a contin-
uous basis (Evenhuis, 2017a). As a consequence, in order to observe and
analyse regional resilience it is necessary to adopt a historical perspective
as this ability should be seen in multiple episodes (Evenhuis, 2017a).
While the importance of institutions, policies and agency for shaping
regional resilience has been acknowledged in recent literature (Boschma,
2015; Bristow & Healy, 2014), this relationship remains underexplored,
especially when adopting a historical perspective (Henning, 2019). This
is mainly due to resilience being a complex and multifaceted concept,
that goes beyond the idea of adaptation. Thus, Boschma (2015) distin-
guishes between adaptation and adaptability processes, the former related
to maintaining regional paths and the latter referred to the creation of
new regional growth paths. This distinction is important in order to
understand regional resilience as each process relates to very different
types of policy rationales and attitudes of the actors involved, namely
reactivity and proactivity (Bristow & Healy, 2014).
The notion of shock or disturbance is also another important aspect
to understand the concept of resilience, as it can be referred either to
macroeconomic fluctuations such as economic recessions or structural
changes in the economy (such as deindustrialization). The evolutionary
concept of resilience is more adequate to understand how regions respond
to the latter ones but also useful for understanding the mechanisms of
change delivered to cope with economic crises (Evenhuis, 2017a). There-
fore, this chapter will deepen into the different mechanisms of change for
a regional economy to develop resilience through exploring the role of
policy and agency in the two process of change: adaptation and adapt-
ability. To do so, the chapter adopts a historical perspective to examine
how the Basque Country, an old industrial region, has been able to resist,
recover and renew itself after different shocks (economic and financial
crises) and cope with structural changes in the last forty years.
The chapter first explores the link between resilience and regional
policy, with a strong focus on industrial and innovation policies and the
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relevance of history for understanding regional development. Second,
the chapter presents different types of agency that shape institutions and
condition resilience. All these concepts will be explored in depth in a
regional case that discusses how policy paths relate to different types of
regional resilience and disentangle the role of agency in the processes of
change.
Regional Resilience and the Role of Policies
In evolutionary economic geography, regional resilience refers to the
ability of a region to deal with changes on a continuous basis (Evenhuis,
2017a). Resilience is therefore seen as a dynamic, path-dependent process.
This implies that previous regional growth paths condition future resis-
tance to, and recovery from, a shock as well as shape future available paths
(Boschma, 2015; Martin, 2012; Martin & Sunley, 2015; Martin et al.,
2016; Simmie & Martin, 2010; Webber et al., 2018). The consideration
of resilience as a capacity to deal with change needs to be investigated by
adopting a historical perspective and by studying the multiple sequential
adaptation episodes of a region to shocks, either market, competitive or
environmental (Boschma, 2015; Evenhuis, 2017a; Henning, 2019).
Regional economic resilience is a complex and multi-faceted
phenomenon. Martin (2010, 2012) distinguishes four dimensions of
resilience: resistance (ability to resist a shock), recovery (speed and type of
recovery after the shock), renewal (resumption of the pre-shock growth
path) and reorientation (towards a new growth path). Recovery can be
linked to the classic perspective of organizational resilience (Boinand &
Van Eeten, 2014) whereas reorientation is a concept which implicitly
requires exploration. As to the factors that explain the resilience of
regions, the literature has highlighted the following: the competitive-
ness and innovative propensity of regional firms, the regional economic
structure and knowledge base, knowledge networks, labour market condi-
tions, financial system and institutions such as policy measures, quality of
government, governance and social capital (Boschma, 2015; Cortinovis
et al., 2017; Crescenzi et al., 2016; Martin, 2012; Martin & Sunley,
2015).
While institutional factors are acknowledged as important in explaining
regional resilience, they are still relatively underexplored in the literature.
Indeed, Martin et al. (2016) have found a great variation across regions
in their resilience towards economic crises in Britain, something that they
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attribute to regional differences in economic structure and institutions.
Although some authors argue that regional policies are not as important
as productive specialization (Cuadrado & Maroto, 2016; Eraydin, 2016),
there is, in general, a broad agreement around the relative importance
of institutions (among which policy measures can be highlighted) and
agency in the resilience of regions.
Boschma (2015) makes a distinction between adaptation and adapt-
ability processes underlying resilience, referring to situations where
regions maintain previous economic specialization or shift towards new
paths respectively. These concepts are not far from the seminal concepts of
exploitation and exploration (March, 1991), or from those proposed by
the literature of organizational resilience, which distinguishes two types
of responses, anticipatory (static) and strategic (dynamic). The former
aims at reducing the shock impact, the latter at maximizing recovery
and renewal (Annarelli & Nonino, 2016; Billington et al., 2017). The
dichotomy proposed by Boschma can be linked to policy responses as
it confronts two very different policy rationales and attitudes of the
agents involved, namely reactivity and proactivity (Bristow & Healy,
2014). Adaptation and adaptability are also associated to the different
types of resilience needed in a region depending on the nature of the
shock. Emergencies and macroeconomic fluctuations or recessions might
require adaptation but structural changes of the regional economy such
as changes in the industrial configuration need adaptability (Evenhuis,
2017a). Nevertheless, these shocks are never isolated as for example
economic and financial recessions necessarily affect industrial configura-
tions and regional competitiveness. Therefore, adaptation and adaptability
are not necessarily opposed, they can be complementary.
Adaptation and adaptability can be linked to different public policy
interventions. A first and broad distinction has been made between reac-
tive policy measures with the aim of supporting the adaptation and
resistance to a certain shock, and proactive policy measures, aimed at
transforming the existent economy and at creating new growth paths
(e.g., measures to encourage adaptability) (Kakderi & Tasopoulou, 2017).
Policies that promote social and institutional learning, connectivity and
flexibility make regional adaptation to a crisis easier. On the other hand,
policies that foster diversity and related variety in the regional economy
do not only help to reduce the risk of lock-in but also open up new
development paths for the region. It has also been accepted that a
governance system with polycentric and multi-layered institutions, which
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promote public participation and collaboration between the different
agents, increases regional resilience (Kakderi & Tasopoulou, 2017). In
line with Boschma (2015), Fratesi and Rodríguez-Pose (2016) argue that
some factors, such as the workforce skills level or public policies, may
provoke short-term adaptation and medium-term adaptability.
However, the literature on regional resilience still lacks a typology of
policy measures and instruments. Among the reactive policy measures
to adapt and resist, we could find macroeconomic policies (currency,
monetary, labour costs) and restructuring policies (aids and subsidies to
firms, early retirement schemes…). These policies are usually adopted as
a (generally, quick) reaction towards a previous crisis or shock, and are
expected to have a short-term effect on the whole regional economy, but
they are not very effective on promoting a sustained regional economic
development (Landabaso, 2012).
Among the proactive policy measures, we might point to horizontal
framework policies (infrastructures, education, energy, internationaliza-
tion), and to STI and cluster policies (Landabaso, 2012; Nauwelaers &
Wijtnes, 2008; Uyarra & Ramlogan, 2012) that attempt to cope with
some perceived structural problems or failures in the regional economy
or to encourage processes of transformation, such as smart specialization
strategies (Foray et al., 2012). In both cases, their expected effects will be
observed in the mid to long-term.
We could say that ‘reactive policies’ (ex-post) attempt to face the
urgent and unexpected needs of the region, whereas ‘proactive policies’
(ex-ante) attempt to address some changes seen as necessary, expected or
anticipated. Regarding the effects of proactive policy measures on the
adaptation and/or adaptability of the region, they would depend on
the vertical priorities established. They can either reinforce the current
economic specialization of the region, or promote an economic diversifi-
cation, or a combination of both.
Crises and shocks may force the governments to allocate the existing
resources towards urgent needs, e.g., the protection of certain groups
from their negative consequences (unemployment, firms’ closures…); but
they can also trigger changes, in the sense that an adverse scenario may
facilitate collaboration between agents towards a shared vision and a
common goal. Indeed, some broad agendas and strategies for economic
development were born in critical junctures of crisis and/or shocks
(Valdaliso & Wilson, 2015) as crisis may be windows of opportunity
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(Kingdon, 1984; Croenewegen & van der Steen, 2007) or opportunity
spaces (Grillitsch & Sotarauta, 2018) for policy change.
Sometimes, policy measures can be framed in broader agendas for
action that allocate and distribute resources according to different prior-
ities and to the relative political power of every agent (Campbell, 2010;
Mahoney & Thelen, 2009). Agendas cannot be neutral, e.g., they tend
to benefit some agents at the expenses of others (David, 2018). Agendas
take usually the form of government programmes and are government-
led, although its leadership depends on the regional institutional context
such as the system’s governance and/or the quality of government.
Pugalis et al. (2017) indicate that economic strategies, and therefore,
agendas themselves, may reflect different dimensions or understanding of
resilience, namely resistance, recovery or reorientation, which are link to
what the authors conceptualize as conservative, resistant and evolutionary
resilience.
Regional Development and Path Dependence
Kakderi and Tasopoulou (2017, p. 1438) argue that resilience must be
studied ‘within the context of longer run processes of change and policy
options’ in the region, which are path-dependent. Since Grabher’s (1993)
seminal work, path dependence has been a concept increasingly employed
to explain regional development, initially to account for lock-in situa-
tions and, more recently, to explain the different evolutionary scenarios of
regions, e.g., why change goes in a particular direction (Henning et al.,
2013; Martin, 2010; Martin & Sunley, 2006).
Historical institutionalism has devoted a great deal of attention to the
role of path dependence and the mechanisms of continuity and change
in social and political institutions and public policies (Campbell, 2010;
Kay, 2006; Mahoney & Thelen, 2009; Streeck & Thelen, 2005). Poli-
tics is an activity subject to increasing returns and self-reinforcing effects,
where the feedback effects of past policy choices shape and condition
present and future policy developments (Kay, 2006; Pierson, 2004); and
to vested interests of the agents involved, where policy change involves
substantial technical, political and expectation costs (Gingrich, 2015; Kay,
2006). Policy measures are not simply short-term reactions to problems
or crises. They are framed within shared mental maps, policy paradigms,
agendas or discourses that have been previously adopted and maintained
by policy communities, and are difficult to change (Baumgartner, 2013;
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Kay, 2006). Finally, agency and power shape the policy process. In the
last resort, any policy adopted is a choice made by a government. But
this choice is usually the outcome of a complex process of competition,
cooperation and negotiation among the key actors involved that may
have different interests and objectives (Baumgartner, 2013; Kay, 2006;
Mahoney & Thelen, 2009). Indeed, different mechanisms of institu-
tional change can be highlighted from a bottom-up approach, in which
actors can reinterpret existing institutional arrangements to a top-down
approach in which arrangements are changed by powerful actors (i.e.
governments, not only at regional level) (Evenhuis, 2017b). Institu-
tional entrepreneurs, defined as coalitions of different actors (individual
or collective) around a common goal (Bristow & Healy, 2014; David,
2018; Martin, 2012), might be able to change institutional arrangements,
which is a more powerful source for resilience.
Isaksen (2015) distinguishes among three types of regional paths. Path
extension is a term which is related to path dependence. It refers to the
incremental upgrading of existing industry in a region by maintaining
existing technologies, which means adopting an exploitation approach
(adaptive processes) (March, 1991). By their side, path renewal and path
creation are more related to regional resilience as defined by Boschma
(2015) and denote exploration and adaptability processes although to
different extent. Path renewal takes place when industries shift towards
new but related industries and therefore it is a concept linked to related
variety (Neffke et al., 2011), which highlights that it is more likely that
regional diversification takes place in related activities than in totally
new ones. This would be the case of path creation, which constitutes a
regional shift towards industries totally new for the region or completely
new and therefore it reflects an exploration process (March, 1991). This
would imply not only the establishment of new firms or industries but
also the generation of new knowledge organizations and institutions,
including policy. This case is not contemplated in the literature of related
variety. Path creation and entrepreneurship are therefore two interre-
lated concepts, but not only referring to the creation of new industries
and firms, also to the creation of new policies and institutions. Indeed,
Kakderi and Tasopoulou (2017) argue and demonstrate with a case study
that policies that promote social and institutional learning, flexibility and
connectivity facilitate new path development and resilience.
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Agency, Institutional
Entrepreneurship and Resilience
Agency has been acknowledged in the recent literature as one of the key
factors shaping the conditions for regional resilience (Boschma, 2015;
Bristow & Healy, 2014; Evenhuis, 2017a), including dedicated policies
and institutional change. Policies are a form of institution in as much as
they are rules for actors that ‘can and need to be implemented and that are
legitimate in that they will if necessary be enforced’ (Streeck & Thelen,
2005, p. 12). In order to understand resilience in regional economies, it
is necessary to go beyond a narrow focus on macroeconomic performance
of the region and take into account its individuals, organizations, indus-
tries and/or clusters, networks and institutions involving multiple agents
(firms, workers, associations, RTOs, government and other organizations)
(Boschma, 2015; Bristow & Healy, 2014).
The importance of agency in regional resilience is part of a broader
intellectual agenda inspired by the idea of institutional entrepreneurship
(DiMaggio, 1988; Maguire et al., 2004) that has sought to understand
how actors shape the emergence of new institutional arrangements. Insti-
tutional work is referred to in the literature as the purposive action of
individuals and organizations aimed at creating, maintaining or disrupting
existing institutions (Lawrence & Suddaby, 2006, p. 215). The literature
on institutional work conceives agency as a distributed and temporary
embedded process of social engagement, whereby actors both repro-
duce and transform an environments’ structure through the exercise of
purpose, imagination and judgement (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998).
Agency is distributed across a multiplicity of actors with different inter-
pretive frameworks involved in different ways at different stages and
embedded in networks and emerging pathways (Garud & Karnøe, 2001,
2003). Actors are embedded in social structures and thus shaped by
existing institutions, yet able to purposely deviate from them (Garud
et al., 2010). It is also inter-temporal because it not only requires the
‘capacity to imagine alternative possibilities’, but also the ability ‘to
contextualize past habits and future projects within the contingencies
of the moment’ if existing institutions are to be transformed (Emir-
bayer & Mische, 1998, p. 963). Related to this temporal dimension, three
different elements of agency have been identified: iteration, practical-
evaluation and projectivity (Battilana & D’aunno, 2009; Emirbayer &
Mische, 1998). The first element (interaction) is oriented towards the
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past, and describes the ‘selective reactivation by actors of past patterns of
thought and action’ (Battilana & D’aunno, 2009, p. 46). The second
(practical-evaluative) is the capacity of actors to make practical and
normative judgements between alternative possible trajectories of action,
in response to emerging demands, dilemmas and ambiguities of presently
evolving situations. The third and final element (projective) involves an
imaginative engagement with the future.
Embedded actors shape and configure new processes and mobilize
the past to accomplish their objectives and to create new options for
the future (Garud & Karnøe, 2001). They connect the past with the
future in the form of visions or expectations, in order to attract interest,
mobilize resources, build political networks, develop technical capabili-
ties and legitimize new practices (Croenewegen & van der Steen, 2007;
Steen, 2016; Uyarra et al., 2020). The term bricolage has been used to
describe social actors purposefully bringing together resources and using
what is at hand, and eventually creating the conditions for change and
transformation (Campbell, 2010).
Agency, leadership and bricolage are present in regional develop-
ment literature in the form of accounts of ‘regional experimentalism’
and synthesized in what Grillitsch and Sotarauta (2020) refer to the
trinity of change agency driving regional industrial path development,
namely innovative entrepreneurship, institutional entrepreneurship and
place leadership. Innovative (Schumpeterian) entrepreneurs are those
seeking to mindfully deviate from existing paths and create new paths.
Institutional entrepreneurs seek to challenge existing norms, raise legit-
imacy and institutionalize alternative practices. Place-based leadership,
or civic-leadership (Brooks, 2017), involves coordinating efforts and
resources to enable new regional development opportunities.
Attention has been given for instance to the role of place-based lead-
ership or place-renewing leadership in supporting resilience of places.
Following Bristow and Healy (2014), it is a sort of collective agency
that eventually might produce an agenda for action to anticipate and
cope with external shocks and unanticipated events. Bailey et al. (2010,
p. 462) define ‘place-renewing leadership’ as ‘a form of public–private
strategic leadership that empowers institutional or social forms of gover-
nance to absorb and adjust (pro-actively and re-actively) to path breaking
economic change’. Bailey & Berkeley (2014) examined the role of the
West Midlands Regional Taskforce (WMRT) in contributing to the
resilience of the West Midlands region in the UK, severely affected by the
286 E. MAGRO ET AL.
2008–2009 economic crisis. They argued that the WMRT played a key
role in supporting two dimensions of resilience, in terms of recovery (e.g.
by helping maintain key supply chain capacity in place during the crisis)
and renewal (helping strategic firms upgrade into higher value activities
and diversify into related sectors). Tomlinson and Branston (2014) anal-
ysed how the North Staffordshire ceramics industrial district was able to
reverse a phase of ‘long decline’ through purposive adaptation and joint
action by local actors, thus arguing that ‘there is nothing inevitable about
the trajectory of old industrial districts’ (p. 502). Brooks (2017) similarly
analysed the civic leadership exerted by the Local Enterprise Partnership
of the Sheffield city region.
Agency, Institutions and Resilience
in the Basque Country
In order to explore the relationship between agency, institutions and
regional resilience we employ a case study, with a longitudinal—e.g.,
historical- and holistic perspective, which fits well with the context-,
place- and path-dependent nature of both resilience and the policy process
(David, 2018; Flanagan & Uyarra, 2016; Kakderi & Tasopoulou, 2017;
Kay, 2006; Navarro et al., 2014; Witt, 2003). Our analysis is based
on a broad array of qualitative information: official policy programmes
and agendas, reports, academic literature and interviews with the agents
involved in the policy process conducted within different research projects
developed from 2008 onwards.
The Basque Country is an old industrial region that has experienced
a successful economic transformation over the last 30 years, driven by a
highly interventionist regional government applying sustained industrial
policies aimed at promoting science, technology and innovation, with a
strong focus on industry. It is one of the most autonomous regions of
both Spain and the EU with competences and self-government in several
fields, including tax collection (Morgan, 2016; Navarro et al., 2014;
OECD, 2011; Valdaliso, 2015). It belongs to the group of technological
advanced regions in the EU, with a strong weight of the manufacturing
industry: in 2016 industry accounted for 26.3% of its GDP and 20.1%
of employment, percentages much higher than both the Spanish and
European average. Its strong industrial base helps explaining another two
characteristics: its high R&D intensity and strong export orientation.
11 AGENCY, INSTITUTIONS AND REGIONAL RESILIENCE … 287
This story of transformation goes hand in hand with an increasing
resilience of the Basque economy towards the different economic crises
the region has gone through, from the late 1970s until today (Birch
et al., 2010; Cueto et al., 2017, pp. 71–73; Cuadrado & Maroto, 2016),
and can be measured indirectly by its sustained process of catching
up and convergence with the EU-15, in GDP per capita terms (see
Fig. 11.1). At the sector- and micro-level, Basque firms, clusters and
industries have shown, too, a higher resilience than those of other Spanish
regions in the last economic crisis (Cruz-Castro et al., 2018; Elola
et al., 2013; González-Bravo et al., 2018; Holl & Rama, 2016; Valdaliso
et al., 2016; Valdaliso, 2020). Finally, the Basque Country scores rela-
tively high in the quality of government index among European regions
(Charron & Lapuente, 2018) and seems to have a good level of social
capital (Etxabe & Valdaliso, 2016), two factors that increase regional
resilience (Cortinovis et al., 2017).
Following previous works on this issue (Kakderi & Tasopoulou, 2017),
our aim is to examine the policy responses given to the main economic
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Fig. 11.1 GDP per capita in the Basque Country, Spain and the EU-15, 1980–
2016 (Source Authors’ elaboration from EUSTAT and EUROSTAT)
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40 years, the key agents involved and their impact on the subsequent
regional growth path. We have considered all types of public policies,
from different levels and domains, although only the most important
do appear in the Table 11.1. With regard to policy measures, we have
made a distinction between short-term reactive policy measures (aimed at
resisting and adapting to the crisis) and mid- long-term proactive policy
measures (aimed at promoting and/or coping with structural change).
The first type would exert an effect on that crisis, whereas the second
type could have longer lasting effects on the regional economic resilience
that would be manifest, for instance, in the next economic crisis.
However, public policies are not only reactions to external shocks, but
they are also embedded in policy processes and dynamics subjected to
path dependence, agency and power (Mahoney & Thelen, 2009; Pierson,
2004). In this way, the menu of policies available towards a new crisis is
affected not only by the existing policy paradigm in the region, but also
by its economic structure and its degree of resilience. Putting it another
way, we analyse three pictures (policy responses towards three different
economic crises) framed within a single movie (the policy process in the
Basque region over the last 40 years).
As important as the policy responses in our chapter are, the key
agents involved in the policy process and their behaviour are the primary
unit of analysis. The main agents in our case study are the regional
government, a few institutional entrepreneurs, and some RTOs (Regional
Technology Organizations) and firms. Regarding their behaviour, we
follow the typology of Bristow and Healy (2014): they may anticipate,
react or transform. We have also attempted to describe the coordination
mechanisms of this policy community: networks, coalitions, leaders and
leadership.
It should be noticed, nevertheless, that there are other factors that
may have an impact on the regional growth path not considered here,
such as the evolution of global demand. However, this is a kind of exoge-
nous, taken for granted, variable that affects all the regions within a given
economic area with similar levels of openness.
According to the evolution of GDP and unemployment, we identify
three major economic crises that can also be observed in other European
regions (Martin, 2012): that of 1976–1983, the 1992–1994 years, and
the last economic recession of 2008–2015 (see Fig. 11.2). The region
has also had to cope with three structural changes: (i) the deindustrial-
ization process that started with the first economic crisis, although only
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Fig. 11.2 GDP variation and unemployment rates in the Basque Country,
1976–2016 (Source Authors’ own elaboration from EUSTAT and Caja Laboral
Popular [1987] for unemployment, and from De la Fuente [2017] for GDP)
during the last one governments at the different levels—from the Euro-
pean Commission to regional governments—have become fully aware of
its implications for the entire economy; (ii) the transition from a closed
to an open economy during the 1980s; and (iii) the transition from
a factor-driven to a knowledge-driven economy, during the 1980s and
1990s.
Table 11.1 summarizes the history of economic crises, structural
changes and policy responses in the Basque Country over the last
40 years. We briefly indicate in the second column their main conse-
quences for the region. The third column presents the policy responses
during the crisis and/or in the following years and, if they existed, the
government agendas to cope with them. Column fourth identifies the
most important agents behind those policies in every crisis; column fifth,
the governance mechanism and the dominant behaviour of the key agents;
and column sixth, the perceived impact of those policies on the region’s
subsequent growth and policy paths.











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































11 AGENCY, INSTITUTIONS AND REGIONAL RESILIENCE … 293
The first economic crisis (1976–1983) hit hardest an economy such
as that of Spain, highly protected to foreign competition and scarcely
competitive. Old industrial regions such as the Basque Country, which
had overspecialized in a small group of sectors (iron & steel, metallic
products, machinery and transport material and equipment), faced a real
danger of lock-in. To make matters worse, the crisis went hand in hand
with a deep and radical political change in Spain, which increased insti-
tutional uncertainty, labour mobilization and, in the Basque region, a
significant rise of terrorist activities that targeted, among other groups,
businessmen and managers. The crisis resulted in the disappearance of
hundreds of firms and the loss of thousands of jobs, particularly in the
industry (Aranguren et al., 2012; Valdaliso, 2015).
The policy responses adopted were of two types and were led by
two government levels. The national government, along with some
macroeconomic measures (such as currency devaluation), put in motion
industrial restructuring and promotion programmes with the aim of
resisting and adapting to the crisis. The Basque government, which had
been created from scratch in 1980 (in the context of the new political
system in Spain, which gave considerable autonomy and competences to
regional governments), adopted some complementary measures of indus-
trial restructuring and promotion over the 1980s, to help the existing
sectors to resist, but also started new policies in the fields of technology
and energy aimed towards improving adaptability. Behind those new poli-
cies was a small group of institutional entrepreneurs that came from the
industrial sector and/or a few RTOs, led by the Ministry of Industry,
Javier García-Egocheaga. Their dominant behaviour in those years was
reactive rather than proactive. In relation to the latter, it was about doing
the same things (continuity), but in a more efficient way (exploitation,
according to March, 1991). During the early 1980s, the first regional
government built up an institutional architecture and started a policy path
that became reinforced afterwards (Valdaliso et al., 2014).
The second economic crisis (1992–1994) was shorter and more
focused but also brought about a decrease in GDP and a significant
rise of unemployment. In spite of the economic recovery of the second
half of the 1980s and the positive effects of Spain’s integration into the
EEC (European Economic Community), Basque firms still had several
weaknesses that put them in a difficult situation to cope with the new
single European market, the most important structural change perceived
as such by all the agents in the region. Like in the previous crisis, currency
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devaluation and industrial restructuring and promotion programs were
adopted. However, the Basque government took that crisis as an oppor-
tunity space to adopt a broad agenda for change and transformation,
to help Basque firms to cope with the advent of the single European
market but also to facilitate the transition from a factor-driven to a
knowledge-driven economy, centred on industry. In fact, the PGAPI’s
1991–1995, led by the Vice-President Jon Azua, who acted as a true
institutional entrepreneur (with a lot of political power), explicitly formu-
lated those challenges and envisaged a wide scope of policy measures with
the aim of improving what it already existed (path extension) and encour-
aging the diversification of the Basque economy into new related sectors
such as aeronautics, telecommunications, information technologies and
knowledge intensive business services (path renewal) (Aranguren et al.,
2012; Valdaliso, 2015). The PGAPI agenda reinforced the system’s insti-
tutional architecture and the policy path taken in the 1980s although
allocated some space for change, mainly through layering (Mahoney &
Thelen, 2009), e.g., the creation of new institutions and organizations
in the system, such as cluster-associations (Valdaliso et al., 2014), along-
side existing (‘old’) arrangements. The regional government continued
leading the policy process, although it attempted to get private business
involved through the creation of public–private organizations and even
by recruiting some individuals from the private sector to political posts in
the government.
The policy responses to this crisis and to the structural changes
the Basque economy had to cope with traced a policy path and a
strategy for economic development that became reinforced over the
sustained economic prosperity that lasted up to 2007. In a context of
growing budget and plenty of resources, new institutions and organiza-
tions (Universities, new RTOs, Innobasque and other agencies, Orkestra,
etc.) were added to the system, which became increasingly dense and
complex; and the diversification efforts continued towards new science-
based sectors such as biosciences, nano- and micro-technologies, with the
aim of driving the Basque economy towards a new, knowledge-driven,
growth path (Magro et al., 2014; Valdaliso, 2015; Valdaliso et al., 2014).
Alongside the regional government and its RDAs, firms and the existing
RTOs, new agents such as cluster associations, universities and new RTOs,
alongside new government agencies played increasing prominent roles.
Policy learning and experimentation helped to transform the system’s
governance, which became less hierarchical and more participative.
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By its length and intensity, the last economic crisis was as important
as that of the early 1980s. It also brought about a fiscal consolidation
that resulted in considerable budget cuts by the national and regional
governments. The macroeconomic policy responses were adopted by
the European Central Bank and by the national government (labour
market reform). The regional government provided, in the first years of
the crisis, financial support to help firms to resist, although not to the
same degree when compared to previous crises. The successive Basque
governments maintained the broad lines of their sustained economic
strategy and policy, strongly focused on industry as the key sector of
the Basque economy, but now adopted to the new policy paradigm of
smart specialization (RIS3). In this sense, the strong and strategic bet
on industry as the core sector of the Basque economy, sustained from
the 1980s, allowed the Basque country to resist better—in a European
perspective—the danger of deindustrialization with one of the highest
shares of industry over GDP of all the European regions (NUTS2).
Like in the previous crisis, the regional government saw it as an oppor-
tunity to initiate a process of change in some long-sustained policies
(clusters, STI [Science, Technology and Innovation], internationaliza-
tion) and in the institutional architecture and network of policy agents.
The budget cuts forced the regional government to concentrate its
economic diversification efforts towards three strategic priorities—Basque
Industry 4.0, Energy and Health—and to re-design the existing network
of cluster-associations and scientific and technological agents (Morgan,
2016; Navarro, 2015).
Overall, policy responses attempted to improve the adaptability of the
regional economy and its agents to the new scenario facilitating change
and to some extent, anticipating new challenges. The process of policy
learning in the previous period and the advances registered towards a
more horizontal and participative policy process made possible now a new
system’s governance with a shared leadership, supported by a triple helix
coalition (integrated by the government, RTOs and universities, and firms
and cluster-associations), of which the CVCTI or the steering groups of
RIS3 priorities were clear proofs.
Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter emphasizes the role of institutions, especially policy, and
agency in shaping regional resilience, understood as the capability of
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regions to resist, adapt, respond recover and or/renew from a shock
(Martin, 2012). Adaptation and adaptability processes contribute to
resilience as a regional capability to cope with both economic crises and
structural changes and therefore need to be studied following a histor-
ical perspective (Henning, 2019). This is precisely our contribution with
the long-term and holistic perspective we have taken when discussing the
Basque case, where we distinguish three main episodes and disentangle
the role of policy measures and agency to foster adaptation in the short-
term and adaptability in the medium-long term, aiming at creating new
regional growth paths as a sign of resilience.
The case effectively shows how policy shapes resilience, but it also
highlights that those policy responses are neither single nor simple.
Complexity in policy responses is also discussed by innovation studies and
sustainable transitions literature under the policy-mix concept (Flanagan
et al., 2011; Rogge & Reichardt, 2016) but this chapter goes further by
highlighting the importance of combinatorial policy processes (namely
adaptive, adaptability or exploitation and exploration), following an
evolutionary economic geography view. This supports March’s (1991)
assumption of the importance of maintaining a balance between explo-
ration and exploitation within a system perspective. Indeed, in this case,
the combination of different responses in the three crisis moments shows
how policy is context and time specific and denotes path dependence of
previous policy paths and influence from governance and power rela-
tionships within and beyond the region. Thus, in the three analysed
periods policy measures have been combined to foster both adaptation
by implementing urgent measures to the shocks and policies aiming at
contributing to adaptability have been implemented. It is also important
to highlight that the measures directed to foster adaptability over time
have led to an evolutionary policy process. For example, technology policy
in the first period facilitated the transition towards a knowledge-driven
economy in the second period, and this constituted the roots for a strong
smart specialization strategy (Foray, 2014) in the last one. These policy
responses have facilitated the creation and renewal of regional growth
paths coping not only with economic crises but also with economic
structural changes.
The case also demonstrates the importance of other types of institu-
tions, such as governance arrangements and agency in regional resilience.
It is clear that agency shapes institutions, including policy (Uyarra et al.,
2017). The relationships established from the very beginning among
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different types of actors within the region (regional government, RTOs,
firms) and beyond the region (especially national and EU govern-
ments) have shaped policy responses. However, the case shows how
regional institutions and agency have been the most important drivers
for regional adaptability and therefore for regional resilience. This high-
lights the importance of regional capabilities for resilience, in line with
the assumption of Boschma (2015) who underlined the importance
of the resilience of different units of analysis within regions (individ-
uals, networks, etc). It is also important to acknowledge the role of
institutional entrepreneurs (DiMaggio, 1988) from the very beginning,
especially from the regional government. Despite its highly interventionist
nature, the regional government facilitated the development of gover-
nance mechanisms within the region over time, thus leading to collective
agency and shared, place-based leadership (Bailey et al., 2010), which in
turn catalyzed regional path renewal and path creation.
In addition, in terms of agency the analysis shows an evolutionary path.
The case illustrates how determinant the adoption from the very begin-
ning of a practical-evaluative (approach to cope with emerging demands)
is, and especially as the regional government was created from scratch
in 1980 and therefore had no pre-existing regional institutional arrange-
ments. But what is also more relevant is that since the first crisis episode
the three dimensions of agency were present in the region. Thus, in the
1990s, the interactive dimension was present as the policy path taken in
the 1980s was reinforced; but a practical-evaluative approach was also
identified in the form of a diagnosis of the Basque economy and the
possibilities and measures to take. Finally, the projective dimension arises as
relevant because for the first time a sort of vision of the Basque economy
is proposed. The projective dimension continued in the last crisis, with
the implementation of a regional smart specialization strategy based on
related variety and the creation of new growth paths. In addition, the
case also denotes the importance of bricolage (Garud & Karnøe, 2003) in
times of crises and the ability of regional government to transfer models,
practices and experiences from elsewhere to the region (Navarro et al.,
2014). All these elements can be signalled as constituents of place-based
leadership (Bailey et al., 2010).
Recognizing the complexity of regional resilience and the lack of a
single recipe for all territories, the chapter shows the importance of
evolutionary processes in both policy measures and agency for regional
path development. Furthermore, the chapter highlights a co-evolutionary
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process (Gong & Hassink, 2019) between policy and agency as both show
a reciprocal influence. Policy seen as an evolutionary path-dependent
process shapes agency and at the same time, agency influences policy
responses. Therefore, there is not a linear causality between policy and
agency but a nested institutional context in which the different factors
co-evolve and co-determine each other.
Finally, learnings from this chapter could also inform the (organiza-
tional) resilience literature more broadly. First, as regards the importance
of combining ex ante and ex post processes (adaptability and adaptation)
and keeping a balance between exploration and exploitation processes for
resilience. Second, in relation to the importance of agency and leader-
ship for resilience. And finally, in terms of the interplay of institutions
(organizations and formal and informal rules of the game) and actors
in a co-evolving process of change, which is time and context specific
and can lead to mutual reinforcement or mutual weakening outcomes, as
described by Gong and Hassink (2019).
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on the Multifaceted Nature of Resilience
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Introduction
As the chapters in this volume have shown, resilience is a multifaceted
and malleable concept that can be fruitfully applied to a wide range of
phenomena at all levels of society. At the same time, there is a distinct
danger of concept stretching (Collier et al., 1993). In this concluding
M. Young (B)
Department of European Studies, Institute of International Studies, FSV‚
Charles University, Prague, Czechia
e-mail: young@fsv.cuni.cz
M. L. Frigotto
Department of Economics and Management, University of Trento, Trento, Italy
e-mail: marialaura.frigotto@unitn.it
R. Pinheiro
Department of Political Science and Management, University of Agder,
Kristiansand, Norway
e-mail: romulo.m.pinheiro@uia.no
© The Author(s) 2022




308 M. YOUNG ET AL.
chapter, we look at both the extensiveness of the concept, reviewing the
range of complementary concepts that have been engaged by the authors,
and at how it can be delimited to maintain conceptual distinctiveness and
explanatory value.
In the introduction of this edited volume (Frigotto et al., 2022), five
questions were identified that address translation issues arising from the
resilience concept’s importation into the social sciences. The first issue
has to do with what type of phenomena resilience entails: is it a char-
acteristic, a capability, a process, an outcome‚ and/or a philosophy? The
second derives from the context of the social realm in which things never
return exactly to the original state; there is always an element of change.
How can we allow for variance but still keep the concept of resilience
separate from other concepts that involve change? The third issue has to
do with what drives resilience in the first place. This is generally acknowl-
edged to be some sort of external disturbance, i.e. resilience does not
exist ipso facto, but it leaves open the question of how to characterize
the triggers that engage resilience and how intense they need to be. The
fourth issue has to do with the precise timing of the resilience. Is resilience
instantiated as adversity strikes, or can it be before or afterwards? Finally,
as we translate from the natural sciences to the social world, we must
address the fact that the object of resilience is no longer a material with a
clear physical and chemical makeup, but rather something social and often
immaterial that can be found at any level of society, from the individual to
the system. How can the concept effectively embrace such a broad range
of phenomena?
The process of researching and discussing the various cases in this
volume has provided several insights on how to frame the concept of
resilience as a social phenomenon. Instead of offering a new positivistic
definition of resilience, we clarify the concept by delineating it in a
similar manner as we would the phenomenon of resilience itself, i.e.
by identifying its core elements and its limits or threshold. There are
three elements in our understanding of resilience that deal with the key
questions stated above: time, essence and adversity.
To begin with, any understanding of resilience must deal with tempo-
rality. Resilience cannot exist in a single moment but always draws
together at least two points in time in which a ‘material’ or, in our case,
social phenomena is compared; i.e. resilience requires that a material at
time T2 must recognizably resemble the same material at time T0 despite
the adversity that occurred at time T1. The related notion of ‘bouncing
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back’ to a previous state, although meaningful in the context of the
material sciences, is problematic from a social science perspective where
phenomena and contexts coevolve in a dynamic manner and thus cannot
revert to a previous unchanged state. For example, as confirmed by many
world events, a counter-revolution—even when successful—cannot return
a nation state back to the state prior to the initial revolution (Padgett,
2012).
The element of time is thus directly related to the element of essence.
In the social world, objects simply do not return to the exact same state
as before a disturbance, and debating the extent to which they do or
do not seems to be particularly futile. The more relevant question is
how much change is possible within the range of resilience? For resilience
to be in play, some sort of essence must continue over time. While a
resilient social phenomenon is not exactly the same as before, it is also
not entirely different; rather, it must resemble what it was in its previous
state. Essence, however, should not be construed as a singular core, trait,
or characteristic. Rather‚ the continuity of essence can be fruitfully under-
stood in terms of family resemblance, a concept that Ludwig Wittgenstein
(1968) first used to explain our understanding of the meaning of words.
He wondered how we recognize games despite there being no common
element to all games. He claimed that there is ‘a complicated network
of similarities overlapping and crisscrossing: sometimes overall similari-
ties, sometimes similarities of detail’ (Wittgenstein, 1968, par. 66). When
we talk about the continuity of essence in resilient social phenomena, we
mean that the changes brought by adversity or the preparation for it do
not impede our ability to recognize the original material. This recogni-
tion is not based on a reductionist approach, seeking a core essence that
survives, but rather on this broader commonality. The analogy can be
slightly adapted for resilience thinking such that the resemblance is like
that of a child to his or her adult self.
Finally, we come to the issue of adversity . Again, this is not a binary
question, but rather one of intensity: how much adversity is required to
activate resilience? We argue that in order to qualify as resilience, there
must be a level of adversity that threatens the continuity or essence of the
material or phenomena at stake. Drawing on the original physics-based
origins of the concept, there must be a risk that the material could break
and thus change state or identity as a result. At what point does a forest
stop being a forest and resemble a quasi-desert as a result of deforestation
and climate change (Walker & Salt, 2006)? Again, what ‘breaking’ means
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in terms of social phenomena is not readily definable, and our purpose
here is not to positivistically define the level of adversity but rather to
delineate, that is, to rule out minor adversity as a trigger of resilience.
Returning to the five questions about translation into the social
sciences, we see that resilience can be a characteristic, a capability, a
process, an outcome, or a philosophy, but regardless of which it is, any
phenomena claiming resilience must remain within the limits that delin-
eate the threshold of the concept. Those limits can be understood as
threefold: the phenomena should extend over time, maintain a continuity
of essence, and deal with serious adversity. In Table 12.1, we summarize
the many dimensions, both divergent and intersecting, that appear in the
various chapters of this volume. This serves as a guide for the remainder
of this chapter as we draw parallels and highlight contrasts between the
previous chapters, which can help us to better understand the concept of
resilience and identify new avenues for future study.
Comparing and Discussing the Cases Thematically
Structure and Agency
Both structurationists and post-structurationists agree, though in
different ways, that structure and agency should be reconciled: struc-
ture neither occurs naturally, without human agency, nor is it entirely
the product of human agency (Parker, 2010). Structurationist theory,
building on Anthony Giddens’ work, regards structures as ‘dual’, by
which he means that they are ‘both the medium and the outcome of
the practices which constitute social systems’ (Giddens, 1981, p. 27). In
this way, structure becomes inextricably intertwined with agency. Post-
structurationists such as Margaret Archer criticize this conflation and
argue that a study of structure must analytically distinguish the two, even
if they are ontologically inseparable (Parker, 2010). The chapters in this
volume provide material to address this debate, and they also explicate a
point of commonality, i.e. structures are not only constraining but also
enabling. This is possible because they depict individuals as ‘knowledge-
able’ and ‘capable of putting their structurally formed capacities to work
in creative or innovative ways’ (Sewell, 1992, p. 4). This ability to apply
knowledge is central to the dimension of novelty and learning that we
identified in our theoretical framework for resilience in the introduction
to this edited volume (Frigotto et al., 2022).
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In each of the chapters of this volume, the authors have dealt with
both structure and agency in attempts to analyse resilience across a broad
range of social systems and organizations. The chapters differ, however,
in how they represent the configuration of structure and agency. In the
first part of the volume, we see resilience that emerges from agency in
a moment of crisis and resilience that is purposefully institutionalized
in structure through deliberative foresight activities. The fire brigade in
Chapter 2 is an example of the former. Resilience was created in the
moment as the fire raged, and only afterwards did it lead to structura-
tion—via learning—which applied the lessons of what happened in the
fire, ex-post, in order to institutionalize a more general form of resilience
for dealing effectively with future situations. A similar dynamic can be
found in Chapter 4 with the boilermakers in the naval ship construction:
resilience becomes institutionalized in the structures of the occupation as
a result of repeated interactions and negotiations that were not explic-
itly aiming to build resilience. Chapters 3, 5 and 6 provide examples
of deliberative resilience, i.e. the result of a conscious decision to create
structures that enhance resilience. Chapter 5, which looks at public trans-
port and coordination agencies, and Chapter 3, which investigates the
Austrian military, describe attempts to shape the structure first so as to
ultimately influence the behaviour that happens within it, i.e. making
the agents act in a resilient manner. In the third part of the book, we
see how structure and agency can be depicted as coevolutionary—e.g.
in Chapter 10, at universities within peripheral regions, and Chapter 11,
amidst the interplay of regional and innovation systems. In these chap-
ters, the structure and agent are deeply intertwined in a process of mutual
adjustment. Specifically in Chapter 10, we see how the region changes the
structure of the adversity context within which the university operates as
an agent; but at the same time, the impacts of the university’s decisions as
an actor also change the structures of both the higher education and the
regional systems. This dynamic is also seen amidst the interplay of iden-
tity and resilience that is central to Chapters 8 (universities) and 9 (opera
houses). Chapter 7 takes an approach more similar to those in Chapters 3
and 6, looking at the ingredients needed to cultivate resilience. It argues
for the creation of structures that constitutively embed slack, diversity and
loose coupling.
Nearly all the cases have used a model of resilience that is based on
remaining within a threshold rather than simply bouncing back. The
threshold model is particularly attuned to issues of structure and agency,
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as the threshold is a structural feature within which the agent—be it an
individual, organization or institution—operates. However, it would be a
mistake to think of the threshold as solely having a constraining function;
it also enables the agent’s identity and continuity. The threshold demar-
cates a structural boundary but does not prevent the agent from crossing
it. With and against external pressures from other actors and environ-
mental factors, the agent either remains within the threshold or crosses
(or is pushed across) it. Typically, the threshold in resilience literature
has been depicted as a fixed element; however, we see that it is in fact
malleable, shaped both by the actors themselves and other societal forces,
which are often a result of the publicness of these actors (Bozeman, 1987,
2004). The model of resilience in Chapter 1 refers to the type of resilience
in which change occurs in both the agent and threshold as transforma-
tive. Depicting actors and thresholds as both mutually and simultaneously
in flux forces us to deal with the complexity inherent in the concept of
resilience.
The concept of coevolution, which is addressed explicitly in Chap-
ters 10 and 11, comes from the literature on complex adaptive systems; it
observes that the agents in a system do not wait their turn to adapt but
are all adapting at once. Evolution then, is not a linear and synchronous
process but an emergent one in which different variations succeed based
on their fitness to interact with other new variants and the ever-changing
environment they create. It should be noted here that when we think
about evolution in a social sense, it is not purely random or blind but
involves knowledge and learning. It more closely resembles the way
breeders attempt to propagate desired phenotypic traits than the natural
selection in Darwin’s theory. Graham Room (2016) coins the term ‘agile
actors’ to refer to agents in complex social systems that can detect the
need for change and adapt themselves. Agile actors are not necessarily
resilient, as they may choose to move beyond thresholds, but resilience
requires agile actors to manage the coevolutionary pressures from other
agents and their environments to avoid crossing a threshold (see Trondal
et al., 2022, for a recent discussion linked to the public governance of
complexity under turbulence).
Grouping the Chapters on a Novelty and Temporality Matrix
As a means of taking stock of the empirical findings and their future impli-
cations, we return here to the elements or overarching principles sketched
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out in Chapter 1. Each of the empirical cases is plotted along the core
dimensions of: time (x axis) and novelty (y axis). The resulting set of four
clusters (Fig. 12.1) can then be analysed in some detail.
Four out of the 10 cases are located within the foresight stage, with the
remaining six being evenly split between mechanisms and outcomes. As
for novelty, the majority of the cases (8 out of 10) pertain to situations,
where either fully (six cases) or partly (two cases), the resilient triggers
or drivers were unknown (major), with the remaining cases split between
medium and minor levels of novelty. Four of the 10 cases (Cluster 1)
encompass more than one temporal dimension. What do these cases
have in common, if anything? All of them are public agencies, providing
valuable public services and subject to relatively high levels of political
and economic interference (‘publicness’) by external stakeholders such as
governments, funders and surrounding communities (Bozeman, 1987).
Three of the four cases pertain to higher education institutions (HEIs)
operating in increasingly dynamic and volatile environments, laden with
national and international competition (for funding and prestige), and
Fig. 12.1 Mapping and clustering the volume’s empirical contributions
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subject to regulations at the national level and increasingly at the supra-
national (e.g. EU) level (cf. Hazelkorn et al., 2018). Studies resorting
to systems thinking have shed light on the complexity inherent to HEIs
and systems, suggesting that they are deeply embedded or nested in a
multiplicity of subsystems (science, economy, culture, polity, etc.), oper-
ating at multiple levels of analysis (local/regional/national/global) that,
as a result, coevolve with one another (Pinheiro & Young, 2017). Having
historically been categorized as resilience organizations by demonstrating
the ability to adapt while retaining a sense of identity (Wittrock, 1985),
HEIs the world over are now faced with a series of disruptive challenges,
testing their ability to absorb externally driven change while retaining
a certain degree of internal stability (cf. Tapper & Palfreyman, 2010).
The remaining case in this first cluster (Chapter 2) concerns a fire-
fighter unit, which belongs to the broader category of high reliability
organization (HRO). The latter are notorious for their low tolerance
towards embracing risk, given the considerable personal and societal costs
resulting from potential disturbances (cf. Sutcliffe, 2011). When it comes
to novelty or adversity profiles, the (3) cases involving HEIs face consid-
erable external pressures for change in light of external political and
economic agendas (governments and other national and regional stake-
holders) associated with creeping ‘instrumentalization’ (Olsen, 2007).
The danger here, from the perspective of internal actors and in the
context of the overall resilience of both the HEIs and the higher educa-
tion system as a whole, relates to attempts by multiple external parties and
their vested strategic interests at co-optation (Selznick, 1966) of internal
goals and functions. Instrumentalization of higher education, studies
have shown, tends to focus on short-term imperatives associated with
managerialism dimensions like efficiency, performance and responsiveness
at the expense of critical long-term aspects (while remaining within a
threshold/retaining a sense of identity) such as diversity, autonomy and
explorative behaviour (Pinheiro & Young, 2017; see also Pekkola et al.‚
2021). Finally, one key aspect that binds together the four cases is that
for the organizations involved to provide their services to the public in
an efficient and legitimate way, they rely on high levels of trust or social
capital among societal actors (Putnam, 2001), i.e. students, parents and
local communities in the case of HEIs, and fellow citizens for firefighters.
As for the remaining (6) cases, which are located within a single
temporal dimension, two of these (Cluster 4) correspond to situations
318 M. YOUNG ET AL.
where resilience is categorized as an ex-ante process with the corre-
sponding levels of novelty ranging from low to medium to high. The
cases in question all pertain to entities centred on ensuring public safety,
within the contexts of transportation (Chapter 5) and national defence
(Chapter 3). In both cases, resilience is leveraged, on the one hand, in
the form of ‘rule-following’ and ‘routine-behaviour’—given the antici-
pated nature of adversity triggers—and, on the other, by means of ‘out
of the box’ experimentation and/or ‘rule-breaking’ in light of emerging
contextual circumstances where actors are expected to improvise in situ.
As a result, in both cases, actors act as relatively autonomous entities or
subsystems that are embedded or nested within a larger system of hier-
archical interrelations based on multiple feedback mechanisms (Walker &
Salt, 2006). Actors operate in highly stressful and volatile situations where
the ability to remain calm, i.e. handle emotions and retain a sense of
control by acting rationally, plays a key role. By covering a wide spec-
trum of novelty situations in the context of anticipation or foresight, the
cases in question adopt a processual view of resilience substantiated with
trial and error alongside habituation (cf. Kayes, 2015). This is aligned
with the notion that ‘the true antecedent of resilience is a cultural infras-
tructure, an embedded habit, which allows for responding’ (Giustiniano
et al., 2018, p. 130). What is more, from a dialectical standpoint, these
two cases reflect the existing tensions between formal and informal orga-
nizing, which are thought to be at the heart of resilience: ‘Tensions thus
become seen as sources of energy and the dialectical synthesis can be
seen as the means of benefiting from the creative energy that the tension
generates (Cunha et al., 2002)’ (Giustiniano et al., 2018, pp. 131–133).
Cluster 3 is composed of two empirical cases where the levels of
novelty are thought to be moderate, representing two specific temporal
dimensions: foresight (Chapter 6) and mechanisms (Chapter 4). In
the case of public managers (Chapter 6), adversity derives from the
ambiguous context characterizing their daily activities in the form of
complex tasks and the need to address multiple stakeholders. As rational
actors, formal managers devise a series of mechanisms to anticipate
or foresee such challenges while attempting to cope with ambiguity
and surprise; what Herbert Simon famously termed as pertaining to
‘bounded rationality’ (1991). Similarly, Chapter 4 describes how boil-
ermakers involved with highly complex and sensitive projects cope with
task ambiguity/complexity by drawing upon both tacit and codified forms
of knowledge obtained through training and experience (cf. Edmondson
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et al., 2003) in addition to shared norms and values resulting from
professionalization processes (Forsyth & Danisiewicz, 1985). In contrast
to the first case where resilience is trigged ex-ante, in the latter situa-
tion actors devise mechanisms to overcome challenging and somewhat
unexpected situations as they emerge (in-actus). In so doing, they enact
context-specific learning processes that build upon a combination of
the exploitation of existing skills and knowledge and exploration efforts
substantiated on trial and error aimed at reconfiguring cause and effect
relationships (March, 1991). Scholars have shown that, when shifting
from routine to novel learning situations, factors such as values, identities
and collective commitment—aspects intrinsically associated with occupa-
tional groups—play an enabling role (Kayes, 2015, p. 17). But, what, if
anything, brings together the two cases composing Cluster 3? First, both
situations are examples where individual and collective behaviours under
novel circumstances are structured around roles.
Roles tell organization members how to reason about the problems and
decisions that face them: where to look for appropriate and legitimate
informational premises and goal (evaluative) premises, and what techniques
to use in processing these premises […] Each of the roles in an organiza-
tion presumes the appropriate enactment of the other roles that surround
it and interact with it. Thus, the organization is a role system. (Simon,
1991, pp. 126–127)
In both empirical cases, managers—as experienced learners—play a
crucial role in enabling growth strategies at the individual/employee level
by, first, detecting possible failures or challenges and, second, by mobi-
lizing resources to tackle them while supporting their subordinates to
explore alternatives to solve novel situations. In so doing, trust and shared
norms play a critically important role, allowing individuals to benefit from
sharing knowledge with and learning from one another (cf. Kayes, 2015).
Earlier (quantitative) studies centred on the roles played by communica-
tion and trust in fostering resilience to cope with surprises like natural
disasters, health pandemics and terrorism show a significant positive effect
accrued to trust on the internal coordination of crisis communications
(Stern & Baird, 2015). In the case of boilermakers, we argue that indi-
vidual and collective learning (as well as trust) is leveraged by rotating
members in the form of temporarily assembled teams (cf. Packendorff,
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1995). In the context of organizational learning, March (1991) refers to
the importance of employee turnover, particularly in novel situations:
Rapid socialization of individuals into the procedures and beliefs of an
organization tends to reduce exploration. A modest level of turnover,
by introducing less socialized people, increases exploration, and thereby
improves aggregate knowledge. The level of knowledge reflected by the
organizational code is increased, as is the average individual knowledge
of those individuals who have been in the organization for some time.
(March, 1991, p. 79; emphasis added)
The potential for conflicts derived from the inclusion of newcomers
is minimized since, as an occupational group, boilermakers share a set
of professional norms, values, and identities, resulting in higher levels
of trust, which in turn foster knowledge sharing and learning, including
explorative behaviours centred on finding novel solutions to emergent
problems (March, 1991).
Finally, when it comes to Cluster 4, the (2) cases in question, despite
being rather different in nature, both pertain to high levels of adver-
sity with resilience mechanisms being trigged following major structural
change in their respective organizational fields. They represent circum-
stances where the systems in question, opera houses (Chapter 9) and
autonomous regions (Chapter 11), are deeply embedded or nested in
larger societal systems or ‘institutional orders’ (Thornton et al., 2012),
such as the cultural, economic and political spheres upon which they are
dependent for both resources (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and legitimacy
(Deephouse & Suchman, 2008). In this regard, both cases attest to the
ability of their respective subsystems ‘to survive and persist within a vari-
able environment’ (Meadows, 2008, p. 76). Opera houses, as fiduciary
institutions with a life and identity of their own (Selznick, 1996), much
like the Scandinavian universities in Chapter 8, required a readjustment of
the internal norms and values regulating the subsystem in light of external
dynamics and imperatives without resulting in identity loss. In this regard,
one could refer to successful adaptation in the context of disruptive envi-
ronmental change through ‘fusion and hybridity’ (Padgett, 2012, p. 125),
where old (deeply institutionalized) and new (emergent) features, shaping
agents’ behaviours and identities, were brought together and coexist to
some extent (cf. Berg & Pinheiro, 2016). By attaching new (identity)
rules to existing ones, the original rules that structured actors’ behaviours
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across the subsystem are gradually adjusted to consider emerging circum-
stances (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 16). The Basque case attests to the
importance of both path dependencies and key agents (including policy
entrepreneurs) at different levels of the national and regional subsystems
(Hay & Wincott, 1998). According to Bucheli and Wadhwani (2013,
p. 111), ‘adopting a historical approach to studying [the emergence and
development of] institutions will enhance our understanding of institu-
tions as a historical process rather than as abstract, reified structures’ (see
also Padgett & Powell, 2012). Moreover, following Fleming et al. (2012,
pp. 537–538), the Basque case confirms the catalysing role played by local
institutions in the mobilization and coordination of regionally embedded
networks of key agents (universities, forms, government agencies, etc.)
working together to enhance adaptability and, hence, the overall resilience
of the regional system as a whole.
Towards an Interdisciplinary
Resilience Framework for Resilience
Organizations and Societies
As indicated at the outset of this edited volume, the concept and
phenomenon of resilience first originated in the physical sciences, being
subsequently adopted across a wide range of disciplinary fields and
their respective epistemological, methodological and theoretical tradi-
tions. This, in turn, has led to challenges when it comes to definitions
and approaches, most notably as regards comparisons across disciplinary
domains. The chapters composing the bulk of this volume attest to this
eclecticism when it comes to definitions and conceptualization, but they
share a common interest in approaching resilience from a more systemic
or holistic perspective. The limited overlap of references among the empir-
ical chapters signals the poor cross-fertilization of resilience studies across
research areas, as well as a high specialization of studies in their respective
fields. An analysis of such references showed that chapters map onto 114
different references on resilience and that only nine of these are shared
between more than one chapter: Lengnick-Hall et al. (2011); Linnen-
luecke (2017); and Walker and Salt (2006) appear in three reference
lists, while Bristow and Healy (2014); Fisher et al. (2018); Folke et al.
(2010); Frigotto (2018); Pinheiro and Young (2017); Vogus and Sutcliffe
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(2007) appear in two. This overview supports the claim that a stronger
interdisciplinary approach to resilience is needed.
A major challenge pertains to the problem of ‘conceptual stretching’
associated with defining the limits of resilience as a phenomenon (Roe &
Schulman, 2008). As highlighted in the edited volume’s introduction
in Chapter 1, following Giustiniano et al. (2018, pp. 33–37), there are
several related resilience constructs such as agility, flexibility and anticipa-
tion that are worth taking into consideration. It is often the case in the
social sciences that even if we use the same terms, we do not necessarily
attribute the same meanings, thus definitions and clarifications are the first
necessary step to engage in cross-disciplinary collaborations.
There is an ongoing debate within the scientific establishment about
the value of and trade-offs between classic disciplinary-based inquiries and
more interdisciplinary ones (cf. Nowotny et al., 2002). One of the argu-
ments defending the latter approach is that it is more suitable to address
the multiplicity of ‘wicked problems’ (Brown et al., 2010) or ‘grand chal-
lenges’ facing humankind, such as climate change, urbanization and rising
inequality. This has led to renewed calls for a new mode of knowledge
production (‘Mode 2’) based on collaborations across disciplinary fields
in the context of problem-solving and application (Gibbons et al., 1994).
Yet, for this to be the case, it is still a requirement for interdisciplinary
teams of scientists to be composed of (‘Mode 1’) basic science specialists
in their respective domains if fruitful dialogues are to become a reality
(Broto et al., 2009). This is a necessary yet not a sufficient condition for
interdisciplinarity to bear fruit, and many other enabling factors need to
be present.
According to Klein (2000, p. 7), interdisciplinarity and specialization
are parallel, mutually reinforcing strategies: ‘The relationship between
disciplinarity and interdisciplinarity is not a paradox but a productive
tension characterized by complexity and hybridity’. In a more recent
contribution on the topic in which the author expands the discussion to
encompass transdisciplinary dimensions, attention is paid to the impor-
tance of devising a shared vocabulary that is conducive to such endeavours
(Klein, 2018). In so doing, the author underscores the pivotal relation-
ship between communication and learning, anchored in socio-cognitive
structures for interdisciplinary collaborations that are central to fostering
a culture of cooperation and communication. Given the limited scope
and ambition of this edited volume, we will primarily focus here on the
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conditions that are likely to foster integrative, interdisciplinarity arrange-
ments among social scientists in the context of resilience thinking and
scholarship.
When it comes to interdisciplinary collaborations, MacMynowski
(2007, pp. 8–9) outlines four possible scenarios, namely conflict, tolerant
ambivalence, mutual identification and cooperation‚ and transformation.
Of these, the last two are particularly relevant in the context of this
volume and future initiatives. The scenario characterized by ‘mutual
identification and cooperation’ is one where researchers agree on basic
ontological and epistemological underpinnings and analytical structures.
However, despite this convergence, the tendency here is to approach
research questions from the standpoint of a single analytical framework
associated with a specific disciplinary tradition rather than attempting to
develop a truly integrative approach that takes into consideration syner-
gies across the various traditions. This aim is achieved in the fourth
and most demanding scenario, termed ‘transformation’,1 which entails
a substantial reorientation and recombination of knowledge claims.
[Transformation] begins with recognition of a common problem at the
intersection of very different conceptual, philosophical, and methodolog-
ical standpoints. The understanding of the problem, the research design,
and the analysis recombine elements from intellectual lineages with little
similarity, past cooperation, or shared theory and philosophy […] Tradi-
tional associations with research domains, boundaries, and the distribution
of power need to be broken down and transformed. This is a multilevel,
intensive reflection and re-creation process. (MacMynowski, 2007, p. 9)
Moreover, for MacMynowski (2007), transformation requires not only
a move beyond disciplinary silos but also outside academic walls and
isolated projects to engage with multiple knowledge users and other
external stakeholders in the spirit of mutually beneficial coproduction and
co-creation (Brandsen et al., 2018).
How are we to move from sporadic collaborations towards more
integrative approaches anchored in cooperation/identification and/or
transformation in the context of resilience thinking and scholarship? For
MacMynowski (2007), this entails addressing three important dimensions
1 It is important to stress that this term should not be confused with ‘transformative
resilience’, which was discussed in the introduction and conclusion of this volume.
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or stages associated with interdisciplinary collaborations as an emergent,
dynamic, multifaceted and coevolving process (Fig. 12.2). Each stage
addresses a set of critical queries that provide the foundation to move
to the next stage while acknowledging that the process is non-linear and
thus iterative in nature.
The first stage, differentiation, sheds light on a set of epistemolog-
ical queries centred on how the (new) knowledge is generated. Pertinent
questions include, but are not limited to: Is the overall intellectual moti-
vation of the project to predict, to explain, or to interpret? What are the
goals of the project? What is the relationship between the subject/object
of research and the researchers? What are the aim(s) and purpose(s) of the
project? Ideally, the differentiation stage is undertaken at the outset, yet
it is also possible to do this at any other stage of the process, iteratively,
as research evolves and (new) knowledge is generated and reconstructed
(MacMynowski, 2007, p. 10). In the second phase, clarification, partici-




Fig. 12.2 Fostering interdisciplinarity through an iterative process (Source
Authors’ own, based on MacMynowski [2007, p. 11])
12 TOWARDS RESILIENT ORGANISATIONS AND SOCIETIES? … 325
different perspectives while addressing questions such as the following:
What are the epistemic, rhetorical or normative purposes that are at the
heart of differences in perspectives (i.e. potential conflicts) among partic-
ipants? How are validity, reliability and certainty to be determined? What
alternative research approaches (leading to different answers and perspec-
tives) are feasible? Finally, synthesis pertains to ‘the intellectual fruit after
the labour of differentiating and clarifying the research models, concepts,
and philosophies at hand’ (MacMynowski, 2007, p. 11). Critical queries
include: Is it possible to conceive of the subject/object under inves-
tigation or research system in a different way? How do the different
elements (philosophy, theory, methods) fit together or combine with
one another? What gestalt(s) can be created that otherwise could not
be if research was undertaken independently within a single discipline
or perspective? Finally, as alluded to earlier, the ‘process of differentia-
tion, clarification, and synthesis is likely to be an iterative undertaking,
repeating itself throughout research design, resolving research problems,
interpreting results, and determining conclusions’ (MacMynowski, 2007,
p. 12).
Based on our experiences, both positive and negative, while under-
taking this joint project on resilience with colleagues from different
disciplinary traditions and subfields, and regarding future interdisciplinary
endeavours centred on a better understanding of the complex and multi-
faceted phenomenon of resilience within organizations and in society, we
offer the following set of recommendations. We conducted two face-to-
face workshops over a two-year period with all the participants, and as
pointed out above, scholars from different strands need to get to know
one another and openly discuss their ontological, epistemological and
normative positions. The goal here is not necessarily to reach a consensus
but instead to foster awareness and joint understanding of the perspectives
and central postulates that drive scientific work and, ultimately, cultivate
professional identities. An open, inclusive and reflexive communication
process, as was the case with our own project, is likely (though we did
not always succeed) to result in joint learning among participants. In an
ideal scenario, the former process is anchored in shared socio-cognitive
structures, providing a robust foundation for meaningful and sustain-
able cooperation and, most importantly, identification in the form of a
distinct interdisciplinary outlook. Identification, in turn, has the potential
to provide the basic foundation for moving beyond traditional disci-
plinary boundaries, clashes of scientific paradigms, and power structures,
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substantiated in a shared respect for one another and a fair distribution
of authority or influence among the participants. Given the complexity
and historicity (temporal dimension) associated with resilience as a social
science phenomenon, by ‘participants’, following MacMynowski (2007),
we refer here to all the relevant actors, practitioners included, that both
inhabit and have an intrinsic (tacit) knowledge of the structures, mech-
anisms and antecedents underpinning resilience. Their knowledge and
insights are paramount for unveiling hidden structures and underlying
processes affecting the behaviours of social actors, individually and collec-
tively. Several empirical chapters in this volume attest to the importance
of this partnership between outsiders (researchers) and insiders (practi-
tioners), but we would argue that this mutually beneficial relationship
needs to take a more explicit and egalitarian form. All types of knowledge,
codified and tacit, are equally valuable in the quest to open the black box
associated with resilience behaviour and its direct and indirect effects on
individuals, organizations, organizational fields, institutions, and society
at large.
Finally, as far as future interdisciplinary studies on resilience are
concerned, we propose four possible directions. First, and in light of
the fact that, as open systems, all organizations are subject to external
forces (Scott, 2003) and that the cases in this volume only included
those collective actors characterized as having a high degree of public-
ness (Bozeman, 2004), future studies encompassing a broader range of
organizational types (public, private, hybrid, etc.) and degrees of novelty
(low, medium and high levels) could shed light on the extent to which
resilience antecedents and mechanisms affect and play out differently
across a broader population. Second, the volume’s empirical findings lend
support to the claim that resilient organizations are, in essence, learning
entities—even if they resort to different strategies to learn about them-
selves and/or their surrounding environments (March, 1991). Future
inquiries could, for example, shed light on the key actors, structures and
processes associated with different types of learning (and their interac-
tions) at different temporal scales—before, during and after the unfolding
of major events triggering resilience behaviours. Third, following systems
thinking (Walker & Salt, 2006), there is a need to continue to open the
black box associated with nestedness between the micro (agents), meso
(organizations) and macro (society) levels of analysis, both within orga-
nizations and across organizational fields. Most notably, it is imperative
to understand how these levels emerge, coevolve and interact with one
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another in non-linear ways. Finally, methodologically speaking, future
studies should seriously consider adopting both mixed methods (Bryman,
2006) and longitudinal design approaches as a means of capturing the
complex and dynamic essence of resilience as a property, process and
outcome.
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